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LIBERATING LAWYERS: DIVERGENT
PARALLELS IN INTRUDER IN THE DUST AND
TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD
ROB ATKINSON†
ABSTRACT
Professor Atkinson hopes William Faulkner’s Intruder in the Dust
will replace Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird as our favorite story
of lawyerly virtue. In both stories, a white male lawyer and his protégé
try to free a black man falsely accused of a capital crime. But below
these superficial similarities, Professor Atkinson finds fundamental
differences. To Kill a Mockingbird, with its father-knows-best attor-
ney, Atticus Finch, celebrates lawyerly paternalism; Intruder in the
Dust, through its aristocratic black hero, Lucas Beauchamp, and his
lay allies, challenges the rule of lawyers, if not law itself. The first
urges us to serve others in a way that confirms our superiority in a
system we have made in our own image; the second engages us in a
† Professor of Law, Florida State University. I am grateful to Paulo Annino, Sandy
D’Alemberte, Stephanie Gamble, Adam Hirsch, Tahirih Lee, Josh Morse, and Mark Seiden-
feld for their comments and encouragement. Jeremy E. Cohen provided invaluable research
assistance. I am particularly indebted to Thomas Shaffer, the pioneer student of Atticus’s eth-
ics, who not only commented in detail on my manuscript, but also shared with me his notes and
an unpublished manuscript on Gavin. The Florida State University College of Law supported
my work with a summer research grant.
In writing a paper on two bildungsromans, I have been constantly reminded of my men-
tors and my protégés, those who have taught me, and those whom I have taught. I am most
thankful for those times when the distinction has disappeared, when we have ceased to be
teacher and student, and become simply friends. That happens in only one of the novels I con-
sider; that, ultimately, is why I consider it the better.
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dialogue with those who may be able to help us make our common
world better than we alone could ever have imagined.
Beyond this comparison, Professor Atkinson invites us to wonder
why we prefer the more comforting tale to the more challenging. In his
view, the fault lies largely with contemporary legal education. Even as
that education recommends our using the law to liberate others, it fails
to free us from our own prejudices and preconceptions. Current calls
for more skills training and doctrinal scholarship both reflect and ex-
acerbate this failure. Although Professor Atkinson doubts that litera-
ture can lead us to eternal, transcendent values, he believes that it can
open us to new possibilities of personal virtue and social justice. Like
the Socratic dialogues, Intruder in the Dust makes us examine our
lives in dialogue with others. That, Professor Atkinson concludes, is
both its principal lesson for us lawyers and its best claim for elevation
in our canon.
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We know that all men are not created equal in the sense that some
people would have us believe—some people are smarter than oth-
ers, some people have more opportunity because they are born with
it, some men make more money than others, some ladies bake better
cakes than others—some people are born gifted beyond the normal
scope of most men.
But there is one way in this country in which all men are created
equal—there is one human institution that makes a pauper the equal
of a Rockefeller, the stupid man the equal of an Einstein, and the
ignorant man the equal of any college president. That institution,
gentleman, is a court.
Atticus Finch, criminal defense counsel1
“Mr. Finch, if you was a nigger like me, you’d be scared, too.”
Tom Robinson, rape defendant2
“I’m a nigger,” Lucas said. “But I’m a man too. I’m more than just a
man.”
Lucas Beauchamp, murder defendant3
1. HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 218 (1960) [hereinafter LEE, MOCKINGBIRD]
(quoted by his daughter, Jean Louise (“Scout”) Finch).
2. Id. at 207.
3. WILLIAM FAULKNER, GO DOWN, MOSES 46-47 (Vintage Books 1990) (1940) [herein-
after FAULKNER, MOSES].
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‘You’re just my uncle.’
‘I’m worse than that,’ his uncle said. ‘I’m just a man.’
Gavin Stevens, criminal defense counsel4
INTRODUCTION
William Faulkner in Intruder in the Dust and Harper Lee in To
Kill a Mockingbird have given us strikingly parallel accounts of law-
yers as liberators in the most literal and compelling sense. Faulkner’s
Gavin Stevens and Lee’s Atticus Finch work against great odds to
release innocent black clients from incarceration, where they stand
falsely accused of capital crimes, crimes attributed to them largely
because of their color. Both of the would-be liberators are presented
as progressive southerners, but southerners in good standing.5 Both
are aided by children, through whose awakening eyes we see much of
the stories.6
Yet, the stories also differ markedly. Most saliently, Faulkner’s
defendant lives to be freed from jail; Lee’s dies fleeing from prison.
In a sense, Gavin Stevens succeeds, and Atticus Finch fails—more
precisely, the former’s client saves himself; the latter’s gets himself
killed. Faulkner’s is a story of how a black man coolly uses a white
lawyer and his nephew, often very much against their wishes, to de-
liver himself from the law’s very human limitations; Lee’s is a story of
how a white lawyer and his daughter, despite their most sincere and
strenuous efforts, ultimately fail to save a black man who runs, panic-
stricken, before the law’s promised deliverance.
As the stories differ, so have their receptions. From the novels’
first appearances, critics have hailed Atticus and castigated Gavin.7
4. WILLIAM FAULKNER, INTRUDER IN THE DUST 121 (First Vintage Int’l ed. 1991)
(1948) [hereinafter FAULKNER, INTRUDER] (as spoken to his nephew, Charles (“Chick”) Mal-
lison, Jr.).
5. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Growing Up Good in Maycomb, 45 ALA. L. REV. 531, 556-57
& n.119 (1994) [hereinafter Shaffer, Growing Up Good] (describing Atticus’s insistence that
Maycomb is his family’s home and that his opponents in Robinson’s trial are their friends and
citing this as a theme in Intruder as well).
6. See Richard H. King, Lucas Beauchamp and William Faulkner: Blood Brothers, in
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON WILLIAM FAULKNER: THE MCCASLIN FAMILY 233, 237 (Arthur F. Kin-
ney ed., 1990) [hereinafter CRITICAL ESSAYS] (“At the moral center of such novels is the rela-
tionship between an adult of good will, often a lawyer, and a younger relative.”).
7. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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Hollywood immortalized Atticus in an Academy Award–winning
portrayal by Gregory Peck.8 The movie version of Intruder,9 though
directed by Clarence Brown,10 is mostly forgotten. Its favorable re-
views were principally in Europe, and principally for the role of Lu-
cas.11 Legal scholarship and bar journal articles have been full of
glowing allusions to Atticus, and the current professionalism move-
ment has canonized him as something of a patron saint.12 Gavin, by
contrast, has gotten the equivalent of an occasional see also or but cf.
In legal scholarship, however, a reassessment, if not quite a re-
versal of fortunes, is afoot. Scholars on the Left, especially those in-
fluenced by feminist jurisprudence and critical race theory, are
pointing with growing insistence to Atticus’s shortcomings,
particularly his paternalism toward blacks and women.13 From a
8. See TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal Pictures 1962).
9. INTRUDER IN THE DUST (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1949).
10. Brown directed more than 50 films between 1920 and 1952, working with such stars as
Greta Garbo, Clark Gable, Spencer Tracy, Elizabeth Taylor, and Gregory Peck. His screen
credits include Flesh and the Devil, The White Cliffs of Dover, and National Velvet. See Internet
Movie Database, Clarence Brown (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://us.imdb.com/M/person-
exact?Brown%2C%20Clarence%20%28I%29> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
11. See REGINA K. FADIMAN, FAULKNER’S INTRUDER IN THE DUST: NOVEL INTO FILM 7
(1978) (describing the film as a succes d’estime and noting Brown’s receipt of the British Acad-
emy Award for Best Director in 1949); Magills On-Line Movie Review, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, Database Magills (indicating that Juano Hernandez, who played Lucas, won two
European film awards and that the movie as a whole “was well received in Europe”). Perhaps
tellingly, the movie was panned by Time and praised by the Times. See Cinema, TIME, Dec. 12,
1949, at 98, 101 (describing the movie as a “too-earnest treatment” that is “not only dead seri-
ous, but dead on its feet”); Bosley Crowther, The Screen in Review, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1949,
at 18 (“And without one moment’s hesitation, this corner, still shaking, proclaims that it is
probably this year’s pre-eminent picture and one of the great cinema dramas of our times.”).
12. For the lawyerly equivalent of The Imitation of Christ, see MIKE PAPANTONIO, IN
SEARCH OF ATTICUS FINCH: A MOTIVATIONAL BOOK FOR LAWYERS (1996). Tellingly, the
volume of legal scholarship on Mockingbird significantly outweighs the literary. See CLAUDIA
DURST JOHNSON, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD: THREATENING BOUNDARIES 20 (1994) (noting
the paucity of literary scholarship on Mockingbird and concluding that “since 1960 a greater
volume of critical reading of it has been amassed by two legal scholars in law journals than by
all the literary scholars in literary journals”).
13. See JANICE A. RADWAY, A FEELING FOR BOOKS: THE BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB,
LITERARY TASTE, AND MIDDLE-CLASS DESIRE 337-47 (1997) (“For all its interest in empow-
ering girls and Negroes, Harper Lee’s novel finally assents to the rule of a learned and compas-
sionate elite.”); Monroe H. Freedman, Atticus Finch—Right and Wrong, 45 ALA. L. REV. 473,
480 (1994) [hereinafter Freedman, Right and Wrong] (citing Atticus’s remark that he had
hoped to get through life without taking a case like Tom Robinson’s); Theresa Godwin Phelps,
The Margins of Maycomb: A Rereading of To Kill a Mockingbird, 45 ALA. L. REV. 511, 530
(1994) (describing a “dismissive” narrative voice). Professor Monroe Freedman first ques-
tioned Atticus’s character in the popular legal press in Atticus Finch, Esq., R.I.P., LEGAL
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1992, at 20, and Finch: The Lawyer Mythologized, LEGAL TIMES, May 18, 1992,
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somewhat different direction, scholars of the law and literature
movement are discovering unexpected virtues in Gavin, or at least
looking for silver linings in what critics once dismissed as clouds on
his character.14 In the loquaciousness their predecessors found irri-
tating, scholars now note Gavin’s subtle uses of narrative to educate
his nephew and protégé, Chick Mallison.15 Even in Gavin’s more po-
litically incorrect monologues, scholars are finding the foils for his
nephew’s maturer vision of race and gender; an earlier generation of
critics detected only the crudely fictionalized conservatism of Faulk-
ner himself.16 In scholarly exchanges, Atticus’s stock is trading at
something of a discount; Gavin’s fortunes are on the rise.
These adjustments are, I think, long overdue. Moreover, as I
shall try to show in this Article, they are at once more closely and
more complexly related than has yet been appreciated. The current
revisionism is not merely a matter of exaggerating the faults of Atti-
cus, a southern liberal, and minimizing the faults of the more conser-
vative Gavin. On a crudely bipolar political spectrum, Atticus and
Gavin are not particularly far apart, and their differences seem great-
est in matters of economics, which has attracted the least attention,
and smallest in matters of race and gender, which has attracted the
most.17
What distinguishes Atticus and Gavin is less what they think
than how they act—in particular, how they interact with their black
clients and with other social outsiders. Put somewhat differently,
critical focus has shifted from the characters of Atticus and Gavin to
the stories of which they are but part. From this perspective, what
                                                                                                                                     
at 25, evoking a storm of protest that caught the attention of the New York Times. See David
Margolick, At the Bar, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1992, at B7 (discussing Freedman’s critique of At-
ticus Finch); see also JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 15 (noting efforts on the part of blacks in the
East and Midwest to censor Mockingbird on account of its “condonation of institutional ra-
cism”).
14. See, e.g., RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS 92 (1992) (finding Gavin to be an exemplary
lawyer figure in whom “there is every indication of ultimate soundness”).
15. See JAY WATSON, FORENSIC FICTIONS: THE LAWYER FIGURE IN FAULKNER 109-39
(1993). But cf. WEISBERG, supra note 14, at 84-92 (faulting the loquacity of Gavin in his earlier
appearances, especially in Intruder, but arguing for his growing appreciation of the value of
silence in later novels, especially in Faulkner’s The Town).
16. See discussion infra Part III.A.
17. See E. Grady Jolly, Feelings for Flem, Faulkner and Federalism, 4 MISS. C. L. REV.
217, 223-24 (arguing that Faulkner’s fictional lawyers, typified by Gavin Stevens in Intruder,
would have been active in the early phase of the civil rights movement, but would have resisted
the later phases, as the role of federal intervention increased).
    
1999] LIBERATING LAWYERS 607
distinguishes one story from another is less the lawyer in the story
than the place of the lawyer, and indeed, of law itself, in the story.
In Mockingbird, Atticus the lawyer takes center stage, preaching
the gospel of equality before the law. He is the prophet of New Deal-
ish progressivism, and his incrementalist, technically oriented profes-
sionalism is the new priesthood. His practice has shown him that
equality before the law is “a living, working reality.”18 Hope here lies
in the prospect that, supported by women and children, right-thinking
laymen will follow Atticus’s lead in recognizing the legal equality of
blacks, who in their turn will have the patience to await the law’s pro-
cesses. Blacks in Atticus’s world pose no threat to elite whites; the
benign songbird of the book’s title conveys the character of the best
of them, those like Atticus’s client, Tom Robinson.
In Intruder,19 Gavin’s own client places him in the background,
because Gavin’s lawyerly mindset obscures to him the novel’s central
fact: Lucas Beauchamp is not just innocent, but virtuous. Moreover,
Lucas’s virtue is from a moral order very different from that of high
school civics or Sunday School Christianity. Lucas is self-consciously
not just a man; he is a mensch, if not an Übermensch. He is not
merely the legal equal of his white oppressors; he is the moral supe-
rior of his lawyerly liberator. His very presence is an unassimilable
intrusion into the world of their inherited prejudices.
18. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 218.
19. In analyzing Intruder, I follow other scholars in making intertextual comparisons with
other Faulkner works set in his fictional Yoknapatawpha County, Mississippi. See John E. Bas-
sett, Gradual Progress and Intruder in the Dust, 13 C. LITERATURE 207, 215 (1986) (“Multiple
references [in Intruder] to Go Down, Moses and the McCaslin-Edmonds legends, of course,
invite intertextual readings between the novels.”); see also WATSON, supra note 15, at 109
(calling for intertextual analysis of Go Down, Moses and Intruder in the Dust). For the classic
statement that Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha cycle should be read as a single, unified work, see
Malcolm Cowley, Introduction to THE PORTABLE FAULKNER xi-xvi (Malcolm Cowley ed., Vi-
king Press rev. ed. 1968) (1946). Gavin appears in the final, title story of Go Down, Moses, and
he and Chick also figure prominently in the stories collected in Knight’s Gambit and in the sec-
ond and third books of the Snopes trilogy, The Town and The Mansion. Their characters are
generally consistent with their depictions in Intruder, though Faulkner’s chronology occasion-
ally falters. In The Mansion, Chick is five in 1919, see FAULKNER, The Mansion [hereinafter
FAULKNER, The Mansion], in SNOPES 681, 839 (Modern Library Edition 1994), and thus 24 on
the eve of World War II, see id. at 865. For this chronology to be consistent with that of In-
truder, which covers Chick’s life from ages 12 to 16, the novel has to be set between 1926 and
1930. But several passages in Intruder suggest a post–World War II setting. Old Nub Gowrie
and his sons share a “twenty-year womanless house,” FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at
214, and the date of death on his wife’s tombstone is 1926, id. at 100, yielding a date of 1946.
And Gavin refers both to “our atom bomb,” id. at 147, and the communist threat to what seems
to be post−Nazi Europe, id. at 211.
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Gavin is slow to see this, not despite his legal training and practi-
cal wisdom, but precisely because of them. His lawyerly profession-
alism, the skills and habits formed in years of law practice, are not
only not the solution; they are as much a part of the problem as the
more obvious racism of his redneck compatriots. The outsiders in the
novel—blacks, women, the elderly, children—teach him what he can-
not see because his vision is narrowed and lowered by “busyness.”
The outsiders themselves have not so much answers as other ways of
approaching problems. Gavin’s hope—and the hope for the future of
their shared moral world—lies in continued, mutually respectful con-
versation and openness to radically new possibilities of social order.
If this is so, then the greater appeal of To Kill a Mockingbird
may tell us something less than wholly laudable about ourselves,
those to whom it appeals.20 It suggests, in the shadow of Nietzsche,21
that we who would be liberators prefer Lee’s liberal-democratic vi-
sion at least in part because, in insisting that our job is to lift others
up, we implicitly place ourselves always above them. Before we liber-
ate them, they need us; afterward, they should be thankful to us. Ab-
stractly and formally, we are never more than equal to them; practi-
cally and historically, they are always beholden to us.22 We have it
both ways, at their expense, all the time.
Faulkner’s feudal-aristocratic vision radically reverses this ar-
rangement, very much at our expense. By identifying ourselves with
Atticus in Mockingbird, we hope to save Tom Robinson, or at least
to reap glory and honor in the trying.23 But if we dare identify with
20. See King, supra note 6, at 238 (“In general such novels [which King calls ‘racial thrill-
ers’] are moral psychodramas for moderate, well-intentioned white readers who can have their
essential moral decency reaffirmed and in turn can look down their moral noses at the back-
wardness of poor whites.”).
21.  For a discussion of Nietzsche and altruism, see infra notes 624-28 and accompanying
text.
22. See King, supra note 6, at 239 (“For the only way an oppressed people can become the
psychological equal of their oppressors is by self-liberation”).
23. This, for example, was the initial reaction of Morris Dees, founder and current director
of the Southern Poverty Law Center:
On a warm June night in 1966, I saw To Kill a Mockingbird at a local drive-in thea-
ter. . . . When Atticus Finch walked out of the empty courtroom after the jury ruled
against his client and the upper gallery, still packed with black folks, rose in his
honor, tears were streaming down my face. Why couldn’t I be a lawyer like Mr.
Finch?
Morris Dees, Foreword to PAPANTONIO, supra note 12, at 5, 7; see id. at 68 (“Are there any
among us who would not trade several million dollar verdicts for such an expression of appre-
ciation and admiration?”); Timothy L. Hall, Moral Character, the Practice of Law, and Legal
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Gavin in Intruder, we risk despair of being Lucas Beauchamp and
resentment at having to be his instrument, the means by which he
transcends not just the redneck rabble, but also us. And yet there is
here, too, a positive message, and a very ancient, even religious one,
one that Nietzsche—perhaps caught in his own ressentiment—never
saw.24 To be humbled is not necessarily to be humiliated, and to insist
on the virtue of humility is not necessarily either to assume a false
pride or to abase the properly proud. We can do our part, which may
not be the center and certainly will not be the whole. In more tradi-
tionally religious terms, we can be thankful that we are the means of
grace, not resentful that we are not the messiah, or God.25
And there is also, I believe, something more generally salutary
about the new appreciation for the relative merits of Intruder in the
Dust. When all is finally weighed in the balance, Mockingbird is a
much lighter tale.26 Before its Pulitzer Prize triumph and Hollywood
apotheosis, it could be seen as “respectable hammock reading.”27 The
fact that legal scholars are now digesting meatier fare (or, if you pre-
fer, more complex carbohydrates) bodes well for legal education
now, and for law itself, in the long run. In law and in life, as in In-
truder in the Dust, the hard questions do not have simple answers,
                                                                                                                                     
Education, 60 MISS. L.J. 511, 519 (1990) (“We want a lawyer-hero, and by the time the book is
over we have one in Atticus’ defense of Robinson”).
24. It is also a message consistent with, if not rediscovered by, some branches of feminism,
at least as early as George Eliot’s concluding elegy to Dorothea in her novel Middlemarch.
25. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 86-96
(1991) [hereinafter SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS] (criticizing traditional gentleman-lawyer
ethics for elevating “mere optimism” above “hope” and truth, and for emphasizing the gentle-
man-lawyer’s skill at protecting the client from suffering instead of manifesting the Christian
“hope” that the fate of others is in the hands of “the Ruler of the Universe”). As I have urged
elsewhere, one can find insight in Shaffer’s traditional religious terminology without embracing
any particular theological orthodoxy or theism in any form. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s
Commentary of the Professional Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 269 (1995); Rob Atkinson, How
the Butler Was Made to Do It: The Perverted Professionalism of The Remains of the Day, 105
YALE L.J. 177, 181 n.14 (1995) [hereinafter Atkinson, Butler].
26. Flannery O’Connor, in the candor of a private letter, put the matter more bluntly, ex-
plaining Mockingbird’s popularity “by the fact that it is a child’s book and that the average
American reads on a child’s level.” Letter from Flannery O’Connor to Caroline Ivey (Aug. 20,
1961), quoted in Jerry Elijah Brown, Introduction to CAROLINE IVEY, THE FAMILY vii, xv
(1991); see also Gregory J. Sullivan, Children into Men: Lawyers and the Law in Three Novels,
37 CATH. LAW. 29, 38 (1996) (“However much Atticus is and ought to be an ideal figure for a
lawyer, the triumph of the child’s vision leaves To Kill a Mockingbird bereft of an enduring
moral resonance.”).
27. Phoebe Adams, Reader’s Choice, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 1960, at 98. There is, however,
some evidence that the reviewer’s reading was in fact done in a hammock. According to the
reviewer, “[t]he book’s setting is a small town in Mississippi.” Id. According to the novel, Ms.
Lee’s Maycomb is in Alabama.
    
610 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [49:601
and the best answers are not always those our predecessors have
given us. If we are to wrestle satisfactorily with those issues, we, like
Gavin’s nephew, Chick, must look for help to those mentors who
have shown us how to move beyond their traditional solutions. That,
of course, is what the Socratic method is ultimately supposed to teach
us.
Applied to the books we have before us, that method strongly
suggests that Faulkner’s Intruder should displace Lee’s Mockingbird
in the canon of lawyers’ inspirational literature. Part I of this Article
examines in detail the diverging parallels of Intruder and Mocking-
bird. It begins in Section I.A by looking at their treatments of hospi-
tality, a critical and recurrent theme in both novels that establishes
very different social frameworks and patterns of relationships be-
tween the characters. Against this background, Section I.B analyzes
the characters of the stories’ main black figures, particularly how
their strikingly dissimilar natures produce parallel problems with the
law. Section I.C examines the relationships between these black cli-
ents and their lawyers. Section I.D widens our perspective to explore
how the lawyers interact with various sets of outsiders: women,
blacks, lower-class whites, children, and the North. Part I concludes
with an examination of the relationship between lawyers and the law,
one of lawyers’ principal means of interaction with each outsider
group. Part II draws lessons from these comparisons for the law and
literature movement, especially its effort to find transcendent moral
norms in literature and to listen to traditionally excluded voices. Fi-
nally, Part III turns the analytic lens around, moving from a focus on
what literature can tell us about how to be to a more introspective
look at what our choice of literature tells us about who we have been,
who we are, and who we may become.
I. THE DIVERGING PARALLELS
A. The Setting: Southern Hospitality
The characters in both novels enact their complex social rela-
tions against a sharply defined background of Depression-era28
southern hospitality. We shall examine class and race relations more
28. Although it is clear that Mockingbird is set in the Depression, see, e.g., LEE,
MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 217 (referring to “this year of grace, 1935”), there are inconsis-
tencies in the chronology of Intruder, see supra note 19.
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systematically below,29 but the reciprocal rituals of guest and host
serve as a useful introduction to the realities of social order, reflect-
ing who takes precedence and who owes deference. These rituals re-
veal a pervasive tradition of noblesse oblige, and breaches of hospi-
tality signal fundamental problems in social relations. The most
fundamental problem in both novels is how to incorporate blacks into
the system. Both stories are thus set firmly on a foundation of south-
ern hospitality, a foundation dangerously astride the fault line of ra-
cial injustice.
Yet, on deeper inspection, the novels’ fundamental structures of
hospitality differ profoundly. As Alasdair MacIntyre has shown, the
moral culture of the West is a sedimentary affair, comprising various
layers of values laid down over wide stretches of time and sometimes
brought into peculiar juxtaposition by normative shifts of seismic
proportions.30 Traditional southern culture, as seen in the hospitalities
of both books, rests on two very distinct premodern traditions. Both
of these traditions coexist in considerable tension, not just with the
South’s Jeffersonian, Enlightenment heritage, but also with each
other.
The uppermost stratum is the Christianized chivalrous tradition
of the European Middle Ages.31 Beneath that tradition, itself quite
old, are even earlier strata, the barely remembered, semi-barbarous
heroic ages reflected, for example, in the Homeric epics, the chroni-
cles of pre−Exilic Israel, and the Icelandic sagas.32 Medieval Europe
struggled, with only partial success, to Christianize and incorporate
these earlier traditions,33 and the untidy edges are evident in the sto-
ries under consideration.
29. See infra Part I.D.2.
30. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 2-4 (2d ed. 1984) (describing how
through the historical process of “one [conception of] morality succeeding another,” we have
arrived at a point where “the language of morality is in [a] state of grave disorder”). See gener-
ally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE, WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988) (discussing how
the concepts of justice and rational action have evolved throughout Western philosophical his-
tory).
31. See W.J. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH ix (1969) (“[T]he gentlemanly idea . . . had
taken refuge in the South and fashioned for itself a world to its heart’s desire: a world singularly
polished and mellow and poised, wholly dominated by ideals of honor and chivalry and no-
blesse . . . .”).
32. See infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
33. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 30, at 166 (explaining how in European
literature from the Middle Ages, “Christian and pagan elements coexisted in varying degrees of
compromise and tension”).
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Atticus, the moral center of Lee’s novel, weds the later, Chris-
tian chivalrous tradition with the legal regime of modern liberal de-
mocracy. These are more or less contiguous strata, and the friction
between them is not especially great. The same fault line of racism
runs through them both, but in the novel it never yawns very wide,
barely reaching progressive liberals like Atticus at the top. Lucas, the
focus of Faulkner’s novel, points both farther back, to the pre-
Christian epics, and farther forward, to a Nietzschean transcendence
of liberal egalitarianism. Lucas’s volatile brand of heroism is thus dis-
ruptive in two directions. It threatens to erupt through the weakest
points of both traditional southern culture, with its rejection of black
aristocrats, and modern egalitarianism, with its embarrassment at in-
dividual superiority of any color.
Thus, the ceremonies of hospitality in the two novels teach very
different lessons about who the nobles are—indeed, about what no-
bility is—and about who is beholden to whom. Lawyers in both nov-
els come from the white plantation-owning aristocracy and are its
presumptive co-heirs to social precedence. In Mockingbird, this basic
position is affirmed, with a heavy emphasis on white professionals’
concurrent obligations to social inferiors. It is among the latter that
most of the racial tension occurs. Blacks’ principal status claim di-
rectly threatens only the very lowest class of whites. In Intruder, by
contrast, the social superiority of the white professional class is itself
radically challenged.
In the final analysis, what really matters is not so much who’s
coming to dinner, as in what capacity. Tom Robinson merely seeks to
be allowed to serve leftovers to the lowest of the low;34 Lucas Beau-
champ conveys the unmistakable impression that he should sit at the
head of the table, as lord of the feast.
1. The Heroic Ethos of Intruder in the Dust. Two instances of
hospitality in the opening chapter of Intruder establish the feudal-
aristocratic background for the story. In the first, Carothers
Edmonds, owner of the two-thousand-acre McCaslin Place, his great-
grandfather’s plantation, comes seventeen miles into town to discuss
some “county business” with Gavin, the county attorney, with whom
he became friends while they were students together at the state
university.35 Having stayed overnight with Gavin at the home of the
34. See Mark 7:24-30 (describing Jesus’ accession to curing the daughter of a Greek
woman once she likened herself to a dog eating crumbs under a dining table).
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Mallisons—Gavin’s twin sister and her husband—Edmonds
reciprocates their hospitality, inviting their son, twelve-year-old
Chick, to go home with him to hunt rabbits.36
Chick accepts the invitation, and the whole affair takes on a de-
cidedly antebellum, English-squirearchical air. Carothers proffers a
“boy” who has a good rabbit dog, and Gavin points out that Chick
has his own “boy,” Aleck Sander. The three boys set out early the
next morning. Chick carries the lordly shotgun; his two guides are
armed with atavistic, metal-tipped throwing sticks. We see the dog,
and more, through Chick’s eyes:
a true rabbit dog, some hound, a good deal of hound, maybe mostly
hound, redbone and black-and-tan with maybe a little pointer
somewhere once, a potlicker, a nigger dog which it took but one
glance to see had an affinity a rapport with rabbits such as people
said Negroes had with mules.37
This order, almost organically natural to Chick, is soon quite literally
and irreversibly upset. Crossing a “footlog” over a creek, he loses his
balance and, falling into the icy water, sees the world turn upside
down. He surfaces to face his rescuer and nemesis, Lucas Beau-
champ:
[H]e looked up at the face which was just watching him without pity
commiseration or anything else, not even surprise: just watching
him . . .—a face which in his estimation might have been under fifty
or even forty except for the hat and the eyes, and inside a Negro’s
skin but that was all even to a boy of twelve shaking with cold and
still panting from shock and exertion because what looked out of it
had no pigment at all, not even the white man’s lack of it, not arro-
gant, not even scornful: just intractable and composed.38
Lucas’s first words to him are “Come to my house,”39 and Chick
accedes. Though he wants to return to Edmonds’s house, he realizes
that Lucas, like his own grandfather, “was simply incapable of con-
ceiving himself by a child contradicted and defied.”40 Following Lucas
home, Chick remembers what everyone knows about him: Lucas is
the grandson of the patriarch Carothers McCaslin himself; his first
                                                                                                                                     
35. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 4.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at 6-7.
39. Id. at 7.
40. Id. at 8.
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cousin, Carothers Edmonds’s father, had deeded him the house to
which they were headed, along with the surrounding ten acres, “an
oblong of earth set forever in the middle of the two-thousand-acre
plantation like a postage stamp in the center of an envelope.”41 Chick
sees in that enclave, hill and house, respectively rutted and ram-
shackled though they are, precisely the features he first saw in Lucas:
independence and intractability.42
He should have seen, he realizes later, that Lucas, every bit as
much as Edmonds, had been his host, that “he had gone out there
this morning as the guest not of Edmonds but of old Carothers
McCaslin’s plantation and Lucas knew it when he didn’t and so Lucas
had beat him . . . .”43 Lucas has, in fact, offered him a form of hospi-
tality even more ancient than he imagines, biblical and Homeric
rather than feudal and manorial. Lucas has given the sanctuary that
the epic hero extends to strangers and wayfarers in his dominion.44
But this is obscured for Chick by his deeply ingrained racist as-
sumptions about the place of black people, about their very nature.
As soon as he enters Lucas’s cabin he notices “that smell which he
had accepted without question all his life as being the smell always of
places where people with any trace of Negro blood live.”45 When Lu-
cas offers his own supper to Chick, Chick sees it as “nigger food . . .
what Negroes ate, obviously because it was what they liked, what
they chose . . . because this was their palates and their metabolism.”46
Only much later, as an adult, would he begin to think otherwise, that
the smell and the food might be neither natural nor chosen, but en-
41. Id. Old Cass built the house for Lucas when he married Molly. See FAULKNER,
MOSES, supra note 3, at 46, 106.
42. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 8-9.
43. Id. at 18.
44. Thus, Odysseus, homeward bound from Troy, invoked the custom of sanctuary in the
cave of Polyphemus the Cyclops:
But since we’ve chanced on you, we’re at your knees
in hopes of a warm welcome, even a guest-gift,
the sort that hosts give to strangers. That’s the custom.
Respect the gods, my friend. We’re suppliants—at your mercy!
Zeus of the Strangers guards all guests and suppliants:
strangers are sacred—Zeus will avenge their rights!
HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, bk. 8, ll. 300-06 (Robert Fagles trans., 1996). So, too, Lot, nephew of
Abraham the patriarch, invoked the sanctity of hospitality against threats by the men of Sodom
against his houseguests: “[D]o nothing to these men, for they have come under the shelter of
my roof.” Genesis 19:8 (Revised Standard Version).
45. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 9-10.
46. Id. at 13.
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forced, not so much by poverty as by racism.47 Quite explicitly, the
mature Chick realizes that he has come to his new understanding on
account of this encounter with Lucas and his wife Molly.48
The very familiarity of the smell, which suffuses the quilt that
warms him and the food that revives him, reminds him of Aleck
Sander’s familiar cabin in his own backyard.49 He realizes almost im-
mediately that “his initial error, misjudgment had been there all the
time, not even needing to be abetted by the smell of the house” or by
the food.50 On account of his habitual racism, Chick fundamentally
misconstrues the relationship created between him and Lucas by the
latter’s act of hospitality. Assimilating it to the servile attentions of
other blacks he knows, he offers Lucas’s wife money for her kindness.
The offer is meant, we recognize, not so much to pay them for their
trouble as to put them in their place; it is less a payment compensat-
ing them for services than a gratuity implicitly confirming their ser-
vility.
More than a mistake is at work here. By this point, Chick has re-
alized that something is radically wrong. Chick resolves to offer
money only after he sees a portrait of Lucas and Molly and learns
from her that Lucas had insisted she not wear the garb of a field
hand. The offer of money is a frantic and futile effort to escape from
the skewed reality of the situation, the very real sense in which Chick,
the inadvertent trespasser, has become beholden to Lucas, the local
landlord.
But Lucas refuses the money, which Chick flings to the floor in
consternation. Chick’s black companion obeys Lucas’s explicit order
to return the money, as Chick obeys his implicit and symbolic com-
mand to take it back. For the next four years, Chick struggles without
success to restore the proper order of his world, to remove his deeply
offensive debt to Lucas, a debt that threatens what he sees as his
own-most self, “his masculinity and his white blood.”51 He and Lucas
engage in a peculiar potlatch: he sends Lucas and his wife the kind of
remembrances that white landlords give their black tenants: cigars
and snuff at Christmas, a floral dress in the spring.52 Lucas replies
47. See id. at 11-13.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 12.
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id. at 26. In another instance, Chick describes Lucas as he “who had debased not
merely his manhood but his whole race too . . . .” Id. at 21.
52. See id. at 22.
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with a gallon of homemade molasses at harvest, a treat from a gen-
tleman farmer like Chick’s grandfather to an urban child with a sweet
tooth.53 And Lucas ups the ante: he has the molasses delivered by a
white boy. In effect, Lucas has returned the original money again,
this time by white hands rather than black.
Realizing this, Chick despairs of finding a way to restore the old
order: “[W]hatever would or could set him free was beyond not
merely his reach but even his ken; he could only wait for it if it came
and do without it if it didn’t.”54 The reason is that his liberation does
not exist in his world; it requires the shattering and reconstitution of
that world. As he is already dimly aware, Lucas must liberate him; in
the most fundamental sense, he cannot free himself, much less Lucas.
The book begins with Chick in this same anxious state—waiting.
From a blacksmith shop across the street, Chick watches as the sher-
iff brings Lucas to jail for the murder of a white man. The meaning of
Chick’s presence is highly ambiguous: “He was there, waiting. He was
the first one, standing lounging trying to look occupied or at least in-
nocent . . . .”55 He does not know why he is there, or what he will do.
He may become a more or less active part of the gathering crowd,
presumptive spectators to a lynching; he may give way to a deep urge
to flee.56 His meal at Lucas’s house, which he recalls in detail as he
waits in the square, prepares both him and us for his ultimate course:
he will do Lucas’s bidding. In the words of Milton’s sonnet on his
blindness and the sovereignty of his Lord: “They also serve who only
stand and wait.”57
2. The Gospel According to Atticus. In Mockingbird, hospitality
also plays a critical role in setting the social background and
establishing bonds of obligation, but with decidedly different results.
In the opening chapter, Atticus, like Gavin, entertains a client from
the country in his home. But this is no plantation-owning university
53. See id. at 22-24.
54. Id. at 23; cf. King, supra note 6, at 241 (maintaining that “Lucas subtly shifts the nature
of the transactions from a battle of gifts to an exchange of services among equals” but con-
cluding that “[b]y finally allowing Chick to pay him back, Lucas maintains his life and his supe-
riority” (emphasis added)).
55. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 3.
56. See WATSON, supra note 15, at 134-35 (agreeing that the novel portrays Chick in an
ambivalent relation to the angry mob).
57. JOHN MILTON, Sonnet XIX (“When I consider how my light is spent . . . .”), in THE
COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 190 (Douglas Bush ed., 1965).
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buddy come to discuss “county business.” Atticus’s client is the father
of one of Scout’s poorer schoolmates, and he comes to Atticus’s
house to secure help in freeing his modest farm from entailment.
When he tells Atticus he will not be able to pay him right away,
Atticus magnanimously declares, “Let that be the least of your
worries.”58
He explains afterward to Scout that they will be paid within the
year, but “not in money.”59 Sure enough, they are paid in kind: first a
load of stovewood, then a sack of hickory nuts; a crate of smilax and
holly at Christmas, and a crokersack of turnip greens in the spring.60
There is no mistaking what manner of man Mr. Cunningham is.
Rather than leave his land to take a WPA job, “he was willing to go
hungry to keep his land and vote as he pleased.”61 He comes, Atticus
explains, “from a set breed of men”;62 he is a sturdy yeoman, a Jeffer-
sonian Democrat.
And yet, in escaping both the dead hand of feudal restrictions
and the blandishments of the welfare state, Mr. Cunningham is
hardly as free as Atticus would have Scout believe. He is, rather,
caught in the middle, beholden to the liberating law and its incarna-
tion, Atticus Finch. Their respective social and economic statuses are
obvious, although only the latter is explicit. Atticus explains to Scout
that, although they themselves are poor, they are not as poor as the
Cunninghams: “The Cunninghams are country folks, farmers, and the
crash hit them the hardest.”63
More indirectly, Lee reveals their relative social status. In admit-
ting that he cannot pay immediately, the farmer makes his embar-
rassed apology to “Mr. Finch”; in response, it is “Walter” to whom
the lawyer magnanimously extends his credit.64 The fruits of the
farmer’s land are distinctly inferior recompense for the lawyer’s pro-
fessional services in the dominant cash economy; thus, they are re-
ceived as a favor rather than paid as a right. Mr. Cunningham’s insis-
tent offerings of agricultural produce are oddly reminiscent of feudal
dues, the proverbial rose at midsummer. They are the sign, not of in-
dependence, but of subinfeudation. The essential difference is that
58. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 27.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
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the recipient is not a traditional landlord, but a modern lawyer. As
we move up the social pyramid in Maycomb County, we find not so
much tightening tiers of rural magnates, as an apex of urban profes-
sionals.
As in Intruder, from this first act of hospitality—a lawyer re-
ceiving a client at home—flows another. But in Mockingbird, there is
no reciprocity; all the generosity runs in one direction. On the pretext
that their fathers are friends, Atticus’s ten-year-old son, Jem, invites
Cunningham’s son Walter home from school for lunch. The real point
of the invitation is to patch over a fight between young Walter and
Scout, his first-grade classmate.65 They had come to blows on their
first day at school when she failed to explain with sufficient tact to
the new teacher why he had no money for lunch and was too proud to
accept any as charity.66
Atticus, himself home from his law office for lunch, plays the
gracious host, talking man-to-man with his guest about farm prob-
lems.67 But things go awry when Scout accidentally humiliates young
Cunningham. She asks why he is pouring molasses all over his food,
country-fashion, apparently spoiling his wholesome, middle-class
meal. Calpurnia, their black maid and surrogate mother, marches
Scout off to the kitchen. Over Scout’s objection that Walter is not
company, but just a Cunningham, Calpurnia lays down the law of
hospitality:
Hush your mouth! Don’t matter who they are, anybody sets foot in
this house’s yo’ comp’ny, and don’t you let me catch you remarkin’
on their ways like you was so high and mighty! Yo’ folks might be
better’n the Cunninghams but it don’t count for nothin’ the way
you’re disgracin’ ’em . . . .68
Thus, Scout learns the lesson of noblesse oblige, liberal style: though
she and her professional family are better than common folk, she
must respect her subordinates’ pride while extending them her char-
ity, even as her father does.69 Chick, sharing the “hamely fare”70 of
65. See id. at 29.
66. See id. at 26-27.
67. See id. at 30. Similarly, in Intruder, Chick describes an exchange between Gavin and a
farming client about “crops or politics, one of which his uncle knew nothing about and the
other the farmer didn’t, until the man would get around to telling what he came for.”
FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 74.
68. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 31.
69. See Shaffer, Growing Up Good, supra note 5, at 539 (“Calpurnia is an avenging angel
on behalf of Walter and of Southern manners . . . .”). But see JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 101
    
1999] LIBERATING LAWYERS 619
Lucas Beauchamp’s cabin, learned a very different lesson, as we have
seen.71
But if Calpurnia can instruct Scout on manners toward lower-
class whites, it is clear from another instance of hospitality that Jem
and Scout have a benevolently patronizing attitude toward her. While
Atticus is away on legislative business in Montgomery, Calpurnia
takes Scout and Jem to worship at her church. When they balk at her
elaborate preparations, she mutters, “I don’t want anybody sayin’ I
don’t look after my children.”72 Once they are in the pew with her,
she gives them each a dime for the collection plate. Jem whispers that
they have their own, but Calpurnia insists that they take hers, since
they are her “company.”73 This poses a minor dilemma: “Jem’s face
showed brief indecision on the ethics of withholding his own dime,
but his innate courtesy won and he shifted his dime to his pocket.”74
Jem’s instinctive understanding of how to be a guest among the
lower orders is, of course, precisely what got Chick into trouble. Jem
was the honored guest of his maid, in a place of Christian worship,
where the last can safely play at being first. Chick’s host was no one’s
servant; the sanctuary of his house, no temple to meekness.
These instances of hospitality reveal the mores of Mockingbird
to be quite patrician and patriarchal, and in that respect they are very
like those of Intruder. But it is a later incident of hospitality that
more precisely parallels Chick’s encounter with Lucas as the novel’s
central social disruption. This is the fateful encounter between Tom
Robinson and his false accuser, Mayella Ewell, in the latter’s home, a
shack on the outskirts of the town dump. Here is revealed the racism
that subverts the order of Scout’s world, even as the meal with Lucas
does Chick’s. But what Tom breaks into is not the self-assured supe-
riority of white professionals, but the intense status anxiety of the
very lowest white class.
Mayella’s family, the Ewells, are poor white trash, the local lum-
penproletariat, a kind of outcaste, pariah people:
                                                                                                                                     
(citing young Walter Cunningham’s lunch with Atticus as evidence of Atticus’s breaking down
class barriers).
70. ROBERT BURNS, A Man’s a Man, for A’ That, in 3 THE POETICAL WORKS OF ROBERT
BURNS 234, 234 (Wm. Scott Douglas ed., 1886) (“What though on hamely fare we dine, wear
hoddin grey, an’ a’ that . . . [t]he honest man, tho e’er sae poor, is king o’ men, for a’ that.”).
71. See supra notes 38-57 and accompanying text.
72. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 128.
73. See id. at 130.
74. Id.
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Every town the size of Maycomb had families like the Ewells. No
economic fluctuations changed their status—people like the Ewells
lived as guests of the county in prosperity as well as in the depths of
a depression. No truant officers could keep their numerous offspring
in school; no public health officer could free them from congenital
defects, various worms, and the diseases indigenous to filthy sur-
roundings.75
On the Ewells, Atticus himself is uncharacteristically harsh: “Atticus
said the Ewells had been the disgrace of Maycomb for three genera-
tions. None of them had done an honest day’s work in his recollec-
tion. . . . They were people, but they lived like animals.”76
The animals they resemble are scavengers and vermin. They sub-
sist on the gleanings of garbage, and the yard around their hovel is lit-
tered with a kind of surreal meta-trash, the remains of refuse, “like
the playhouse of an insane child.”77 Their home itself is a castoff of
the lowest social caste: they live in the decaying hull of “what was
once a Negro cabin.”78 This is almost literally a no-man’s land. Scout
explains that “[n]obody had occasion to pass by except at Christmas,
when the churches delivered baskets,” and when conscientious citi-
zens discarded their own trees and excess holiday trash, at the
mayor’s request, to spare the town the trouble.79
But Tom Robinson must walk past this wasteland every day on
his way to work.80 Mayella, the eldest of the Ewell children, fre-
quently accosts him to help her with chores: chopping kindling and
fetching water.81 Late one November day, she asks him to come into
the house to repair a hinge. But her real purpose is to seduce him;
discovering it, he recoils in terror and flees. Mayella’s father, who has
watched from a window, beats her. Then, closing ranks against the
outside, the two of them accuse Tom Robinson of rape. 
This is the ultimate perversion of hospitality. The guest has not
come to seek sanctuary; the lady of the house has invited him to ren-
der chivalrous service. But the guest is not honored, or even pro-
tected; he is immediately vilified and ultimately killed. Accused of in-
75. Id. at 181.
76. Id. at 37; see also Shaffer, Growing Up Good, supra note 5, at 555 (noting that Atti-
cus’s condemnation of people who are “trash” is uncharacteristically harsh).
77. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 181.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 182.
80. See id. at 203.
81. See id.
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flicting the greatest breach of hospitality possible for a guest, seduc-
tion of his hostess,82 he suffers the greatest breach of hospitality by
the householder, betrayal unto dishonorable death.83 This treachery
goes unpunished simply because, as we shall see in the next section,
Tom’s damsel chooses to relieve her distress with a knight who is not
literally white.
Yet, even to apply these terms to Mayella and Tom is to parody
them. There are indeed a knight and a damsel in Mockingbird, but
they are Atticus and his daughter, Scout. What we have here is a
peasant helping a waif, starved as much for affection as for food. To
be sure, racial differences disrupt what might otherwise have been a
standard Shakespearean subplot. Tom’s blackness makes it presump-
tuous for him to help Mayella in her hovel; her whiteness makes it
outrageous for her to woo him there. But this is a far cry from his
presenting himself at Atticus’s home, asking for Scout’s hand in mar-
riage and his share of the patrimony. And it is a far cry from what
Lucas did: acting with the assurance that the patrimony was already
his, the white heir apparent not merely his squire, or even his page,
but his errand boy, despite the fact that he himself is the product of
the ultimate anathema, miscegenation. Lucas’s cabin is his castle,
metaphysically as well as metaphorically. It is the real seat of the
McCaslin dominion, as he is its proper lord.84
B. Characters of the Black Defendants
Their respective ordeals reveal Tom Robinson and Lucas Beau-
champ as the paradigms of deeply different values in superficially
82. This was, of course, the offense that launched the chief of the classical epics, The Iliad.
See also GUILLAUME DE LORRIS & JEAN DE MEUN, THE ROMANCE OF THE ROSE § 42 (Char-
les W. Dunn ed. & Harry W. Robins trans., Dutton 1962); HOWARD MAYNADIER, THE
ARTHUR OF THE ENGLISH POETS 205-10 (1907) (describing Sir Gawain’s betrayal of his host’s
hospitality through dalliances with the Green Knight’s wife in Sir Gawain and the Green
Knight).
83. Cf. Genesis 39:6-20 (imprisonment of Joseph under false accusation by his Egyptian
master’s wife of having tried to seduce her, after he refused thus to betray his master and “do
this great wickedness”); Genesis 19:1-8 (Lot’s effort to protect the strangers whom he had ex-
tended “the shelter of my roof” from sexual defilement by offering his virgin daughters in their
stead). 
84. Cf. S.F.C. MILSON, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 105-06 (1981)
(recording the absence of inheritability immediately after the Conquest); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A
HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 3 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that after the Norman conquest of Eng-
land, William parceled out land to his more proficient knights to ensure their continued loyalty
and service); id. at 49 (“Immediately after the [Norman] Conquest it seems that the tenant’s fee
was not regarded as heritable of right . . . .”).
    
622 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [49:601
similar worlds. The egregiously ill treatment of each in his world re-
veals the difficulties those worlds have in dealing with differences of
race. At the same time, however, they reveal that both the back-
ground value systems and the racisms that disrupt them are radically
different in the two stories. Tom is charitably engaged, and engag-
ingly charitable, the model not so much of Christian kindness as of
saintly supererogation. Lucas is pitiless and aloof, a pagan hero out of
place in the myths of both the chivalrous past and the liberal present.
1. Tom Robinson, the Good Samaritan. As the reality of Tom
Robinson’s encounter with Mayella Ewell becomes clear to us in the
course of his trial, we realize that he is a model liberal citizen and
Christian neighbor. But what we learn of him first, before the trial
begins, is that he is a model black man in the eyes of contemporary
whites. Calpurnia vouches to Atticus for Tom as coming from a
family of “clean-living folks” whom she knows well, who are
members of her church.85 He lives in one of the cabins out past the
dump, but not a derelict cabin like the Ewells’. These cabins rival the
cottages of Irish tourism brochures in their picturesque rural poverty:
“neat and snug with pale blue smoke rising from the chimneys and
doorways glowing amber from the fires inside.”86 
In direct examination at trial, Atticus brings out the basics of
Tom’s biography—he is twenty-five, married with three children—
and paints his one prior legal misadventure in the best possible
light—he served thirty days for disorderly conduct after trying to
defend himself from a knife attack; the attacker served no time
because he could afford the fine.87 He is a faithful employee—one is
tempted to say retainer—of a respected white landowner; he helps to
tend and harvest the boss’s cotton crop and does yardwork in the off-
season.88
Tom Robinson knows his place, and his predicament, and Atti-
cus carefully elicits this self-knowledge. In explaining why he fled the
scene of his alleged crime, Robinson says, “Mr. Finch, if you was a
nigger like me, you’d be scared, too.”89 Watching from the black peo-
ple’s balcony, as a guest of the wizened Reverend Sykes, Scout af-
85. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 88.
86. Id. at 182.
87. See id. at 202.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 207.
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firms Tom’s goodness: “He seemed to be a respectable Negro . . . .”90
At the end of Atticus’s direct examination, Tom’s employer blurts
out, “That boy’s worked for me for eight years an’ I ain’t had a speck
o’trouble outa him. Not a speck.”91
Tom Robinson, moreover, is not merely humble and respectable;
he is pitiable. “If he had been whole,” Scout observes at his trial, “he
would have been a fine specimen of a man.”92 But he is broken. Even
before Atticus shows through Tom’s own testimony that he lacks the
moral depravity to rape Mayella, he has already shown in cross-
examining her that Tom lacks the physical capability. As a boy, he
had had his left arm nearly ripped off by a cotton gin; the accident
left Tom’s left arm useless, a foot shorter than his right, with a “small,
shriveled hand.”93 Thus, the humble, hard-toiling helot is also the vic-
tim of a Dickensian industrial disaster. In the pantheon of appealing
working-class prototypes, Robinson has a dual distinction: he is both
a worker and a peasant. His very ministrations to Mayella depict his
subjection in almost literally biblical terms: he splits kindling and
fetches from the well; he is a hewer of wood and a drawer of water.94
But as Tom Robinson’s encounter with Mayella Ewell becomes
clear to us in the course of his trial, we realize that he is more than
just a respectable Negro, a falsely accused innocent. He is a model
liberal citizen and Christian neighbor, and in that lies both his undo-
ing and the indictment of his persecutors. Tom Robinson takes the
part of the Good Samaritan, helping those whom the conventionally
righteous pass by,95 even the part of Christ, ministering to the most
despised and socially opprobrious in their own homes.96 He, like Je-
sus, enters homes where the host does not confer honor and sanctu-
ary, but disgrace and even danger. Speaking of Mayella and her fam-
ily from the balcony at Tom’s trial, Scout tells us that “Maycomb
90. Id. at 204; compare RALPH ELLISON, SHADOW AND ACT 58 (Signet 1964) on whites’
ambivalence between “a malignant stereotype (the bad nigger) on the one hand and a benign
stereotype (the good nigger) on the other.” For both blacks and whites, of course, the latter
stereotype has an eponym from earlier fiction: Uncle Tom.
91. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 207.
92. Id. at 204.
93. Id. at 197.
94. See Joshua 9:3-27 (describing Israel’s reduction of the people of Gibeon to “hewers of
wood and drawers of water”).
95. See Luke 10:30-36 (relating the parable of the Good Samaritan who helps a stranger
on the side of the road).
96. See Matthew 9:11; Mark 2:16; Luke 5:30 (discussing the religious establishment’s ques-
tioning of Jesus’s eating with “tax collectors and sinners”).
    
624 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [49:601
gave them Christmas baskets, welfare money, and the back of its
hand. Tom Robinson was probably the only person who was ever de-
cent to her.”97 Having met Jesus’s unspoken command—“inasmuch as
ye have done it unto the least of these my brethren, ye have done it
unto me”98—Tom deserves his benediction: “Come, O blessed of my
Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you.”99
That he receives a very different reward (at least in the here and
now) is attributable to his embodying the lesson of the Good Samari-
tan parable even more perfectly than is at first apparent. That par-
able itself was originally an indictment of racial prejudice, a much
more radical message to its first-century Jewish audience than it is to
us in its present form.100 In the sanitized version we have in the Gos-
pels, the message is the one we have just seen in Tom’s case: the
neighbors we are to love as we love ourselves are the suffering
strangers, the least among us.
This was a message the religious establishment of Jesus’s day—
the very priests and rabbis who ignore their needy neighbor in the
parable—had long espoused themselves. Thoroughly orthodox rabbis
were already teaching that even strangers are our neighbors and that
virtue requires care for them.101 Nor was Jesus’s message merely that
they failed to practice what they preached. This indictment of them
was certainly there, but that was not the point that would have been
most salient to the parable’s original hearers. For them, the central
question was not “who is my neighbor,” which the religious estab-
lishment had accurately answered, but “who can be good,” which the
religious establishment held to be orthodox Jews, members of their
own temple-centered culture.102
The parable’s answer to that latter question cut to the very root
of rabbinical culture: a Samaritan can be good, can fulfill the essence
of the moral law, to love thy neighbor as thyself.103 This was a radical
97. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 204.
98. Matthew 25:40 (King James Version).
99. Id. 25:34.
100. See John Dominic Crossan, Parable and Example in the Teaching of Jesus, 18 NEW
TESTAMENT STUD. 285, 294-95 (1971/72) (arguing that the Good Samaritan story should be
read as a parable within its original historical context as well as an allegory of the divine). Cros-
san’s thesis is now widely shared among New Testament scholars. See, e.g., NORMAN PERRIN,
THE NEW TESTAMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 291-93 (1974) (following Crossan’s account).
101. See PERRIN, supra note 100, at 292.
102. See id. at 292-93.
103. More precisely, as Jesus is reported to have said to one of the scribes, the First Com-
mandment is to love God above all; the second, to love your neighbor as yourself. See Matthew
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reversal of moral expectations because Samaritans were mixed-race
pariahs.104 They were apostate Jews who had intermarried with their
non-Jewish neighbors during the Exile, while the ancestors of Jesus’s
audience, led by the predecessors of his “Scribes and Pharisees,” had
kept the original creed and culture pure and intact.105 Jesus’s radical
message was that these very Samaritans, whom his hearers had been
taught to despise and reject, could be more virtuous than their teach-
ers.106 To translate this message into the language of Tom’s trial—lan-
guage that has not lost its power to disturb—the Samaritan whom Je-
sus held up as a moral model was, in the minds of Jesus’s audience, a
“nigger.”
In his closing argument, Atticus invokes Jefferson’s egalitarian-
ism and denounces “the evil assumption—that all Negroes lie, that all
Negroes are basically immoral beings, that all Negro men are not to
be trusted around our women . . . .”107 As Atticus knows, he has al-
ready refuted the charge that this particular black man fits these
stereotypes, already disproved the charge that Tom is bad. What he
cannot do is convince Tom’s jury to admit what it clearly knows: that
Tom is affirmatively good, and good in precisely the way that makes
him, by their own standards, their moral superior.
The prosecutor’s sly trading on this difference—the difference
between not being bad and being affirmatively good—is Tom’s un-
doing. Having established that Tom had entered the Ewell compound
many times to help Mayella, the prosecutor asks, “Why were you so
anxious to do that woman’s chores?”108 Tom apparently takes the im-
plication to be that he had amorous designs on Mayella, or worse,
and he hastens to reveal his real motive as not just innocent but vir-
tuous: “I felt right sorry for her, she seemed to try more’n the rest of
’em—.”109 At that point, the prosecutor, Mr. Gilbert, springs the trap,
with the desired effect:
                                                                                                                                     
22:34-40; accord Mark 12:28-31. On this point, at least according to the Gospels, Jesus and the
Jewish authorities were in accord. See Mark 12:32-34; see also Luke 10:25-28 (describing how
when a lawyer gives Jesus the same answer, Jesus affirms that it is the proper one). As we shall
see below, Jesus radicalized the First Commandment as well as the second, also with explicit
reference to the despised Samaritans and the temple establishment. See infra note 112 and ac-
companying text.
104. See PERRIN, supra note 100, at 292-93.
105. See id. at 319-20.
106. See id. at 292-93; Crossan, supra note 100, at 294.
107. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 217.
108. Id. at 209.
109. Id.
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“You felt sorry for her, you felt sorry for her?” Mr. Gilmer seemed
ready to rise to the ceiling.
The witness realized his mistake and shifted uncomfortably in the
chair. But the damage was done. Below us [children, seated in the
black balcony], nobody liked Tom Robinson’s answer. Mr. Gilmer
paused a long time to let it sink in.110
What sinks in is the realization, not of Tom’s guilt, but of his
even more damnable presumption: condescending to help a white
woman, even a Ewell, in her home, even a home that is literally a
dump. The prosecutor’s strategy works because Tom’s jury is not
ready to admit that the Samaritan in their midst could be good—as
good as, even better than, they themselves, something of a saint, if
not quite a messiah. Atticus’s fellow citizens fail not so much politi-
cally, because they cannot acknowledge Robinson’s legal equality, as
morally, because they cannot accept his spiritual superiority.
Thus, Tom’s embodying of the values his community professes
to hold fundamental is implicitly at stake in his trial. It is important to
see what is implicitly secure, affirmed rather than challenged. The
truth of Tom’s position, religious and secular, is indeed suppressed
here, but we must be clear on just how subordinate he would have
remained even if his truth had won. What he affirmatively asks for is
itself essentially negative. Tom asks only to be given the very little to
which the law, as thoroughly racist in its letter as in its application, al-
ready entitles him: not to be judicially condemned for a crime that he
very obviously did not commit, merely because a white person bears
transparently false witness against him. Beyond that, he asks nothing.
Far from asking to be co-ruler with Atticus, or even for a color-blind
legal regime, he does not even ask for an end to what we know as
petty apartheid: drinking from separate water fountains, stepping to
the back of the bus, sitting in a segregated balcony in public build-
ings.
Nor are these requests, minor as they are in themselves, implicit
in what he does ask. Doing racial justice in Tom’s trial is wholly con-
sistent with a thoroughly Jim Crow legal regime. Tom does not even
ask that the separate facilities of his segregated world be made equal;
all he asks is that he not be punished for a crime he did not commit
nor for crossing a line not itself inscribed in law.
110. Id.
    
1999] LIBERATING LAWYERS 627
Tom does not even ask directly for that. Quite significantly, his
modest, indeed minimal, demand is made only through Atticus, his
white lawyer. Thus, Atticus is not merely unthreatened by Tom’s
demand; his social and moral supremacy is implicitly reaffirmed. As a
moral matter, he is revealed as a meta-Samaritan, implicitly improv-
ing on the parable itself: he is the helper of the helper of the neighbor
who is the most needy. As a sociopolitical matter, even the most
humble demands for minimal social justice must be made through
him. The political priesthood of all believers—as exemplified by Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s boycotts and street demonstrations and the
black churches’ voter registration crusades—is nowhere in sight. If
you want absolution in Atticus’s world for secular sins you did not
commit, you must approach the temple of justice through its self-
appointed priests. If Tom’s assumption of his true place is a threat to
the most economically poor and morally benighted, it is no threat to
the superiority of Atticus and his ilk. Tom, after all, declines a clumsy
advance from Mayella Ewell; he does not come a-courting Atticus’s
sister, Alexandra.111
Here again, a comparison with the original Good Samaritan
story is instructive. Jesus presents his principal audience, the lower
orders of the Palestinian Jewry, with a bitter pill: the Samaritans, re-
ligious syncretists and racial amalgamists whom the Jews had always
despised as lower even than themselves, may in fact be purer and
more pious. That is not the whole message, or even its most radical
part. Implicit in the parable is the message Jesus gives on another oc-
casion to someone who is herself a Samaritan: the day is at hand
when true worship shall be rendered not in the sacred mountains of
Samaria, or even in Jerusalem itself, but in spirit and in truth.112 Je-
sus’s universalizing, spiritualizing message, in other words, threatens
not just to equate the lowest orders of Jewry with their historically
compromised neighbors; it calls for the transcendence of the very cul-
tic apparatus of traditional Judaism itself, and thus the displacement
of Judaism’s priestly ruling class.
Tom’s story presents the parable’s first, less-radical message. It
threatens to disabuse lower-class whites of their sense of innate, race-
111. See JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 64 (“The most destructive disruption occurs when
Mayella Ewell asks a Black man, Tom Robinson, to first come inside the Ewell fence and then
the Ewell house.”). Though Johnson rightly notes that this is the novel’s greatest disruption,
she fails to note how much this disruption leaves intact, and thus how relatively minor it really
is.
112. See John 4:21-24.
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based moral superiority to their fellow peasants who happen to be
black. Their resentment is not presented as particularly understand-
able, and no one would defend their carrying it to the extreme of
condemning an innocent man to death. The other half of Jesus’s par-
able, the toppling of the top, is strikingly absent here. Tom’s trial
leaves the temple of liberal law very much intact, with its secular
priests reaffirmed in their moral and social superiority. As we shall
see,113 this cannot but have been a profoundly comforting message.
Furthermore, Tom’s story does not just omit this critical element
of the Good Samaritan story; it also reverses an important aspect of
the Gospel account of which that story is itself but a part. In the Gos-
pels, it is the religious establishment that conspires to crucify the ul-
timate Samaritan, with the connivance of the secular Roman legal
authorities.114 In Mockingbird, as we shall see,115 it is the ordinary
farmer folk on the jury who condemn Tom, who kill the mockingbird,
the embodiment of beneficent humility. Unlike the Palestinian mob
that cried, “Crucify him!” in Jesus’ case, Tom’s jurors have no high
priest to orchestrate their anger, and no magisterial Pilate accedes to
it. Quite the reverse: Atticus opposes the hoi polloi at every turn,
with the active sympathy of the trial judge.116 On appeal and certifica-
tion, we have every reason to believe, a higher court—not in Heaven
hereafter, but in Alabama here and now117—will deliver Tom from
this evil, if only he is sufficiently long-suffering. When he is not, the
fault is more in his character than in their justice. The Gospel ac-
cording to Atticus is that liberalism’s law is our proper lord and law-
yers its holy priesthood.
2. Lucas Beauchamp, the Denigrated Nobleman. Lucas, too,
gets into trouble for embodying in his blackness the highest virtues of
his culture, but those values and that culture are radically different
from Tom Robinson’s. Lucas is the paradigm of the hereditary
landed aristocrat, representative of an aristocracy founded on
113. See infra Part III.A.
114. See Matthew 26:3-5, 14-16, 47-75, 27:1-26; Mark 14:1, 2, 10, 43-72, 15:1-15; Luke 22:2-6,
47-71, 23:1-25; John 18:1-40, 19:1-16.
115. See infra Part I.E.2.
116. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 228 (describing the judge’s appointment of
Atticus instead of the usual, less well-qualified, candidate). In the movie version, the judge sig-
nals his disgust at the trial’s conclusion by slamming his door on the jury’s verdict.
117. This was the lesson of the Scottsboro rape case. See infra notes 190-91 and accompa-
nying text.
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ruthless military prowess.118 Lucas is self-consciously such a person,
and his neighbors’ resentment of his being such a person,
paradoxically conjoined with their incomprehension of what such a
person is, is the source of his trouble.
Lucas, we have already seen, is the grandson of old Carothers
McCaslin; Carothers Edmonds, current owner of the McCaslin plan-
tation, is his cousin. Lucas, however, thinks of himself as “the oldest
living McCaslin descendant still living on the hereditary land . . . .”119
As Gavin says elsewhere of a less noble and less sympathetic black,
Lucas’s heritage, or at least his patronym, “runs Norman blood.”120 In
the language of the conquerors of Anglo-Saxon England, Lucas’s
surname, Beauchamp, literally means “beautiful field,” bespeaking
his alliance with the land and the landed. The white family whose
name Lucas’s ancestors took was quite conscious of this aristocratic
heritage.121
Lucas’s given names—Lucius Quintus Carothers McCaslin—al-
lude not just to the Classical Romans, but also to one of the most no-
table Mississippians of the nineteenth century, Lucius Quintus Cin-
cinnatus Lamar, a U.S. Senator, Secretary of the Interior, and Justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court.122 As a young man, Lucas was careful to
assert his transcendence of this background by literally making a
name for himself. By his own fiat, Lucius became Lucas, “not deny-
ing, declining the name itself, because he used three quarters of it;
but simply taking the name and changing, altering it, making it no
longer the white man’s but his own, by himself composed, himself
selfprogenitive and nominate, by himself ancestored, as . . . old Ca-
rothers himself was . . . .”123
118. On virtue in heroic cultures generally, see MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note
30, at 121-30.
119. FAULKNER, MOSES, supra note 3, at 39.
120. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 103 (Vintage Books 1975) (1951) [here-
inafter FAULKNER, REQUIEM] (explaining that the murderer Nancy Manigault’s patronym, if
not her heritage, is Norman).
121. One Beauchamp asserted the family’s rightful ownership of the Beauchamp estate in
England and proper succession to its earldom, insisting that its Mississippi plantation be called
Warwick, after the family’s English seat. See FAULKNER, MOSES, supra note 3, at 5, 288.
122. See C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913, at 17-18, 271
(rev. ed. 1971); Arthur F. Kinney, Introduction to CRITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 6, at 1, 16
(suggesting that Faulkner meant the name Lucius Quintus Carothers McCaslin to allude to
L.Q.C. Lamar).
123. FAULKNER, MOSES, supra note 3, at 269.
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When Chick first sees Lucas, towering above him on the stream
bank, he immediately notices the trappings of aristocracy: the worn,
handmade beaver hat like his own grandfather’s and the heavy gold
watch chain.124 Later, in Lucas’s cabin, Chick sees him use a gold
toothpick, again like his grandfather’s,125 and notices “a vast shadowy
tester bed which had probably come out of old Carothers McCaslin’s
house . . . .”126 He also sees a gold-framed portrait of Lucas in his full
regalia: “the worn brushed obviously once-expensive black broad-
cloth suit . . . and the raked fine hat and the boiled white shirt of his
own grandfather’s time and the tieless collar and the heavy watch-
chain and the gold toothpick like the one his own grandfather had
carried in his upper vest pocket . . . .”127 All these, like his land, Lucas
has from his ancestors, and he has more besides: a walnut bureau, a
wedding gift from Isaac McCaslin,128 legally rightful heir of the planta-
tion, and a .41-caliber Colt pistol, “that weapon workable and effi-
cient and well cared for yet as archaic peculiar and unique as the gold
toothpick, which had probably (without doubt) been old Carothers
McCaslin’s pride a half century ago.”129 This pistol, like the heroic
heritage it symbolizes, will be Lucas’s burden and his salvation—in a
word, his fate.130
These things are not castoffs, and Lucas is not aping illegitimate
aristocratic ancestors. Lucas not only owns his heirlooms; he is enti-
tled to them. Beyond that, he literally bears them well, befitting his
status: “not arrogant at all and not even scornful: just intolerant in-
flexible and composed.”131 In his own house, Lucas stands over his
guest,132 “straddled baronial as a duke or a squire or a congressman
before the fire . . . .”133 This is his bearing in public as well. Unlike
other blacks and poorer rural whites, Lucas comes to town only on
124. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 6, 12-13.
125. See id. at 12, 24.
126. Id. at 10. Heirlooms, at common law, were chattels that descended like real property
to the primogenitary heir. Local custom sometimes included the best bed among the heirlooms;
it went with the patrimony to the new head of the family. See ROBERT MEGARRY & H.W.R.
WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 547-48 (5th ed. 1984).
127. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 24.
128. See FAULKNER, MOSES, supra note 3, at 51.
129. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 68.
130. Significantly, Lucas insists that he has the pistol by purchase, not by gift. See id. at 221.
Lucas has earned, not merely inherited, his aristocratic accoutrements.
131. Id. at 13.
132. See id. at 12.
133. Id. at 36.
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weekdays, not on Saturday. Like whites who are planters, not mere
farmers, he seldom comes more than the once a year he makes the
trip—always in his broadcloth suit—to pay taxes on his land.134
This lordly deportment—not designed to impress, not in any
conscious sense designed for any outward effect—is profoundly of-
fensive to Lucas’s white fellow citizens. After their initial encounter,
Chick learns how whites universally thought of Lucas:
[T]he Negro who said ‘ma’am’ to women just as any white man did
and who said ‘sir’ and ‘mister’ to you if you were white but who you
knew was thinking neither and he knew you knew it but who was not
even waiting, daring you to make the next move, because he didn’t
even care.135
The effect of this attitude is wide and deep: “[E]very white man
in that whole section of the country had been thinking about him for
years: We got to make him be a nigger first. He’s got to admit he’s a
nigger. Then maybe we will accept him as he seems to intend to be ac-
cepted.”136 When his uncle Gavin tells him Lucas has been arrested for
murder, Chick initially responds, “Yes . . . . They’re going to make a
nigger out of him once in his life anyway.”137 Nor are blacks favorably
impressed. As Chick’s companion, Aleck Sander, tells him, “[i]t’s the
ones like Lucas makes trouble for everybody.”138
White resentment at Lucas has boiled over before, but he re-
mains unperturbed. When an affronted white sawmill hand insults
him in a country store one Saturday as “[y]ou goddamn biggity stiff-
necked stinking burrheaded Edmonds sonofabitch,”139 Lucas calmly
corrects him: “I aint a Edmonds. I dont belong to these new folks. I
belongs to the old lot. I’m a McCaslin.”140 As Cleanth Brooks has
pointed out, “[t]his is not precisely the soft answer that turneth away
wrath, and it is not meant to be.”141 In response to the ominous obser-
134. See id. at 24-25.
135. Id. at 18; see also FAULKNER, MOSES, supra note 3, at 101, 110-11, 113 (describing how
Lucas always refuses to call Edmonds and his father “mister” or “Mister Zach,” but instead
says “Mr. Edmonds” or no name at all).
136. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 18.
137. Id. at 31.
138. Id. at 84.
139. Id. at 19. Significantly, the murder of which Lucas is accused occurs near the same
store, also on a Saturday. See id. at 27.
140. Id. at 19.
141. CLEANTH BROOKS, WILLIAM FAULKNER: THE YOKNAPATAWPHA COUNTRY 284 (La.
State Univ. Press 1990) (1963).
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vation that “that look” will get him killed, Lucas is even more conde-
scendingly dismissive: “Yes, I heard that idea before, And I notices
that the folks that brings it up ain’t even Edmondses . . . .”142 This re-
tort incites a murderous assault, to which Lucas responds with unset-
tling equanimity while a white bystander diverts the blow. Lucas re-
mains “quite calm, not even scornful, not even contemptuous, not
even very alert.”143
These are the characteristics of the warrior-aristocrat in its neo-
classical, Nietzschean incarnation.144 Lucas embodies virtue in its pri-
mary, primitive sense—natural and instinctual. His conduct is hardly
the product of reflective choice; it is more the unselfconscious out-
working of his character. He is quite conscious of, and comfortable
with, who he is, and from that consciousness flows, with an almost or-
ganic inevitability, what he does. Even in the face of a lynch mob,
Lucas evinces not just calm, but also a related heroic trait, a sardonic
sense of humor.145 Lucas is cavalier, and not just metaphorically, in a
culture that idolizes the mythic cavalier. This is how Lucas’s white
cousin, Isaac McCaslin, sees Lucas when he comes to claim his patri-
mony, his share of the thousand dollars Carothers McCaslin be-
queathed his slave son, Lucas’s father:146 “the face the color of a used
saddle, the features Syriac, not in a racial sense but as the heir to ten
centuries of desert horsemen.”147
We learn of Lucas through his acts because he is a classical hero,
a man of action, as opposed to introspection, or even words.148 In-
deed, his very words—orders, insults, jokes—are performatives
142. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 20.
143. Id.
144. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 39 (Random House
1967) (1887) (“To be incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds
seriously for very long—that is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of
power to form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget . . . .”); see also David Millard, What Is It
Like to Be a Faulkner?, in PERSPECTIVES ON PERCEPTION: PHILOSOPHY, ART, AND
LITERATURE 139, 145 (Mary Ann Caws ed., 1989) (describing as “an admirable Southern re-
sponse” Lucas’s choice to cite his own prestigious ancestry in response to angry comments from
a white man).
145. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 63, 72; see also MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE, supra note 30, at 123 (“In the Icelandic sagas a wry sense of humor is closely bound up
with courage.”).
146. See FAULKNER, MOSES, supra note 3, at 257-58; see also id. at 102 (describing how the
legitimate sons of Carothers McCaslin execute the legacy).
147. Id. at 104.
148. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 30, at 122 (explaining that in a heroic
society, actions are required because a man is what he does).
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rather than descriptions or explanations.149 He does eventually ex-
plain how he came to be in his predicament, but only after he has got-
ten himself out of it. He gets himself out of it by evoking rather than
commanding obedience, by being taken on faith, before he will con-
descend to explain.
The best bred of his white contemporaries, his white cousin Ca-
rothers Edmonds, owner of the McCaslin plantation and Chick’s
original host on the fateful day of his fall into the creek, has long ago
understood Lucas’s character and the basis for it. Looking at the
same face that Chick saw as he emerged from the creek, Edmonds
had seen
a composite of a whole generation of fierce and undefeated young
Confederate soldiers, embalmed and slightly mummified—and he
thought with amazement and something very like horror: He’s more
like old Carothers [McCaslin] than all the rest of us put together, in-
cluding old Carothers. He is both heir and prototype simultaneously
of all the geography and climate and biology which sired old Caroth-
ers and all the rest of us and our kind, myriad, countless, faceless,
even nameless now except him who fathered himself, intact and com-
plete, contemptuous, as old Carothers must have been, of all blood
black white yellow or red, including his own.150
These are the same features that Edmonds’s cousin Isaac McCaslin,
rightful heir of the plantation, had seen in Lucas forty-five years be-
fore: “the composite tintype face of ten thousand undefeated Con-
federate soldiers almost indistinguishably caricatured, composed,
cold, colder than his [Isaac’s], more ruthless than his, with more bot-
tom than he had.”151
Edmonds knows all this because he has grown up almost literally
in Lucas’s house, and he has come to understand how Lucas had
bested Edmonds’s own father when the latter tried to take Lucas’s
149. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 4-6, 47 (1962) (distinguishing
“performative” from “constative” uses of language).
150. FAULKNER, MOSES, supra note 3, at 114-15; see also id. at 101 (“Yet it was not that
Lucas made capital of his white or even his McCaslin blood, but the contrary. It was as if he
were not only impervious to that blood, he was indifferent to it.”). It is important to note,
against any suggestion that Lucas’s aristocratic qualities all come from white people, that his
black great-grandmother, herself a slave, who committed suicide upon learning of Carothers
McCaslin’s unavengeable act of incest against their daughter, had qualities precisely like those
of Lucas: “solitary, inflexible, griefless, ceremonial.” Id. at 259; see also id. at 69 (recounting
Gavin’s description of Lucas as “a man most of whose blood was pure ten thousand years when
my own anonymous beginnings became mixed enough to produce me”).
151. Id. at 104-05.
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wife, Edmonds’s wet nurse and surrogate mother, as his mistress.152
Edmonds also realizes why Lucas had stayed on after this: “because
Lucas is impervious to anybody, even to forgiving them, even to
having to harm them.”153
Edmonds might thus have realized the truth about Lucas in the
present case—that Lucas could not be provoked by anyone, much
less a local redneck, into a murderous rage. Moreover, Edmonds,
given his longstanding ties to Lucas and his status in the community,
is, as Chick puts it, “the one man white or black . . . who would have
had any inclination let alone power and ability . . . to try to stand be-
tween Lucas and the violent fate he had courted . . . .”154 Unfortu-
nately, Edmonds is, at the critical juncture, off in New Orleans having
surgery.155
All other white people—from the rednecks at the barber shop to
the hyper-educated Gavin—profoundly misunderstand Lucas. Ac-
cordingly, when he is found standing over the newly slain body of a
white man, everyone assumes that he has acted in the most flagrant
defiance, courting disaster. They see all his proud, even haughty con-
duct as seething up to the point when it inevitably boiled over in
murderous rage against a white man.156 This misunderstanding oper-
ates at two levels. At the first level, white people attribute to Lucas,
as a black man, the resentments that they believe all black people
feel, the fantasies of rage black men in particular want to act out. For
most whites, this assumption is unconscious; Gavin at his most sen-
tentious makes it explicit for Chick in analyzing the actions of the ex-
pected lynch mob and its sympathizers.157
At a deeper level, a very different kind of imputation is occur-
ring, one which Gavin also shares, but without being conscious of it
himself. The construction of black rage that all whites share and im-
pute to Lucas is a projection of the kind of rage they would them-
selves feel if they were black. It is a very human urge to lash out
against deeply dehumanizing subordination. In imputing that rage to
blacks, whites implicitly grant them a common human nature, the
152. See id. at 112.
153. Id.
154. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 35-36.
155. See id. at 30, 36.
156. See id. at 32, 36-37, 48.
157. See id. at 47-48 (“Which is exactly what Lucas is doing: blew his top and murdered a
white man—which Mr. Lilley [a local shopkeeper] is probably convinced all Negroes want to
do . . . .”).
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human nature that is theirs, and thus they must deny them its outlet,
lest they grant them a too-explicit equality. Black murderers, ac-
cordingly, must be lynched. To allow them a trial—even a trial that
inevitably will result in conviction and execution—would implicitly
recognize their legal, moral, and psychological equality, all of which
their lynchers at once know and must deny.
As applied to Lucas, this mentality is fundamentally misplaced.
He is not, in the sense that this thinking implies, their equal; he does
not share their resentment. He is above that, and in being above that,
above them. Quite ironically, he is superior to them in ways that even
the best of them cannot imagine. Because they do not know Lucas,
and because Lucas is the only one in their midst possessing such a na-
ture, they have no means of understanding him. The closest category
they have to explain black forbearance is Christian forgiveness, and
Lucas, as only Edmonds is aware, has long since transcended that.
Far from forgiving enemies like them, he knows instinctively that
they are not worthy of his attention. Thus, the aloofness that they
most resent in him, and which they believe they have finally broken
down with the cumulative impact of their disrespect, is in fact more
insulting than they are even capable of realizing.
It is not so much that their desire to lynch him is evidence of
their evil nature, for “evil” is a category that applies only in their own
resentful moral universe. It is rather that their failure to understand
his innocence reveals their “badness,” or baseness, the absence not
merely of the virtue that crowns Lucas in the very different moral
universe he inhabits, but also of the capacity even to see that virtue.158
Long before this tribulation, Lucas had ceased resenting their effort
to make him “a nigger” and had ceased to strive to be their equal as a
man. He has come to understand what they never can: he is more
than merely a man.159
John Grisham’s A Time to Kill,160 whatever its other merits, of-
fers an instructive logical and psychological middle ground between
Intruder and Mockingbird. Faced with an affront to his moral integ-
rity, the meek and saintly Tom Robinson essentially turns the other
cheek; Lucas Beauchamp, at the opposite, Nietzschean end of the
158. See NIETZSCHE, supra note 144, at 40 (describing how in Neitzsche’s moral order,
those of base morality are unable to perceive the true moral nature of things, and, through their
misunderstanding, conceive of aristocratic “good” as “evil”).
159. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
160. JOHN GRISHAM, A TIME TO KILL (1989).
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moral spectrum, is almost wholly unperturbed, simply taking the fol-
lies of his inferiors in stride. Grisham’s Carl Lee Hailey, in contrast to
both, acts as most of us would be inclined to act, taking violent
vengeance upon the defilers of his daughter.161 Grisham’s moral mes-
sage is thus thoroughly orthodox: more egalitarian than Lee’s and
less aristocratic than Faulkner’s. To paraphrase Lucas’s and Tom’s
self-descriptions, Carl Lee is not a “nigger”; he is a man. He is, how-
ever, no more than a man.
C. Lawyers and Clients
In the last section, we saw how Lucas’s and Tom’s characters up-
set their places in their respective social worlds. In this section, we
will see how their characters and social positions combine to shape
their relations both to their lawyers and to the law itself. Through the
various phases of their cases—the initial selection of the lawyer, the
actual conduct of the case, and the final settling up of lawyer and cli-
ent—Lucas shapes his own fate, while Tom is ever at the mercy of
others.
1. Selecting the Lawyers. Both Lucas and Tom get their lawyers
through intermediaries, but there the similarities end. Lucas sends his
own knight-errant, Chick, to fetch a free-lance lawyer, Gavin, whom
he plans to pay and whose proffered services he carefully weighs but
quickly rejects. By contrast, a judge appoints Atticus to defend Tom
pro bono; we learn how wise the judge was to choose Atticus and
how virtuous Atticus was to accept the appointment. But, for all we
are told, Tom is wholly silent and passive throughout the entire
process.
a. Intruder. In Intruder’s opening scene, Chick awaits Lucas’s
arrival at the jailhouse. He shares the town’s belief that Lucas has
161. Witness the exchange between Carl Lee and his liberal white lawyer, Jake Brigance:
“Lemme ask you this. If it was your little girl, and if it was two niggers, and you could
get your hands on them, what would you do?”
“Kill them.”
Carl Lee smiled, then laughed. “Sure you would, Jake, sure you would.”
. . . .
“I have no choice, Jake. I’ll never sleep till those bastards are dead. I owe it to my lit-
tle girl, I owe it to myself, and I owe it to my people. It’ll be done.”
Id. at 43-44.
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murdered a white man, but he is drawn to him by a compelling sense
of continued obligation and, beyond that, of something approaching
awe.162 Lucas, seeing Chick in the crowd, dispatches him to bring his
uncle, the lawyer, to the jail.163 The quasi-feudal bond established by
the meal Chick ate at his house is thus the first link between Lucas
and his lawyer, and it is the imprisoned Lucas who initiates the
relationship. Though Chick later wrestles with why he was drawn to
Lucas’s aid,164 the central reason is adumbrated in the opening scene,
where Chick awaits Lucas’s arrival at the jail: “Because he knew
Lucas Beauchamp . . . because he had eaten a meal in Lucas’
house.”165 Chick’s deliverance from the creek reminds us of that most
ancient of fealties, the source of obligation in the very Decalogue
itself: “I am the LORD thy God, which have brought thee out of the
land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt have no other
gods before me.”166
Lucas’s relationship with his other principal assistant, the elderly
Miss Habersham, illustrates the same pattern. As we shall see in
more detail below,167 she comes to Lucas’s aid not in a spirit of Chris-
tian charity or liberal justice, but of feudal obligation—in her case, to
Lucas’s wife. No matter that this was an obligation to a kind of feudal
subordinate; feudal obligations ran in both directions, down to sub-
ordinates as well as up to superiors. Every lord but the king was also
a vassal.168
In an ironic reversal of his refusal of Chick’s payment for hospi-
tality, Lucas insists on paying Chick for his quasi-legal service. Law-
yers and their runners never do Lucas a favor; he makes clear from
the outset that they are his paid agents. He has no friends, he insists,
162. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 3, 42-44.
163. See id. at 44.
164. See id. at 64-67, 71.
165. Id. at 3-4.
166. Exodus 20:2-3 (King James Version). Reference to the Exodus, of course, points to an
important, and ironic, reversal. Chick is saved by a black man, a son of slaves. He is literally
saved from death in the creek, but more fundamentally, he is saved from the racism that tram-
meled his understanding of human excellence. See King, supra note 6, at 241 (“Having saved
Chick’s life, Lucas asks now to be saved by him.”).
167. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
168. Under the feudal doctrine of nulle terre sans seigneur, “all land whatsoever is held,
mediately or immediately, that is directly or indirectly, of the Crown.” SIMPSON, supra note 84,
at 1. On the other hand, outside his own dominions, even the king himself could be a vassal.
    
638 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [49:601
and he pays his own way.169 Chick may not be clear on what draws
him to Lucas, or on what sort of relationship he can establish with
Lucas, but Chick is quite clear on Lucas’s view of him: “[H]e was not
even asking a favor, making no last desperate plea to his humanity
and pity but was even going to pay him provided the price was not
too high . . . .”170
b. Mockingbird. By contrast, it is the law’s guarantee of legal
counsel, not any deep personal ties, that puts Atticus in touch with
Tom. Atticus tells his brother, “You know, I’d hoped to get through
life without a case of this kind, but [Judge] John Taylor pointed at me
and said, ‘You’re it.’”171 It is clear that this is to be a classic, indeed
paradigmatic, pro bono case. The court, personified in the judge,
sends the lawyer to the passive, imprisoned client; the officer of the
court implicitly picks up the tab, absorbing the economic cost of
providing uncompensated representation.172 And here liberal justice
is not blindly impartial, but presciently benevolent. Atticus’s
neighbor, Miss Maudie, explains to Jem that Judge Taylor passed
over the usual court-appointed defense lawyer, “Maycomb County’s
latest addition to the bar, who needed the experience,” in order to
appoint Atticus, “the only man in these parts who can keep a jury out
so long in a case like that.”173
When pressed to explain his motives for taking the case, Atti-
cus’s focus is distinctly on himself, not his client. He makes clear sev-
eral times that it is his own sense of personal rectitude and his need
to be seen as virtuous by others that compel him to take Tom’s case.
In response to Scout’s asking why he is defending someone most
people think he should not, Atticus alludes to “a number of reasons,”
169. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 63 (“‘I said I pays my own way,’ said Lu-
cas.”).
170. Id. at 71.
171. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 97.
172. See Talbot D’Alemberte, Remembering Atticus Finch’s Pro Bono Legacy, LEGAL
TIMES, April 6, 1992, at 26 (describing as pro bono Atticus’s representation of Tom). On the
other hand, some commentators have argued that Atticus’s representation of Tom should not
be viewed as true pro bono work because Atticus was not a volunteer. See Freedman, Right and
Wrong, supra note 13, at 481 (noting somewhat disparagingly that “Atticus Finch never in his
professional life voluntarily takes a pro bono case in an effort to ameliorate the evil—which he
himself and others recognize—in the apartheid of Maycomb, Alabama”); see also LEE,
MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 174 (noting that Scout is relieved to discover that Atticus did
not take the case voluntarily).
173. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 228.
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but elaborates only one: “The main one is, if I didn’t, I couldn’t hold
up my head in town, I couldn’t represent this county in the legisla-
ture, I couldn’t even tell you or Jem not to do something again.”174
Each explanatory clause begins with “I”; Atticus does not mention
Tom Robinson at all.
When Atticus places his position on a religious foundation, he
does base his sense of obligation on Tom’s need for help: “This case,
Tom Robinson’s case, is something that goes to the essence of a
man’s conscience—Scout, I couldn’t go to church and worship God if
I didn’t try to help that man.”175 But even here, the emphasis is on At-
ticus’s personal righteousness. That entails helping Tom, but helping
Tom is in the subordinate clause. In helping Tom Robinson, as Tho-
mas Shaffer has pointed out, Atticus’s mode is not primarily acting
according to high principles in the Kantian, deontological tradition.
Instead, he is simply living out the consequences of his virtuous char-
acter.176 But Atticus’s character, if not flawed, is oddly focused. He
turns distinctly inward, toward being a virtuous person, rather than
outward, toward helping another. 
2. Listening to the Client’s Story. Gavin and Atticus both
respond with genuine, even physical, courage to what they perceive
as threats of grievous racial injustice, willingly interposing themselves
between their clients and lynch mobs.177 But Gavin fundamentally,
almost fatally, misconstrues his client’s situation; the critical work in
making Lucas’s case is complete before Gavin has done anything but
argue with him. Atticus, by contrast, foresees everything from the
beginning and assumes full control of every aspect of the case,
without our ever hearing him even consult with his client.
a. Mockingbird. Atticus scarcely needs to listen; he seems to
have gathered the truth of Tom’s innocence osmotically. We never
hear Tom tell Atticus his story; the closest we have, in barest outline,
is what Atticus tells his brother: “The only thing we’ve got is a black
man’s word against the Ewells’. The evidence boils down to you-
did—I-didn’t.”178 Atticus not only knows, almost instinctively, his
174. Id. at 83; see also id. at 96 (Atticus explains to his brother, “But do you think I could
face my children otherwise?”).
175. Id. at 113.
176. See THOMAS SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 7 (1987) [hereinafter SHAFFER,
FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS] (arguing that Atticus is best understood by examining his char-
acter, not his principles).
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client’s innocence; he also knows his neighbors’ racism: “The jury
couldn’t possibly be expected to take Tom Robinson’s word against
the Ewells’.”179 Atticus knows from the outset that he will lose at trial,
and he plans accordingly: “Before I’m through, I intend to jar the
jury a bit—I think we’ll have a reasonable chance on appeal,
though.”180
Nowhere does Atticus consult with his client on this strategy,
though he reports that he tried to explain it.181 But, when the authori-
ties take Tom to prison, Atticus tells Calpurnia that “he just gave up
hope.”182 Although Atticus empathizes with Tom’s frustration, we are
left with the conviction that, had Tom listened to his lawyer and kept
his faith in the law, he would have been saved. The tragedy, ulti-
mately, is that Tom took his fate into his own hands, when he should
have relied upon his lawyer and the law.
We learn of that fate thirdhand. Atticus reports to his sister what
he heard through an intermediary about the prison guards’ account
of Tom’s futile attempt to escape from prison:
“It was during their exercise period. They said he just broke into a
blind raving charge at the fence and started climbing over. Right in
front of them—”
. . . .
“They fired a few shots into the air, then to kill. They got him just as
he went over the fence. . . . Seventeen bullet holes in him. They
didn’t have to shoot him that much.”183
This sequence confirms the town’s racist interpretation:
To Maycomb, Tom’s death was Typical. Typical of a nigger to cut
and run. Typical of a nigger’s mentality to have no plan, no thought
for the future, just run blind first chance he saw. Funny thing, Atti-
                                                                                                                                     
177. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 63 (Gavin offers to stay with Lucas in jail
in the face of a mob’s imminent arrival); LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 155-157 (Atticus
faces down a lynch mob).
178. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 96.
179. Id.
180. Id. Earlier, Atticus had told Scout they must fight on even though they will lose: “Sim-
ply because we were licked a hundred years before we started is no reason for us not to try to
win.” Id. at 84.
181. See id. at 247.
182. Id. at 248-49.
183. Id. at 248.
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cus Finch might’ve got him off scot free, but wait—? Hell no. You
know how they are. Easy come, easy go. Just shows you, that Robin-
son boy was legally married, they say he kept himself clean, went to
church and all that, but when it comes down to the line the veneer’s
mighty thin. Nigger always comes out in ’em.184
Thus, the town makes sense of the death of one who, they learned at
trial, was a “respectable Negro”: all blacks are, at bottom, “bad.”
The town’s minority of respectable white citizens draws the op-
posite conclusion and draws together around it. The local newspaper
editor, who had put aside his own racism to support Atticus against
the lynch mob,185 fulminates in an editorial: “[I]t was a sin to kill crip-
ples, be they standing, sitting, or escaping. He likens Tom’s death to
the senseless slaughter of songbirds by hunters and children.”186
Tom’s death finally brings Atticus’s ambivalent sister Alexandra
around to his side: “This is the last straw, Atticus.”187
Atticus, as always, is forgiving and philosophical (and, of course,
correct). With respect to the guards who shot Tom, he tries to see
things their way: “He wasn’t Tom to them, he was an escaping pris-
oner.”188 And in Tom’s death itself, Atticus bends under the tragic
burden of its ill-fated heroism:
Atticus leaned against the refrigerator, pushed up his glasses, and
rubbed his eyes. “We had such a good chance,” he said. “I told him
what I thought, but I couldn’t in truth say that we had more than a
good chance. I guess Tom was tired of white men’s chances and pre-
ferred to take his own.”189
His futile escape attempt was not, from Atticus’s perspective, a con-
firmation of Tom’s racial inferiority. It was, instead, a flash of under-
standable but ill-advised heroism sparked by deeply human frustra-
tion.
Just how good a chance they had, or may be supposed to have
had, on appeal is clearly to be assessed against the background of the
184. Id. at 253-54.
185. See id. at 167 (‘“You know, it’s a funny thing about Braxton,’ said Atticus. ‘He de-
spises Negroes, won’t have one near him.’”).
186. Id. at 254.
187. Id. at 248.
188. Id. at 249.
189. Id.
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contemporary Scottsboro case.190 Addressed to an audience in 1960,
Lee’s account contains a heightened tragedy. If only Tom had taken
Atticus’s advice, a virtuous appellate court might well have over-
turned his conviction on appeal, as appellate courts repeatedly did in
the Scottsboro case.191
b. Intruder. With Lucas, precisely the opposite is true. Lucas
takes matters into his own hands at the very outset, and he delivers
himself not only without his lawyer’s help, but against his lawyer’s
advice. Moreover, Lucas makes it quite clear from the outset that the
law itself is a danger, with which he suspects Gavin may be too
closely allied. Gavin, who comes to the jail already having decided to
represent Lucas, learns that Lucas does not see him in the first
instance as a liberator. Knowing that appearances are against him,
Lucas first asks Gavin, “What you going to do with me?”192 Gavin,
surprised and offended, distances himself from what he presumes to
be the source of Lucas’s danger, the murdered man’s family and their
network of kin. Lucas dismisses these dangers with a wave of his
hand, then gets to the point: “I mean the law. Aint you the county
lawyer?”193
Only after Gavin assures him that he is not the prosecutor does
Lucas observe, “Then you can take my case.”194 Even then, Lucas
makes clear that he is not primarily interested in hiring a lawyer.
Gavin’s status as a lawyer is incidental, rather than essential, to Lu-
190. See JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 11 (analyzing parallels with the Scottsboro case as es-
sential to understanding the historical context of Mockingbird). The Scottsboro case developed
from the March 25, 1931, arrest of nine young black men in Scottsboro, Alabama, for the al-
leged rape of two young white women. See JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO 3-5
(1994). Even though most of the evidence against them came from the testimony of their ac-
cusers, one of whom subsequently recanted, eight of the accused were sentenced to death. See
id. at xi, 131-32. The trial of the ninth, who was only thirteen years old, ended in a mistrial. See
id. at 8-9. After seven years of appeals and retrials, during which the U.S. Supreme Court twice
overturned the convictions, four of the original indictments were dropped, and the remaining
five men received long prison terms. See id. at 394-96. By 1946, all the men had been paroled
except one. See id. at 396. Two years later, he escaped to Michigan, where the state government
refused to extradite him to Alabama. See id. at 379-81.
191. See Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935) (overturning a conviction because
blacks were excluded from the jury); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (same); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (reversing convictions on the ground that Alabama failed to pro-
vide adequate assistance of counsel); Powell v. State, 141 So. 201 (Ala. 1932) (reversing one
defendant’s conviction on the ground that he was a juvenile at the time of the alleged crime).
192. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 58.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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cas, a potentially serious hazard but not a particularly promising help:
“I wants to hire somebody. It dont have to be a lawyer.”195 Their
meeting is a veritable poker game of high stakes and mutual distrust.
Each looks for advantage, hoping to bend the other to his wishes.196
Lucas tries to maneuver Gavin into taking his case before revealing
what happened; Gavin tries to extract Lucas’s story before agreeing
to handle the case in the manner Lucas wishes.
Frustrated with Lucas’s reticence and insistence on controlling
the course of the representation, Gavin asserts that he holds all the
cards: “Because you aint got any job to offer anybody. You’re in jail,
depending on the grace of God to keep those damned Gowries from
dragging you out of here and hanging you . . . .”197 Assuming that Lu-
cas wants to plead not guilty and go to trial, Gavin is unequivocal: “I
dont defend murderers who shoot people in the back.”198 Gavin lays
out an alternative strategy: he will secure a venue in which the judge
does not know Lucas, plead him guilty, and persuade the judge to
sentence him to life imprisonment, in view of his advanced age and
clean record.199
But the advantage, ironically, is with Lucas. His look is “shrewd
secret and intent”;200 he knows his opponent better and sizes him up
more accurately. Lucas’s abbreviated version of events does not re-
195. Id. at 59.
196. See id. The conversation first reminds Chick of the child’s game Five Hundred, then of
high-stakes poker. See id. The latter allusion clearly raises the metaphorical stakes for Lucas;
his mother was won (and, of course, lost) in a poker game between two white men, one her
cousin, the other her owner. See FAULKNER, MOSES, supra note 3, at 20-29, 101. And the deck
was almost certainly stacked by the dealer, Lucas’s father, who stood to marry the young slave
woman at wager, and did. Here the stakes are equally high, but now Lucas is playing his own
hand.
197. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 60; see also MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, su-
pra note 30, at 127 (identifying the role of suppliant as antithetical to that of hero: “The suppli-
ant, too, who has been forced to beg for what he must have, has put himself at the mercy of an-
other and so renders himself a potential corpse or slave.”).
198. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 58; see also BROOKS, supra note 141, at 282-83
(asserting that “it is essential to our understanding of the novel for us to realize that when
Gavin Stevens tells Lucas that he will take his case, he does so in spite of a presumption of Lu-
cas’s guilt that amounts almost to certainty”).
199. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 63. The penitentiary to which Lucas
would have gone was the notorious Parchman, see id. at 58, a byword for slave labor under
field-gang conditions, see DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM
AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE; WILLIAM BANKS TAYLOR, DOWN ON PARCHMAN
FARM: THE GREAT PRISON IN THE MISSISSIPPI DELTA (1999). But cf. BROOKS, supra note 141,
at 286 (stating that “Gavin Stevens . . . simply wants Lucas to get a fair trial and only such pun-
ishment as the law will properly mete out”).
200. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 59.
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veal his innocence to Gavin, but it does reveal to Lucas that Gavin
cannot begin to fathom that possibility and thus that Lucas will have
to look elsewhere for assistance.201 Gavin offers Lucas physical pro-
tection at the obvious risk of his own life, precisely as Atticus had
done for Tom.202 But Lucas rejects this aid, not because he believes he
does not need it, but because he knows it is inadequate. Moreover, he
rejects it with sardonic humor, nicely lampooning Gavin’s loquacity:
“If you stay here you’ll talk till morning.”203
What Lucas needs is someone to do the unthinkable: to exhume
Vince Gowrie, whom he had apparently shot, in order to prove that
the fatal bullet was not from his antique Colt pistol.204 He arranges for
Chick to return without his uncle on the pretext of bringing him some
tobacco, and he puts the job to him. Chick, as we have seen, accepts.
Gavin only returns to Lucas’s aid after Chick, with the help of Miss
Habersham and Aleck Sander, makes the exculpatory discovery that
Vince Gowrie’s body had been removed from its grave after Lucas’s
arrest.205
3. Settling up. The conclusions of Tom and Lucas’s cases
confirm the nature of their relationships with their lawyers. The
entire black community symbolically acknowledges its debt of
gratitude to Atticus. Lucas, if no longer quite indebted to nothing and
to no one, nevertheless deftly puts Gavin in his place.
a. Mockingbird. The underlying spirit of noblesse oblige in
Mockingbird is underscored in a scene at the end of the trial that
nicely echoes the terms of Atticus’s relation with his other
impoverished client, the white Walter Cunningham. At breakfast on
the day after the trial, Calpurnia serves up to Atticus’s surprise the
offerings of the grateful black community: a chicken “Tom
Robinson’s daddy sent you along . . . this morning” and rolls from
“Estelle down at the hotel.”206 Following Calpurnia back into the
201. See id. at 60-63.
202. See supra note 177.
203. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 63.
204. See id. at 93 (“It remained . . . to elect and do . . . the two things out of all man’s vast
reservoir of invention and capability that Beat Four [an area of Yoknapatawpha County] would
repudiate and retaliate on most violently: to violate the grave of one of its progeny in order to
save a nigger murderer from its vengeance.”).
205. See id. at 103.
206. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 225-26.
    
1999] LIBERATING LAWYERS 645
kitchen, Atticus and his children discover a countrified cornucopia:
“The kitchen table was loaded with enough food to bury the family:
hunks of salt pork, tomatoes, beans, even scuppernongs. Atticus
grinned when he found a jar of pickled pigs’ knuckles.”207
Even though Atticus seems amused, Calpurnia is concerned:
“This was all ‘round the back steps when I got here this morning.
They—they ‘preciate what you did, Mr. Finch. They—they aren’t
oversteppin’ themselves, are they?”208 The bounty briefly overwhelms
Atticus, but he recovers and reassures Calpurnia: ‘“Tell them I’m
very grateful,’ he said. ‘Tell them—tell them they must never do this
again. Times are too hard . . . .’”209
With this magnanimous message, Atticus restores order, but it is
worth noting in some detail what an order this is. In the first place,
and most fundamentally, it is an order in which Atticus is the arbiter
of order. Calpurnia is not sure her fellow blacks’ gesture is proper un-
til she has Atticus’s reaction. In the second place, it is an order in
which not just Tom Robinson, Atticus’s pro bono client, and not just
Tom Robinson’s immediate family, but also the entire local black
community—“they”—are indebted to Atticus. For all his gracious-
ness, Atticus keeps it that way; indeed, keeping it that way is not an
intentional element that undermines his graciousness; it is implicit in
and inseparable from that very graciousness itself.
In the third place, these are the very sorts of offerings Mr. Cun-
ningham made to pay Atticus for his legal service in the novel’s
opening pages. And Atticus makes clear, as we have seen, that the
Cunninghams are extremely poor. In Atticus’s words, “[t]he Cun-
ninghams are country folks, farmers, and the crash hit them hard-
est.”210 Yet, times are not too hard for Atticus to allow Mr. Cunning-
ham to pay in full, albeit in kind and on installment. Scout long ago
learned the reason: “The Cunninghams never took anything they
can’t pay back—no church baskets and no scrip stamps”211—in other
words, no charity. Atticus clearly admires this independence: “Mr.
Cunningham,” Atticus has said, “came from a set breed of men.”212
Blacks, it seems to go without saying, are from a different breed. Im-
207. Id. at 226.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 27.
211. Id. at 26.
212. Id. at 27.
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plicit in Atticus’s refusal of further payment from them is an accep-
tance not only of their collective debt, but also of their collective
place as the objects of the charitable forgiveness of debt.
b. Intruder. Nothing could be further from the aristocratic
aloofness of Lucas. He is not just free of debt, but above the very
commercial world in which mere monetary debt is incurred.
Everyone who is black is beholden to Atticus; Lucas, although black,
thinks himself beholden to no one, least of all to his lawyer.
At the end of his ordeal, in the very final pages of the story, Lu-
cas confirms the nature of his relationship with his lawyer. Gavin sees
him coming across the town square and tells Chick, “[H]e’s a gentle-
man; he wont remind me to my face that I was wrong; he’s just going
to ask me how much he owes me as his lawyer.”213 Sure enough, Lucas
has come to settle his accounts, and what transpires is a comic reca-
pitulation of their earlier, jailhouse encounter, in which Gavin mis-
measured Lucas with very nearly tragic consequences.214
Gavin, jockeying for the upper hand, says Lucas owes him noth-
ing for legal services, since he did not believe Lucas at the outset.215
Lucas insists on at least paying Gavin’s expenses, which Gavin sets at
a ludicrously low two dollars, the price of a fountain pen tip he broke
writing down Lucas’s story. Lucas responds to what might have been
taken as a slighting offer of charity by reminding Gavin of their re-
spective roles: “That dont sound like much to me but then I’m a
farming man and you’re a lawing man and whether you know your
business or not I reckon it aint none of my red wagon . . . to try to
learn you different.”216 What is more, Lucas proffers his payment in
pennies. Gavin, with mock insistence that “this is business,” requires
Lucas to count the coins. But Lucas has the last word: he asks for a
receipt.217
213. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 234.
214. See supra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
215. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 238.
216. Id. at 239.
217. See id. at 240-41; cf. BROOKS, supra note 141, at 292-94 (conceding that “Lucas leaves
with the honors of the field, and he is allowed the last word,” but viewing Lucas’s coins as “to-
ken of a debt beyond payment” to Gavin and Chick); King, supra note 6, at 241-42 (conceding
that Lucas turns the tables and finally reverses Gavin’s paternalism here, but finding the rever-
sal inadequate because it is merely personal, not communal and political, a gesture rather than
a conversation).
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The mock-seriousness of the entire exchange redounds to Lu-
cas’s advantage.218 It trivializes both the currency in which Gavin, in
his capacity as a lawyer, is paid and the nature of the bonds that such
payments establish. More significantly, it underscores who, in the re-
lationship between lawyer and client, is beholden to whom. The
agrarian aristocrat calls the lawyer, and by implication the legal pro-
fession and even the law itself, to account, without even taking that
accounting very seriously.
D. Lawyers and “Others”
Gavin’s relationship with Lucas, like Atticus’s with Tom, is only
the most salient way in which these lawyers interact with traditional
outsiders. In what follows, we will examine the links between Gavin
and Atticus and several outsider groups: women, blacks and lower-
class whites, and children, especially the lawyers’ protégés.219 In each
case, we will see that, as presented in their respective stories, Atticus
has much to teach,220 and Gavin, much to learn.
1. Lawyers and Women. Bordering the adult male dominion in
the world of each novel is a distinct female hemisphere, never fully
separate but never quite perfectly congruent. Moreover, in each
novel, a particular woman embodies virtues admirable in the male
realm. But these women’s worlds differ both from each other and in
their intersections with the world of men, particularly male lawyers.
Mockingbird’s women’s world is supporting and subordinate;
Intruder’s is, in important respects, independent and superior.
a. Mockingbird. Like the male world it complements, the
female world of Mockingbird revolves around Atticus. Atticus’s wife
218. Cf. BROOKS, supra note 141, at 294 (noting the characters’ use of jests to handle what
might otherwise have been an embarrassingly maudlin situation).
219. See JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 71-93 (discussing encounters with “the Other” as one
of Mockingbird’s main Gothic themes).
220. Thus, according to Janice Radway,
Harper Lee’s novel aims for nothing less than the reconceptualization of women and
“Negroes” as collections of individually different human beings rather than as cate-
gories of people identifiable by certain common properties. In the end, though, it can
only manage that task by modeling this newly recognized individuality on that of the
white men who are presumed to be its most extraordinary exemplars. Although the
book wants very much to be progressive about the subjects of gender and race, it fails
finally to undo the fundamental equations that generally ensure that those with
power are gendered male and tinted white.
RADWAY, supra note 13, at 337.
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has died by the time the novel opens;221 there are three significant
women in Atticus’s life, each in a distinctly supporting role. They are
his maid, Calpurnia; his next-door neighbor, Miss Maudie
Atkinson;222 and his sister, Alexandra. Calpurnia is, as we have seen,
Jem and Scout’s surrogate mother, the junior partner in Atticus’s
unorthodox parenting arrangement. As such, she runs afoul of Aunt
Alexandra, who is very much torn between affection for her brother
and unthinking acceptance of traditional southern folkways. This is
how Scout describes Aunt Alexandra upon her coming to live with
them:
To all parties present and participating in the life of the county,
Aunt Alexandra was one of the last of her kind: she had river-boat,
boarding-school manners; let any moral come along and she would
uphold it; she was born in the objective case; she was an incurable
gossip. When Aunt Alexandra went to school, self-doubt could not
be found in any textbook, so she knew not its meaning. She was
never bored, and given the slightest chance she would exercise her
royal prerogative: she would arrange, advise, caution, and warn.223
She is particularly concerned about the proper deportment of
elite women and the preservation of family status. Atticus’s represen-
tation of Tom precipitates her decision to displace Calpurnia by
moving in with Atticus’s family.224 Her chief complaint is Scout’s un-
ladylike dress and conduct.225 She and Atticus come to loggerheads
over her insistence that Calpurnia be dismissed; he steadfastly re-
fuses, maintaining that Calpurnia is part of the family.226
Miss Maudie is a different kind of southern lady, unorthodox in
socially acceptable ways that make her in many respects the female
counterpart of Atticus. Scout introduces her as “the best lady I
221. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 12.
222. I have persuaded a surprising number of people that Miss Maudie is my paternal
grandfather’s sister-in-law; this is probably not the place to continue the claim.
223. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 139.
224. Aunt Alexandra arrives precisely as Jem and Scout return from their visit to Cal-
purnia’s church. See id. at 137.
225. See id. at 89 (“But the only time I ever heard Atticus speak sharply to anyone was
when I once heard him say, ‘Sister, I do the best I can with them!’ It had something to do with
my going around in overalls.”).
226. See id. at 147; see also JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 52 (“Aunt Alexandra, so strong in
her obsession of remaking Atticus’s unconventional family into an orthodox one and forcing
the family history on the reluctant children, ironically promotes the emergence of the worst
values from Atticus’s family, and simultaneously threatens the existence of the best values of
that family.”).
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know.”227 She both resolves the conflict between Atticus and Alexan-
dra over the rearing of his children and teaches them and Alexandra
what Atticus is all about. Like Atticus’s family, she comes from the
old aristocratic stock of Finch’s Landing,228 a pedigree that permits
her an appealing array of eccentricities. She has a sharp tongue, a
love of the outdoors, and a no-nonsense candor with children.229
These qualities endear her to Atticus’s children, especially Scout,
who confides in her and takes her as something of a role model. The
most prominent aspect of her role is defending and explaining Atti-
cus.230
Miss Maudie’s values and her version of being a lady triumph in
a Methodist missionary society tea that Aunt Alexandra holds at At-
ticus’s house.231 Aunt Alexandra is clearly in her element as hostess.
Calpurnia is serving teacakes in a starched apron;232 Scout also at-
tends as a lady-in-training, with her best Sunday dress concealing her
“britches.”233 Miss Maudie, not a Methodist herself, is consigned to an
adjunct status: “It was customary for every circle hostess to invite her
neighbors in for refreshments, be they Baptists or Presbyterians.”234
But Aunt Alexandra soon loses the upper hand. The meeting’s
ugly subtext, establishment disapproval of Atticus’s representation of
Tom, threatens to disrupt the façade of Christian concern for the dis-
advantaged safely overseas in Africa.235 Miss Maudie puts Atticus’s
detractors in their place with a deft word, winning a grateful glance
from Aunt Alexandra. Scout is duly impressed, if a bit mystified, by
their odd alliance: “I wondered at the world of women. Miss Maudie
227. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 52.
228. See id. at 50.
229. See id. at 51.
230. For example, when Atticus proclaims that it is a sin to kill a mockingbird, Scout recalls
that she has never before heard Atticus call anything a sin, so she asks Miss Maudie about it.
See id. at 98. Miss Maudie explains: “Your father’s right . . . . Mockingbirds don’t do one thing
but make music for us to enjoy. They don’t eat up people’s gardens, don’t nest in corncribs,
they don’t do one thing but sing their hearts out for us. That’s why it’s a sin to kill a mocking-
bird.” Id.
231. See id. at 240-51.
232. See id. at 240.
233. Id. at 241.
234. Id.
235. See JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 87 (describing the society meeting’s Gothic fascination
with the safely distant “‘sin and squalor’ of a dark Other”).
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and Aunt Alexandra had never been especially close, and here was
Aunty silently thanking her for something. For what, I knew not.”236
But that is only the beginning. Back in the kitchen, Atticus calls
Calpurnia out to help him break the news of Tom Robinson’s death
to his widow. Shattered by this news and shorn of their servant, Aunt
Alexandra and Scout must keep up appearances on their own. Aunt
Alexandra nearly breaks down:
“I can’t say I approve of everything he does, Maudie, but he’s my
brother, and I just want to know when this will ever end.” Her voice
rose: “It tears him to pieces. He doesn’t show it much, but it tears
him to pieces. I’ve seen him when—what else do they want from
him, Maudie, what else?”237
This is a critical juncture. Aunt Alexandra’s perspective has shifted
from presiding over a hypocritical ceremony to helping Atticus, but
she cannot quite see what that involves. At this point, Miss Maudie,
the ultimate lady, takes charge: “‘Be quiet, they’ll hear you,’ said
Miss Maudie. ‘Have you ever thought of it this way, Alexandra?
Whether Maycomb knows it or not, we’re paying the highest tribute
we can pay a man. We trust him to do right. It’s that simple.’”238
As Scout notices, Miss Maudie identifies who “we” are in almost
precisely the same terms she earlier had used to console Jem over the
injustice of Tom’s conviction: “The handful of people in this town
who say that fair play is not marked White Only; the handful of peo-
ple who say a fair trial is for everybody. . . . The handful of people in
this town with background . . . .”239 With that identification of the true
aristocracy and its champion, everything falls into place, all in the
service of Atticus.
At the outset of the meeting, when facetiously asked whether
she wanted to be a lawyer, Scout had replied, “Nome, just a lady,”
and Miss Maudie had approvingly squeezed her hand.240 As the scene
in the parlor opened, Scout had “wondered at world of women,” ex-
pressing anxiety about her inevitable entry into its superficiality and
236. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 246.
237. Id. at 249.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 249-50; cf. id. at 228 (“‘We’re the safest folks in the world,’ said Miss Maudie [to
Jem]. ‘We’re so rarely called on to be Christians, but when we are, we’ve got men like Atticus
to go for us.’”).
240. Id. at 243.
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hypocrisy.241 She felt “more at home in my father’s world,” the rough
but honest world of men, where people “did not trap you with inno-
cent questions to make fun of you.”242 Now, having explained things,
Miss Maudie checks them for their composure and joins them as co-
hostess. “After all,” Scout concludes at the scene’s close, “if Aunty
could be a lady at a time like this, so could I.”243 Atticus, self-
appointed messenger of the law, has dispatched himself to the relief
of Tom’s widow; back in the parlor, standing and waiting takes a very
different form from Chick’s service to Lucas: “Aunt Alexandra
looked across the room at me and smiled. She looked at a tray of
cookies on the table and nodded at them. I carefully picked up the
tray and watched myself walk to Mrs. Merriweather. With my best
company manners, I asked if she would have some.”244
Miss Maudie’s depth of insight into Atticus’s character and her
devotion to his cause might suggest an element of romance between
them. But their relationship is wholly platonic; when Miss Maudie
playfully flirts, it is with Atticus’s brother, a protégé of her father, a
doctor.245 Indeed, it is Miss Maudie herself who makes clear to the
children an aspect of Atticus’s character that they can understand
only obliquely at their age. Implicit in the wisdom of his fifty years is
an immunity from romantic passion: “You and Jem have the benefit
of your father’s age. If your father was thirty you’d find life quite dif-
ferent.”246 By “different,” she clearly means to imply worse, and
maybe even the worst, the horror of childhood horrors: a stepmother.
In a heavily symbolic—indeed, almost parodically, Freudian—
scene early in the novel, Lee removes any suspicion that Atticus’s
age, in Scout’s innocent terms, “reflected upon his abilities and manli-
ness.”247 Compared to the occupations and achievements of her
241. Id. at 246-47; see also id. at 147 (“I felt the starched walls of a pink cotton penitentiary
closing in on me . . . .”).
242. Id. at 246-47. Unless, of course, you deserve to be tricked, as both Bob and Mayella
Ewell learn to their chagrin. See id. at 189 (describing Bob Ewell’s opinion that “[t]ricking law-
yers like Atticus Finch took advantage of him all the time with their tricking ways”); id. at 193-
200 (detailing Atticus’s sly and devastating cross-examination of Mayella).
243. Id. at 251.
244. Id. Although Mrs. Merriweather was a simpering hypocrite, the Atticus detractor
whom Miss Maudie had initially silenced, even she must be accorded the courtesies due guests
in a proper lady’s house.
245. See id. at 50-51.
246. Id. at 99.
247. Id. at 97; cf. JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 36 (“The gun also takes on some symbolic
value in the novel as a source of power that must always be reined in.”).
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schoolmates’ fathers, Atticus’s career is a disappointment. He is fifty
and feeble; he works in an office and wears glasses; he will not even
play on the Methodists’ church-league football team. Unlike other
fathers, who hunted, fished, played poker, smoked, and even drank,
Atticus “sat in the livingroom and read.”248 Pressed to his defense,
Miss Maudie insists that “he can make somebody’s will so airtight
can’t anybody meddle with it”;249 besides which, he plays not only
checkers, but also the Jew’s harp. But Scout remains unimpressed;
indeed, having discovered only these modest accomplishments, she is
even more ashamed.250
Then she and Jem discover a mad dog on their quiet street. Cal-
purnia coolly calls Atticus, who rushes home with Sheriff Tate. Hav-
ing declared that “this is a one-shot job,” the sheriff, much to the
amazement of Jem and Scout, “almost threw the rifle at Atticus.”251
Atticus pushes his glasses up onto his forehead, then drops them to
the street, where Scout hears them crack; moments later, he “ground
the broken lenses to powder under his heel,”252 presumably to protect
the feet of small children. But first, with Zen-like coordination, he
fires a single shot that hits the mad dog just above the eye; the animal
“didn’t know what hit him.”253 Jem and Scout are astounded.254
Miss Maudie hails Atticus from across the street: “I saw that,
One-Shot Finch!” She follows up her advantage with the children,
explaining the nickname of Atticus’s youth, when he was renowned
as the best shot in the county.255 When Jem asks why he no longer
hunts, Miss Maudie elaborates: “If your father’s anything, he’s civi-
lized in his heart. Marksmanship’s a gift of God, a talent . . . . I think
maybe he put his gun down when he realized that God had given him
an unfair advantage over most living things.”256 Atticus’s apparent
lack of stereotypical southern machismo is not impotence, but a kind
of chivalrous renunciation, the symbolic celibacy of the most truly
virile.
248. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 98.
249. Id. at 99.
250. See id.
251. Id. at 104.
252. Id. at 105.
253. Id.
254. See id. at 105-06.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 107.
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A political cartoon in the Montgomery Advertiser suggests an
element of sublimation as well, revealing the real outlet of Atticus’s
mature energies: “It showed Atticus barefooted and in short pants,
chained to a desk: he was diligently writing on a slate while some
frivolous-looking girls yelled, ‘Yoo-hoo!’ at him.”257 Jem explains to
Scout that this is a compliment. In an emergency session called in the
depths of the Depression, Atticus is doing the things that otherwise
would not get done, “like reorganizing the tax systems of the counties
and things. That kind of thing’s pretty dry to most men.”258 That kind
of thing, in our idiom, of course, is not “sexy.”
Atticus had met his much younger wife while he was in Mont-
gomery with the legislature, but she is dead and that phase is long
past. Lee avoids the obvious cliché of calling the law Atticus’s jealous
mistress. But this metaphor would not be entirely accurate: Atticus is,
rather, the law’s devoted consort, with all the women in his life as
law’s ladies-in-waiting.
But even well-meaning ladies can be a bother, to law and to its
male agents, as we learn in the book’s final episode. In a kind of
Halloween-out-of-hand, the elusive Boo Radley saves Jem and Scout
from the vengeance of Bob Ewell, whom he kills in the fracas. Atti-
cus, briefly addled by the affair, mistakenly assumes that Jem, rather
than Boo, has killed Bob Ewell. Even after Sheriff Tate dispels this
illusion, Atticus insists on an inquest to clear Jem’s name. The sheriff
vows to assert that Bob Ewell fell on his own knife; Atticus insists,
true to form, that the “[b]est way to clear the air is to have it all out in
the open.”259
But the sheriff finally prevails, convincing Atticus not to subject
the reclusive Boo to the ordeal of publicity. Significantly, it is not the
inquest itself that concerns the sheriff; it is the well-intended but un-
welcomed attentions Boo’s heroism would inevitably bring from
women:
“All the ladies in Maycomb includin’ my wife’d be knocking on his
door bringing angel food cakes. To my way of thinkin’, Mr. Finch,
taking the one man who’s done you and this town a great service an’
257. Id. at 126.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 287.
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draggin’ him with his shy ways into the limelight—to me, that’s a sin.
It’s a sin and I’m not about to have it on my head.”260
Scout, who has overheard the debate, tells Atticus that the sheriff is
right. She has heard Atticus call only one thing a sin,261 and she rec-
ognizes that sin here: “[I]t’d be sort of like shootin’ a mockingbird,
wouldn’t it?”262
Thus, Atticus’s understudy, with his assent, equates the custom-
ary attentions of southern women with the cardinal sin, the only
other instance of which we have in the story is the shooting of Tom
Robinson. Scout, Atticus, and the sheriff all agree implicitly that the
women in question could not be made to understand what a child re-
alizes instantly and intuitively. Rather than try to explain something
so simple to women of ordinary intelligence, Atticus will not only
wink at a lie, but also involve his daughter in the connivance. In Atti-
cus’s manly world, even the processes of law itself must bend in the
crisis to the silly ways of women.263 
There is, however, one woman in Mockingbird who is neither
silly nor servile, one who embodies manly virtues that Atticus himself
admires as such. She is another of their neighbors, Mrs. Henry
Lafayette Dubose.264 Paradoxically, she loathes Atticus, largely for his
representation of Tom, though Atticus greatly admires her. As it
turns out, however, this paradox, too, is resolved very much in Atti-
cus’s favor.
Mrs. Dubose is a perversion of masculine virtues, a virago. Her
trademark is a Confederate army pistol, “concealed among her nu-
merous shawls and wraps.”265 She is physically hideous266 and thor-
oughly racist, sexist, and snobbish. She taunts Jem and Scout by call-
ing Atticus “a nigger-lover,”267 and she torments Scout about her
260. Id. at 290.
261. See id. at 98.
262. Id. at 291.
263. Johnson is right, as far as she goes, to argue that “[i]n the case of Boo Radley’s killing
of Bob Ewell . . . laws and boundaries must be overridden for justice to be done.” JOHNSON,
supra note 12, at 106. It is important, however, to see precisely what, in Atticus’s mind, the pa r-
ticular threat to justice is here.
264. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 114-21, 257.
265. Id. at 108. Lest we overlook the obvious phallic associations, the movie has Jem tell us
she keeps the pistol in her lap.
266. See id. at 115-16. This is Scout’s perception; Atticus explains, “She can’t help that.
When people are sick they don’t look nice sometimes.” Id. at 117.
267.  Id.
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unladylike deportment and the prospect of her becoming a waitress
at a local cafe, to the disgrace of her well-born mother from Mont-
gomery.268
Atticus enjoins Jem to bear with her stoically, like a gentleman,
but Jem breaks under the constant insults to his father. He retaliates
by decapitating her prized camellias.269 Having “fallen into her
hands,”270 as Atticus puts it, Jem must honor what seems at first a bi-
zarre request. Late each afternoon, he must read to her from Ivan-
hoe.271 The point of this exercise only becomes apparent with her
death. Atticus, who as her lawyer was with her at the last, informs
Jem that, after putting her business affairs in order, she had resolved
to conquer her morphine addiction, “to leave this world beholden to
nothing and nobody.”272 For her, Jem’s readings were nothing more
than distractions from the agonies of her ultimately successful with-
drawal.
But for Jem Atticus meant these readings to be something more,
as he explains:
“I wanted you to see something about her—I wanted you to see
what real courage is, instead of getting the idea that courage is a
man with a gun in his hand. It’s when you know you’re licked before
you begin but you begin anyway and you see it through no matter
what. You rarely win, but sometimes you do. Mrs. Dubose won, all
ninety-eight pounds of her. According to her views, she died be-
holden to nothing and nobody. She was the bravest person I ever
knew.”273
She was also “a great lady,” and Jem is duly impressed.274 The
scene, which concludes the book’s first part, closes with Jem “finger-
ing the wide petals”275 of the perfectly white Snow-on-the-Mountain
camellia, symbol of pure and incorruptible southern womanhood,276
268. See id. at 110.
269. See id. at 111.
270. Id. at 120.
271. See id. at 114-15. As Claudia Durst Johnson points out, “[t]he malignancy of romance
is most apparent in the association of Sir Walter Scott’s Ivanhoe, a novel synonymous with ro-
mance, with Mrs. Dubose, the repugnant old woman . . . .” JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 69.
272. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 120.
273. Id. at 121.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Hence the name of a Reconstruction-era vigilante band, the Knights of the White Ca-
mellia, “a particularly violent group of southern vigilantes, given to lynching and terrorizing the
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which she had sent him as her parting beau geste—and Parthian
shot.277
Self-immolation in gloriously lost causes is, of course, the stereo-
typically Cavalier and Confederate virtue, rivaled only by the aristo-
cratic aloofness of “being beholden to nothing and no one.” These
are the virtues Lucas embodies in Intruder, and it would be striking
indeed if their ultimate exemplar in Mockingbird were Atticus’s can-
didate, Mrs. Dubose. Scout knows otherwise and has told us before
Mrs. Dubose’s apotheosis. Describing the foul-mouthed abuse Atti-
cus unflinchingly endured from his heroine, Scout says, “It was times
like these when I thought my father, who hated guns and had never
been to any wars, was the bravest man who ever lived.”278
Furthermore, Atticus has already stated his own position on lost
causes. When Scout asked him whether they would win Tom Robin-
son’s case, he had replied, “Simply because we were licked a hundred
years before we started is no reason for us not to try to win.”279 Scout
immediately recognized this as the spirit of “Cousin Ike Finch [who]
was Maycomb County’s sole surviving Confederate veteran.”280 But it
is neither this nostalgic relic, given as he was to “rehash[ing] the
war,”281 nor the cantankerous Mrs. Dubose, secreting her CSA pistol,
who ultimately stands for virtue, southern style. It is, of course, Atti-
cus. He divorces Confederate pertinacity from both the re-living of
past glories and the exorcizing of personal demons, wedding it to the
progressive, public cause of racial justice.
Mrs. Dubose, then, is what theologians call a type or prefigure of
Atticus, a kind of rough-hewn John the Baptist preparing us for his
gentler Jesus. Moreover, she is not quite as “unbeholden” as she
would like to believe. It is, after all, Atticus who sends Jem to relieve
her suffering with his gentlemanly readings of Scott’s chivalrous epic.
It is Atticus who recognizes her as the bravest person he ever knew
and Atticus who uses her to educate his children in courage. Thus,
she who denounces Atticus is eventually brought round to serving his
purposes, even as the rebellious angels unwittingly serve God; those
who curse him, bless him. Ultimately, Atticus even improves on God;
                                                                                                                                     
black populace after the Civil War as a way of preserving the old southern way of life . . . .”
JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 48-49.
277. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 121.
278. Id. at 109.
279. Id. at 84.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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he, like Christ, is modest. Mrs. Dubose has wronged Atticus, and he
implicitly forgives her (presumably because she knows not what she
does).
b. Intruder. Gavin’s relationships with women could not be
more different from Atticus’s. Seeing Atticus through the eyes of
Scout, we would think he never had a sexual thought; seeing Gavin
through Chick’s eyes, we blush at both the adolescent romantic
exuberance of his young adulthood and the almost ludicrous
misogyny of his middle age. The latter comes out most clearly in the
book’s final chapter, when Gavin delivers to Chick a long excursus on
how “the automobile has become our national sex symbol”:282
‘[T]he American woman has become cold and undersexed; she has
projected her libido onto the automobile not only because its glitter
and gadgets and mobility pander to her vanity and incapacity . . . but
because it will not maul her and tousle her, get her all sweaty and
disarranged. So in order to capture and master anything at all of her
anymore the American man has got to make that car his own.’283
When Chick protests, “That’s not true,” Gavin gives the basis for his
opinions: “I am fifty-plus years old. . . . I spent the middle fifteen of
them fumbling beneath skirts. My experience was that few of them
were interested in love or sex either. They wanted to be married.”284
As Chick will come to find out later, his uncle’s assessment is not
so much a deduction from false premises as an induction from too
small a sample. We learn through Chick’s narration in other Faulkner
novels, particularly The Town and The Mansion, that fumbling be-
neath skirts was very much on his uncle’s mind for the better part of
fifteen years and that few women were interested in either love or sex
with him.285 The height of his romantic misadventures involves Eula
Varne Snopes and her daughter, Linda. He pursues the married
mother with awkwardly adolescent chivalry, ostensibly to defend her
282. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 233.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 234.
285. See BROOKS, supra note 141, at 194 (“For if any one thing about [The Town] soon be-
comes clear, it is that Gavin, and not for the first time in Faulkner’s fiction, is treated as a figure
of fun—almost as the butt of the author’s jokes.”); id. at 219 (observing that by the time of The
Mansion, when he has graduated from Harvard, Chick “in spite of his affection for his uncle,
sees him more and more as a lovable old fuddy-duddy”).
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universally and rightly doubted chastity;286 he courts the daughter
when she is barely an adolescent, plying her with poetry and ice
cream floats on the dubious pretext of “forming her mind.”287 At
various times, he engages in fisticuffs on behalf of each.288 As Richard
Weisberg has observed, these indiscretions reveal not the sterling at-
tributes we look for in our heroes, but the darker desires we fear
finding in ourselves.289
At the risk of radical understatement, Gavin is a deeply sexually
frustrated fellow by the time of Intruder.290 Faulkner gives us ample
reason to suspect that many of Gavin’s higher intellectual pursuits
are thinly concealed sublimations. He flees to the University of Hei-
delberg when he loses Eula;291 he uses poetry to impress Linda.292 In
stark contrast with Atticus’s behind-the-scenes service to the law as
legislator, Gavin as city attorney presses an absurdly public lawsuit to
harass Eula’s paramour, the mayor.293 No dusty-street showdown with
a mad dog redeems his masculinity. Rather, as Chick later observes
about his quail-hunting, “[h]e—Gavin—wouldn’t be much of a gun
even if he stopped talking long enough but now and then he would go
with me.”294 Gavin does eventually marry, but only to become a kind
of cuckold by indirection. His wife is an old flame from another fine
local family, the wealthy widow of a murdered New Orleans mobster
whose children Gavin must assist from the well-feathered nest before
he can resume his long-suspended wooing.295
286. See WILLIAM FAULKNER, The Town [hereinafter FAULKNER, The Town], in SNOPES,
supra note 19, at 351, 391-93, 415.
287. Id. at 505-06; see FAULKNER, The Mansion, supra note 19, at 802.
288. Gavin scuffles with Eula’s husband out of jealousy. See FAULKNER, The Town, supra
note 286, at 415. Gavin is also forced to defend himself from an attack by a boy enamored with
Linda. See id. at 514.
289. See WEISBERG, supra note 14, at 88.
290. Eula has committed suicide, after committing Linda to his care, see FAULKNER, The
Town, supra note 286, at 634-40; Linda herself, widowed and war-wounded, see FAULKNER,
The Mansion, supra note 19, at 838-39, professes a love for her mentor that needs no consum-
mation, id. at 904, then leaves town, never to return, id. at 1054-58.
291. See FAULKNER, The Mansion, supra note 19, at 795; FAULKNER, The Town, supra
note 286, at 396, 437.
292. See FAULKNER, The Mansion, supra note 19, at 802; FAULKNER, The Town, supra
note 286, at 505-06.
293. See FAULKNER, The Town, supra note 286, at 421.
294. FAULKNER, The Mansion, supra note 19, at 863.
295. This is recounted in the title story of Knight’s Gambit. See WILLIAM FAULKNER,
Knight’s Gambit [hereinafter FAULKNER, Knight’s Gambit], in KNIGHT’S GAMBIT (Vintage
Books 1978) (1939) [hereinafter KNIGHT’S GAMBIT]; see also FAULKNER, The Town, supra
note 286, at 504 (briefly describing Gavin’s wife’s former marriage).
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Gavin, like Atticus, has a sister—indeed, a twin—but she, unlike
Aunt Alexandra, is in no need of enlightenment about her brother.
She predicts not only that he will lose his first love through an excess
of porch-swing poetry reading, but also that he will marry a widow
with children;296 with uncanny accuracy, she is right on both counts,
about the same woman. It is this sister’s son, Chick, who is the child-
less Gavin’s understudy, almost exactly the reverse of Atticus and
Alexandra’s child-rearing arrangements.297 Gavin’s sister does play
something of a supporting role, but this is particularly in furtherance
of Gavin’s quixotic romances, and it generally serves to limit their
damage publicly while privately highlighting their absurdity.298
As there is in Mockingbird a female character, Mrs. Dubose,
who parallels the protagonist, so there is in Intruder a female coun-
terpoint, Miss Habersham, to Lucas.299 But Miss Habersham, unlike
Mrs. Dubose, is not a dark mirror giving a recognizable but distorted
reflection of her male counterpart. She is of essentially the same he-
roic substance as Lucas himself, and she brings the same insights to
Chick about his uncle and his world. In the end, the only ascendancy
Gavin, perennially wrong about women in general, ever gains over
Lucas is to point out that Lucas ultimately is beholden to Miss
Habersham.
Miss Habersham’s similarity to Lucas, especially from Chick’s
perspective, is adumbrated as he introduces her. She wears a hat and
gold watch like his grandmother’s, even as Lucas’s matched his
grandfather’s;300 her expensive gloves and shoes, “made to her meas-
ure in a New York shop,”301 contrast with her secondhand pickup
truck and unpainted house with “neither water nor electricity,”302 just
296. See FAULKNER, The Town, supra note 286, at 393.
297. Unlike Gavin, Aunt Alexandra does have a child, but her son “left home as soon as
was humanly possible” and remains deeply estranged from his parents. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD,
supra note 1, at 85.
298. See BROOKS, supra note 141, at 194 (“Naturally, his twin sister, Maggie Mallison, loves
him and, as he is well aware, would like to mother him and protect him from some of his fol-
lies.”).
299. Thomas Shaffer has noted that the children in both stories learn about courage from
these “elderly, single women,” Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics in the Law Office,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 610 n.24 (1996), but he does not go on to explore differences
between these teachers and their lessons.
300. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 74-75.
301. Id. at 76.
302. Id. at 75-76.
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as the worn elegance of Lucas’s attire contrasts with the rudeness of
his cabin.
Yet, even here, the implicit comparison begins to run in Miss
Habersham’s favor: her dilapidated home is not a cabin but “the co-
lumned colonial house on the edge of town.”303 Lucas, as we have
seen, is proud to be the oldest McCaslin living on the ancestral plan-
tation; Miss Habersham’s name “was now the oldest which remained
in the county.”304 The county seat, indeed, was originally called “Doc-
tor Habersham’s,”305 after her ancestor and the town’s founder, whose
ascendancy thus antedated the existing political order symbolized by
the town’s new name, Jefferson.
Even in independence, Lucas’s most cherished quality, Miss
Habersham excels him. Thanks to her land, she is as economically in-
dependent as he; she makes her living selling door-to-door the vege-
tables and chickens she and her retainers306 raise. But personally, she
is even more independent. She is “a kinless spinster of seventy”;307
though old and a widower by the time she helps rescue him, Lucas
has had a wife and children.
And it is through his beloved wife that Lucas, who claims to be
friendless and beholden to no one, comes to be both befriended by
and beholden to Miss Habersham:
[O]ld Molly, Lucas’s wife, who had been the daughter of one of old
Doctor Habersham’s, Miss Habersham’s grandfather’s, slaves, she
and Miss Habersham the same age, born in the same week and both
suckled at Molly’s mother’s breast and grown up together almost in-
extricably like sisters, like twins, sleeping in the same room, the
white girl in the bed, the Negro girl on a cot at the foot of it almost
until Molly and Lucas married, and Miss Habersham had stood up in
the Negro church as godmother to Molly’s first child.308
303. Id. at 75.
304. Id. Faulkner emphasizes the antiquity of the Habershams as chief of Jefferson’s three
founding families elsewhere as well. See FAULKNER, The Town, supra note 286, at 628. Indeed,
the town originally bore their name. See FAULKNER, REQUIEM, supra note 120, at 6-7. But cf.
FAULKNER, Knight’s Gambit, supra note 295, at 65-66 (implying the third family was Stevens,
not Habersham).
305. FAULKNER, REQUIEM, supra note 120, at 7.
306. She has two “Negro servants,” an elderly woman and her husband, FAULKNER,
INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 76, who is the brother of Lucas’s wife, Molly, see id. at 117. See also
FAULKNER, MOSES, supra note 3, at 114 (referring to Molly’s older brother living in Jefferson).
307. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 75.
308. Id. at 86; see FAULKNER, MOSES, supra note 3, at 357 (depicting a parallel account of
the two women’s long-standing relationship). In the earlier story, the prototype of Miss Haber-
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Lucas, who prides himself on being descended from his illustrious
forebears through the male line, is rescued by the female sole sur-
viving heir of a longer line. And Lucas is not even rescued in his own
name. Miss Habersham comes not primarily to help Lucas, the man,
but derivatively, in the name of Molly, another woman.
It is Chick who remembers the connection with Molly, and it is
he who also sees that there is something more between Miss Haber-
sham and Lucas. Theirs is not just a quasi-feudal tie between vassal
and lady, but also a shared insight into the nature of the social and le-
gal order in which they are both outsiders, Titans surviving the end of
their time. Indeed, just as Chick originally failed to appreciate Lu-
cas’s noble qualities because he was black, so Chick had not only
failed to take Miss Habersham’s proper measure at the outset, but
also dismissed her as entirely irrelevant, because she was an old
woman.309
This shared outsider status gives Miss Habersham a particular
appreciation of Lucas’s plight. When Chick tells her Lucas’s account
of the murder, Miss Habersham knows immediately why Lucas did
not confide in Gavin:
‘Yes,’ Miss Habersham said. ‘Of course. Naturally he wouldn’t tell
your uncle. He’s a Negro and your uncle’s a man . . . . Lucas knew it
would take a child—or an old woman like me: someone not con-
cerned with probability, with evidence. Men like your uncle and Mr.
Hampton [the sheriff] have had to be men too long, busy too long.
—Yes?’310
Chick had first heard this analysis in a homey, stereotypically
“other” setting: an elderly black man, with the help of an elderly
white witch, had located a lost ring of Chick’s mother’s under a pig
trough.311 It was a friendship ring, “a cheap thing with an imitation
                                                                                                                                     
sham was called Miss Worsham. See WATSON, supra note 15, at 109 (identifying Miss Haber-
sham with Miss Worsham).
309. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 76-81; see also id. at 77 (“He had forgot-
ten Miss Habersham. He had dismissed her; he had said ‘Excuse me’ and so evanished her
. . . .”). Even after their successful graveyard expedition, he repeatedly finds himself thinking
that, as an old woman and a lady, she should not be involved in such things. See id. at 110, 114.
310. Id. at 88.
311. See id. at 69. Faulkner leaves no question about her being a witch: “Mrs. Downs: an
old white woman who lived alone in a small filthy shoebox of a house that smelled like a fox-
den on the edge of town in a settlement of Negro houses . . . who . . . didn’t merely tell fortunes
and cure hexes but found things . . . .” Id.; see also WILLIAM FAULKNER, SANCTUARY 200
(First Vintage Int’l ed. 1993) (1931) (“[T]he ramshackle house of an old half-crazed white
woman who was believed to manufacture spells for negroes. It was on the edge of town . . . .”).
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stone,” one of a pair, “which his mother and her roommate at Sweet-
briar Virginia had saved their allowances and bought and exchanged
to wear until death as young girls will . . . .”312 The outsiders’ uncanny,
intuitive, almost clairvoyant approach had succeeded where Chick’s
family’s more orthodox methods had failed. Chick had explicitly
doubted whether this alternative approach could apply in the serious
world of his uncle, the real and important world of adult white men,
particularly in life-and-death matters like Lucas’s case.313
Miss Habersham shows him that it can.314 Chick continues to
doubt Lucas’s claim that someone else committed the murder;315 Miss
Habersham accepts it immediately on its own authority or, more pre-
cisely, on Lucas’s authority. And she moves to do something about it,
without entertaining the probability of failure but not without atten-
tion to logistics: she lends her pickup and lines up the picks and shov-
els.316 Her after-hours presence in Gavin’s office when Chick arrives
there Sunday evening from Lucas’s jail cell is uncanny and never ac-
counted for; she is just there, as the need arises.
This event points to the most striking dimension of Miss Haber-
sham’s world—her time. As Chick himself comes to understand it,
her time requires the attention in which access to truth is available
universally, to anyone: “[A]ll they had to do was just to pause, just to
stop, just to wait . . . .”317 This is the very element lacking in the men’s
time, which is why she says they miss the truth of Lucas’s story.318 In
312. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 68-69.
313. Id. at 70-71 (“Only this was no obscure valueless little ring exchanged twenty years ago
between two young girls but the death by shameful violence of a man who would die not be-
cause he was a murderer but because his skin was black.”).
314. See BROOKS, supra note 141, at 286 (“Charles Mallison would, of course, have been
unable to perform his mission without the aid of Miss Habersham. He had to have . . . her
pickup truck, but he needs even more than that her counsel and her moral backing.”). Gavin
himself puts the matter more bluntly: “[Y]ou might have gone out there without her to drag
you by the hand but Aleck Sander wouldn’t and I’m still not so sure you would when you came
right down to it.” FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 104-05.
315. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 86-87.
316. See id. at 89.
317. Id. at 88. This is remarkably close to the “careful attention,” PLATO, Euthyphro, in
EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO 1, 16 (F.J. Church & Robert J. Cumming trans., MacMillan
1948) (n.d.), to which Socrates, on the eve of his execution, calls back his frantic friend Crito for
their final dialogue. See PLATO, Crito, in EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, supra, at 51, 59. It is
also reminiscent of Milton’s mature reflection on his blindness: “They also serve who only
stand and wait.” MILTON, supra note 57, at 190. This latter position, as we have seen, see supra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text, is precisely the position in which Chick finds himself vis-à-
vis Lucas at the novel’s beginning.
318. See id. at 88, 116.
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presiding over Chick and Aleck Sander’s exhumation, she insists that
they take time reverently to remove and replace the flowers on the
grave despite their alarming lack of time.319 On the boys’ nearly
heedless panic, she imposes the reverence of an almost religious or-
der.
Yet, this is an order very much at odds with that of adult males,
business and professional men. Her real, organic time sharply con-
trasts with their artificial, mechanical, nine-to-five schedule. Her time
is responsive to the exigencies at hand but never wholly determined
by them; their schedules force the needs at hand into a Procrustean
bed of office hours, only to be swept away themselves in the rush of
unpredictable events. Hers is flexible; theirs, static. When Gavin, in-
formed of their discoveries, insists on waiting for daylight to re-
exhume the body, she cuts him off with a curt observation: “We
didn’t.”320
If only briefly and symbolically, Miss Habersham makes even
the menfolk bend their time to hers. Gavin astutely observes that, if
she will stay at the jail with Lucas while they reopen the grave, the
Gowries, out of deference to her sex, will not lynch Lucas in the
men’s absence. Before acceding, she insists that they take her home
to fetch her mending. Now that the crisis is over, she will not sit idly
by or, worse still, impose on the jailer’s wife the social obligation of
entertaining her.321 Time to her is more than money and more than a
Newtonian dimension: it is a fluid element with which she lives in
harmony.322
Even in stereotypically manly things, Miss Habersham excels her
men. She proves herself an excellent equestrian, dismissing Chick’s
apology for not having a ladies’ sidesaddle with a disdainful “pah.”323
She rides astride, literally like a cavalier, in a culture in which the
cavalries of J.E.B. Stuart and N.B. Forrest have cultic status.
319. See id. at 100, 127.
320. Id. at 110.
321. See id. at 116.
322. Miss Habersham’s time is emphatically not the enforced idleness of southern lady
time, the ritualized, formalistic, numbingly boring time of Aunt Alexandra’s missionary circle
in Mockingbird. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 241 (depicting Scout’s impressions of
a dull meeting of the missionary circle). From Scout’s innocent perspective, the excitement of
men’s time is vastly preferable. See id. at 246-47. The wiser Miss Habersham knows better than
both; she carries her mending to the jail. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 116.
323. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 97.
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Lucas, as we have seen, embodies the resolution of defeated but
unvanquished Confederate youth;324 his female counterpart, Miss
Habersham, acts with that resolution to save him, doing what needs
doing in the face of seemingly inevitable failure.325 Unlike Mrs. Du-
bose, she does not act for her own sake; unlike Atticus, she does not
act through the law, or on the basis of faith in the law. Atticus be-
lieves firmly in the justice of the courts and the efficacy of his own
words before them; Miss Habersham rests her faith, rightly as it turns
out, on her own actions and the word of the beleaguered Lucas Beau-
champ, uttered in jail.326
It is only to her, at the end of the book, that Lucas must pay
homage, at the behest of Gavin. He pays in flowers, the currency of
her kind, which Lucas must get from Gavin’s sister, since his wife,
Molly, who grew the flowers at his house, is dead.327 Lucas’s token
payment to Gavin, as we have seen, asserts his mastery over those
who work for bourgeois money.328 By contrast, his payment of flowers
to Miss Habersham acknowledges fealty to one who works in a very
different, and implicitly superior, realm. That superiority, Miss
Habersham has shown us, is not the enforced elevation of genteel
white ladies, into which Chick originally and repeatedly tried to dis-
miss her. Nor is it an untenable, isolating self-reliance of adult men. It
is, rather, an organic, almost familial network of both friendship and
practical, effectual virtue, a fellowship to which even the heroic Lucas
belongs only by proxy, through his wife.
c. Summary. At the outset of the final chapter of
Mockingbird, Scout declares, “Haints, Hot Steams, incantations,
secret signs, had vanished with our years as mist with sunrise.”329
Aunt Alexandra had a premonition of evil that fateful night,330 but
she had long since been shown to be woefully unreliable. None other
than the wise Calpurnia had dismissed such references to the
supernatural as “nigger-talk,”331 and when Calpurnia herself displays
324. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
325. This is her exchange with Chick, when he realizes “the simple inert unwieldy impossi-
ble physical vastness of what he faced”:
“We cant possibly do it.”
“No,” Miss Habersham said. “Well?”
FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 89.
326. See id. at 228 (“I know Lucas Beauchamp.”).
327. See id. at 235-36.
328. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
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an uncanny intuition, Scout dismisses it as “some voo-doo system.”332
Very early in Intruder, Chick realizes that his mother’s friendship
with her girlhood roommate is like Miss Habersham’s sisterly tie with
Molly, the connection that is essential to saving Lucas. And he comes
to appreciate that the “outsider” mode of experience and praxis,
peculiar in his world to women, blacks, the elderly, and the young,
ought not be rejected simply on account of these associations. Quite
the contrary, he comes to see the busyness of “menfolks” as inferior
in fundamental ways to the womanly, even the witchly.
2. Lawyers, Race, and Class. Both Faulkner and Lee portray a
gallery of lower-class whites distinct from both the country gentry
and the urban professional class, themselves mostly descended from
the gentry. Both authors draw the racism of their poor whites in stark
relief, and both make it an immediate threat to the very lives of their
innocent black defendants. Their principal false accusers are very
devils: Faulkner’s Crawford Gowrie is a thief,333 a fratricide,334 and a
corpse-defiler;335 Lee’s Bob Ewell is a violent drunkard, a child
abuser,336 and an attempted murderer. Faulkner’s “Beat Four” and
Lee’s “Old Sarum” are rural enclaves of violent autonomy, literally
laws unto themselves, where the writ of liberal law only sporadically
runs.337
                                                                                                                                     
329. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 268.
330. See id. at 267.
331. Id. at 44.
332. Id. at 112. Miss Maudie dismisses rumors about Boo Radley as “three-fourths colored
folks and one-fourth Stephanie Crawford.” Id. at 52.
333. To make matters worse, he steals from his own business partners, who were his
younger brother and his handicapped uncle. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 217-
18.
334. The town “repudiat[ed]” Crawford Gowrie upon learning of his fratricide, thereby
doing their worst to him, “depriv[ing] him to the full extent of their capacity of his citizenship in
man.” Id. at 198.
335. Miss Habersham pronounces the final judgment here: “‘He [Crawford] put him [his
brother Vinson] in quicksand,’ she said with calm and implacable finality . . . .” Id. at 226.
336. Atticus proves at trial that Mr. Ewell beats Mayella, and Tom’s testimony strongly im-
plies incest. According to Tom, she told him she had never been kissed by a grown man, since
“what her papa do to her don’t count.” LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 206; see also
JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 7 (resolving ambiguities in the direction of incest).
337. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 35 (describing Beat Four’s violence and
turmoil); JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 66 (“Old Sarum . . . is a place where violence always
threatens to spill over into the more restrained town of Maycomb.”); LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, su-
pra note 1, at 155-66 (providing an account of a lynch mob from Old Sarum).
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On the other hand, neither author reduces all poor whites to
easy, even tempting, negative stereotypes.338 Instead, both Faulkner
and Lee attribute to their lower-class whites the virtues of sturdy
yeomanry, virtues that their lawyers very much admire,339 and both
show that even members of lynch mobs can be sympathetic figures.340
Both draw their law enforcement officers from the white lower-
middle class,341 and both not only absolve them of any active sympa-
thy with the lynch mobs, but also show them to be heroic upholders
of the rule of law, ready to risk their very lives to protect their
charges.342 Indeed, the lawyers in both stories insist on solidarity with
338. See Frank H. Lyell, One Taxi Town, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., July 10, 1960, at 5 (“Miss
Lee has not tried to satisfy the current lust for morbid, grotesque tales of Southern depravity.”).
But cf. JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 41 (“Virtually every external feature of the Gothic can be
located in To Kill a Mockingbird . . . .”). For a discussion of the frequent recourse to such
stereotypes in fiction about the South, and their recurrent popularity, see BROOKS, supra note
141, at 10-11. In Intruder itself, Chick is well aware of the appeal of southern stereotypes, espe-
cially to northern audiences: “[A] volitionless, almost helpless capacity and eagerness to be-
lieve anything about the South not even provided it be derogatory but merely bizarre enough
and strange enough . . . .” FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 150. The classic work of
southern stereotypes, if the term classic can indeed be applied to this genre, is ERSKINE
CALDWELL, TOBACCO ROAD (1932). See also JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO
148 (1994) (noting a defense counsel’s explanation of how the jury could reach a guilty verdict:
“If you ever saw those creatures, those bigots whose mouths are slits in their faces, whose eyes
popped out at you like frogs, whose chins dripped tobacco juice, bewhiskered and filthy, you
would not ask how they could do it.”).
339. See BROOKS, supra note 141, at 11 (noting that although Faulkner was aware of the
comic possibilities in poor white characters, he “frequently reveals his sympathies with the
characters who come of poor-white stock, seeing in them an integrity, dignity, and sense of val-
ues which is not commensurate with their inadequacies in speaking or writing formal English”).
340. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 214 (suggesting that the Gowries [a family
of lower-class whites] refrained from lynching Lucas because they know from the outset that he
is innocent); LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 164-65 (describing how a lynch mob dis-
perses after Scout strikes up a conversation with Walter Cunningham, Sr., a member of the
mob who is also the father of one of her schoolmates).
341. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 105:
He [Sheriff Hampton] was a countryman, a farmer and son of farmers when he was
first elected and now owned himself the farm and house where he had been born,
living in the rented one in town during his term of office then returning to the farm
which was his actual home at each expiration, to live there until he could run for—
and be elected—sheriff again.
LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 288 (“Mr. Tate’s [stubbornness] was unschooled and
blunt, but it was equal to my father’s.”).
342. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 51-53 (describing the steadfastness of the
jailer and deputy in guarding Lucas); LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 162 (alluding to the
sheriff and his deputies’ pursuit of a suspected lynch mob deep into the woods); see also
FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 227 (“[Sheriff Hampton] has a way of carrying right
along with him into all situations maybe not peace, maybe not abatement of the base emotions
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their communities, including their racist members,343 and each helps
his adolescent male protégé address a deep ambivalence between
communal loyalty and revulsion at racism. Each protégé, in turn,
comes to see his and his mentor’s role toward the community as one
of respected, albeit sometimes tragic, leadership.
Yet, there are striking and instructive differences. Lee’s racists,
or at least some of them, have an element of incorrigibility that
Faulkner’s lack. Lee’s poor whites, as a jury, convict Tom even after
Atticus proves his innocence, and their upper-class white sympathiz-
ers never show any shame about the injustice.344 Faulkner’s poor
whites, even the family of Lucas’s alleged victim, accede to Lucas’s
release without any trial at all, as soon as the evidence of his inno-
cence is established.345 They never admit, much less apologize for,
their error, but neither do they assert their rightness. Indeed, in act-
ing as if nothing untoward had occurred, they implicitly acknowledge
their guilt.346 Bob Ewell egregiously lies to support his daughter’s
false accusation of rape, and he attempts to murder Atticus’s children
after Atticus reveals the lie. Nathan Bedford Forrest (“Nub”) Gow-
rie347 ignores Chick’s profound affront to his youngest son—Chick’s
disturbing of his grave to exonerate a black man—once it becomes
clear that the dead son’s elder brother is the real culprit. The truth
                                                                                                                                     
but at least a temporary stalemate of crude and violent behavior just by moving slow and
breathing hard.”).
343. In Mockingbird, Atticus continues to think of his fellow community members as
friends, despite the hostility they express toward him. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at
84. Atticus’s faith in his fellow citizens is not shaken, even when those citizens threaten him
with violence. The morning after a lynch mob threatens Atticus and Tom, Atticus describes one
of the mob’s members as still a friend and “basically a good man.” Id. at 168. Likewise, in In-
truder, Gavin sees himself as no better than the citizens who condemn him, and he refuses to
share in Chick’s sense of moral superiority to their community. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER,
supra note 4, at 205.
344. Mrs. Merriweather, “the most devout lady in Maycomb” and a peer of Aunt Alexan-
dra, suggests that black servants will stop grumbling and that “[i]f we just let them know we
forgive ’em, that we’ve forgotten it, then this whole thing will blow over.” LEE, MOCKINGBIRD,
supra note 1, at 243-44.
345. Cleanth Brooks emphasizes this in William Faulkner: The Yoknapatawpha Country.
See BROOKS, supra note 141, at 281-82; see also FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 214
(demonstrating Nub Gowrie’s readiness to kill his older son for the murder of his brother).
346. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 192. Chick observes that “[t]hey ran. . . .
They reached the point where there was nothing left for them to do but admit that they were
wrong. So they ran home.” Id.
347. See id. at 100.
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brings Ewell to cynical, even diabolical, denial; in Gowrie, it arouses
deep, and deeply human, grief.348
As Lee and Faulkner give very different accounts of lower-class
racists, so they treat very differently important aspects of their law-
yers’ relationships to them. Both Gavin and Atticus purport to un-
derstand what drives racism, and on that basis to forgive it, even as
they oppose it. But Atticus’s virtue is defined in total opposition to
racism; Gavin’s moral failing lies largely in his complicity with it, con-
scious as well as unconscious. In Mockingbird, sympathy for Tom
Robinson against the racists is the precise demarcation of “real” so-
cial standing. People “with background” are with Atticus; those
against him, whatever their pedigree, are “trash.”
In Intruder, Gavin, for all his aristocratic ancestry, his Harvard
and Heidelberg education, cannot escape the racist assumptions that
infect his entire community. He only belatedly understands Lucas’s
innocence, and he never quite appreciates the fullness of his nobility.
Moreover, his affiliation with his racist compatriots, even the lynch-
ers, has an aspect Atticus’s lacks. Gavin, quite unlike Atticus, insists
on standing with them, despite the evil of their position, against out-
sider reformers. As we shall see in the next section, Gavin insists at
great, indeed wearying, length on taking his stand with a solid South,
his country, right or wrong; for Atticus, this issue never arises.
Inextricably bound up with issues of class are issues of race. Both
novels depict blacks as an underclass, repressed and oppressed. Both
show their lawyers to be opposed to lynching, to the point of being
willing to risk their lives to prevent it. On the other hand, neither
lawyer is particularly radical on matters of race.349 The central differ-
ence between the stories, however, is their treatment of race rela-
tions. Mockingbird, particularly the trial of Tom Robinson and its
impact on Atticus’s children, leaves us with the unmistakable impres-
348. Indeed, the grief that Chick sees Gowrie experience over the defilement of his son’s
body reminds him of the grief he saw in Lucas over the death of his wife, “where in a sense a
heart capable of breaking had no business being.” Id. at 158; see also BROOKS, supra note 141,
at 288 (“The enlargement of the boy’s sympathies thus works in two directions to include the
chief of the lynchers-to-be as well as the man in danger of being lynched.”).
349. See Jolly, supra note 17, at 224 (speculating that Gavin would have opposed the “mas-
sive integration” phase of the civil rights movement because of its reliance on heavy federal
involvement). Atticus, in rejecting the epithet of radical, says “I’m about as radical as Cotton
Tom Heflin,” a notorious segregationist. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 264; see also
GOODMAN, supra note 338, at 220 (quoting Heflin, a former U.S. Senator, as warning that any-
thing less than a conviction in the Scottsboro case would put “wicked thoughts in the minds of
the lawless Negro men”).
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sion that Atticus is right about race; Intruder shows Gavin’s attitude
to be deeply flawed, particularly in his misassessment of Lucas Beau-
champ, who has revealed to Chick a very different perspective on
race.
a. Mockingbird. The proper ordering of the social classes and
relations between them are very much an issue in Mockingbird. Aunt
Alexandra’s criterion, a travesty of traditional southern female
opinion,350 is a muddled notion of pedigree and “background” that
even the children can parody, if not quite escape:
Aunt Alexandra was of the opinion, obliquely expressed, that the
longer a family had been squatting on one patch of land the finer it
was.
“That makes the Ewells fine folks, then,” said Jem. The tribe of
which Burris Ewell and his brethren consisted had lived on the same
plot of earth behind the Maycomb dump, and had thrived on county
welfare money for three generations.351
Against Aunt Alexandra’s comically genealogical notion of class,
Scout places her childlike version of Atticus’s implicit moral meritoc-
racy: “Somewhere, I had received the impression that Fine Folks
were people who did the best they could with the sense they
had . . . .”352 When Atticus tries to oblige Aunt Alexandra by pre-
senting Jem and Scout with their aunt’s view on what it means to be a
Finch, “the product of several generations’ gentle breeding,”353 things
end in a muddle of mutual embarrassment. All three know that Atti-
cus takes a different position, but even he is unable at this point to ar-
ticulate it clearly.354
The children struggle to reconcile Aunt Alexandra’s preach-
ments on “background” with Atticus’s meritocratic practice.355 Jem
suggests that “[b]ackground doesn’t mean Old Family” but rather
“how long your family’s been readin’ and writin’”;356 Scout maintains
350. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 143-44.
351. Id. at 140.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 143.
354. See id. at 143-45.
355. See id. at 237-40.
356. Id. at 239.
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that “there’s just one kind of folks. Folks.”357 Jem, however, cannot
concur in this innocent affirmation. The cataclysm of Tom Robin-
son’s conviction has shaken the foundation of his democratic faith:
“If there’s just one kind of folks, why can’t they get along with each
other? . . . [W]hy do they go out of their way to despise each
other?”358
But if Tom Robinson’s case destroys a childlike moral egalitari-
anism, it does so to make way for a more mature moral meritocracy.
As we have seen, Miss Maudie Atkinson provides the synthesis,359
modulating social class and personal morality to identify Maycomb’s
real aristocrats:
“The handful of people in this town who say that fair play is not
marked White Only; the handful of people who say a fair trial is for
everybody, not just us; the handful of people with enough humility
to think, when they look at a Negro, there but for the Lord’s kind-
ness am I. . . . The handful of people in this town with background,
that’s who they are.”360
This is, of course, a very particular virtue, and its exponents have At-
ticus at their head.
Atticus, for his part, identifies the other end of Maycomb’s so-
ciomoral spectrum, the true “trash.” As he tells Jem, they are his
principal opponents in Tom Robinson’s case, those whose essential
vice negates his defining virtue:
“As you grow older, you’ll see white men cheat black men every day
of your life, but let me tell you something and don’t you forget it—
whenever a white man does that to a black man, no matter who he
is, how rich he is, or how fine a family he comes from, that white
man is trash.”
Atticus was speaking so quietly his last word crashed on our ears.
I looked up, and his face was vehement. “There’s nothing more sick-
357. Id. at 240.
358. Id. On Jem’s alienation from the white community, see id. at 223-24 (describing Jem’s
immediate reaction to Tom’s conviction); id. at 227-29 (depicting Jem’s discussion of the con-
viction with Miss Maudie Atkinson); id. at 260-61 (depicting Atticus’s explanation of Jem’s
confusion to Scout).
359. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
360. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 249-50.
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ening to me than a low-grade white man who’ll take advantage of a
Negro’s ignorance.”361
On other occasions, Atticus explicitly links the use of racial epithets
with low class standing.362
Atticus had begun his early, ill-fated, and palpably unauthentic
disquisition to his children on the standing of their family by de-
scribing it as “the facts of life,” reflecting his sister’s insistence on the
fundamentality of class.363 In the same passage in which he identifies
“trash,” Atticus points to a very different fundamental reality:
“There’s something in our world that makes men lose their heads—
they couldn’t be fair if they tried. In our courts, when it’s a white
man’s words against a black man’s, the white man always wins.
They’re ugly, but those are the facts of life.”364
Yet, even Scout realizes that this is not the whole story, but
merely “another scrap to add to Jem’s definition of background.”365
There is, she senses, something not quite complete about this synthe-
sis, with its subordination of class to virtue. Jem’s own amateur tax-
onomy reflects a sociological insight that cannot be reduced without
remainder to personal morality, without distorting their social world:
“There’s four kinds of folks in the world. There’s ordinary folks like
us and the neighbors, there’s the kind like the Cunninghams out in
the woods, the kind like the Ewells down at the dump, and the Ne-
groes.”
. . . .
361. Id. at 233. Earlier, Scout had observed that, according to Atticus, “cheatin’ a colored
man” is “the worst thing you can do.” Id. at 214.
362. He forbids Scout to use the word “nigger” on the grounds that it is “common,” id. at
82, and he explains use of the expression “nigger-lover” this way: “ignorant, trashy people use
it when they think somebody’s favoring Negroes over and above themselves. It’s slipped into
usage with some people like ourselves, when they want a common, ugly term to label some-
body,” id. at 117.
363. Id. at 143.
364. Id. at 233. As Thomas Shaffer notes: “The judgment Atticus hands down to his chil-
dren regarding people who are trash seems to contradict the ethic he otherwise announces to
them, namely, the ethic of climbing into the other person’s skin.” Shaffer, Growing Up Good,
supra note 5, at 555. Indeed, the one time Atticus suggests that this approach be applied to Bob
Ewell, it is not to understand the source of Ewell’s wickedness, but to explain a particular out-
burst—spitting in Atticus’s face—in terms of that wickedness. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra
note 1, at 231.
365. Id. at 250.
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“The thing about it is, our kind of folks don’t like the Cunninghams,
the Cunninghams don’t like the Ewells, and the Ewells hate and de-
spise the colored folks.”366
This account, which strongly reflects Aunt Alexandra’s perspective, is
a necessary supplement to Atticus’s analysis of social standing.
For one thing, blacks, whatever their virtue, are definitely not in-
cluded in Jem and Miss Maudie’s “people like us.”367 As Jem’s taxon-
omy makes explicit, everyone acknowledges them as the lowest class,
and not just as a matter of economic reality. Even in their moral defi-
nitions of “background,” the most enlightened of the uppermost
class, Miss Maudie and Atticus, condescend toward blacks. For Miss
Maudie, blackness is an unmistakable mark of divine pretermission,
if not quite reprobation, a stigma right-thinking white people see and
allow for;368 for Atticus, blacks are susceptible, if not gullible, and de-
cent white people do not take advantage of them. For both Miss
Maudie and Atticus, blacks’ exclusion from the virtue of “our kind of
folks” is implicit in their very definition of that virtue: blacks are
those permanent unfortunates in the helping of whom we—“folks
like us”—become virtuous.
Conversely, the virtuous are only those who are, or become,
“folks like us.” Aristocratic roots seem almost a necessary, though
not quite a sufficient, condition of Miss Maudie and Atticus’s brand
of virtue. No lower-class whites seem immune to the infection of rac-
ist unreason, and none of them ever seems to be cured. Not all upper-
class whites are immune; many in Aunt Alexandra’s missionary cir-
cle, for example, spout the foulest racism, as does the dowager Mrs.
Dubose. Even Atticus’s own children are susceptible.369
The critical factor seems to be education, and not so much elitist,
liberal education as education in elitist liberality. Though Jem’s effort
to explain background in terms of education370 is held up as farcical, it
has surprising explanatory power. All the white upper-class folk who
support Atticus are themselves either professional people, the chil-
366. Id. at 239.
367. Id. at 228. Miss Maudie juxtaposes “people like us” and Atticus’s “colored friends.” Id.
368. Miss Maudie dismisses rumors about Boo Radley as “three-fourths colored folks.” Id.
at 52.
369. Scout uses “nigger” to describe a muddy snowman, without malice and to what the
author apparently intended to be taken as humorous effect. See id. at 74. Dolphus Raymond
comments on the corruption of children after overhearing Scout’s observation to Dill that Tom
Robinson was “after all . . . just a Negro.” Id. at 211-14.
370. See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
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dren of professional people, or officers of the law: Atticus’s sympa-
thetic brother is a doctor, as was Miss Maudie’s father; Atticus’s only
other identified supporters are Heck Tate, the sheriff; John Taylor,
the presiding judge; and Braxton Underwood, the local newspaper
editor. The exceptions that tend to prove the rule are two plantation
owners: Link Deas, who also runs a store in town and who was Tom’s
employer, and Dolphus Raymond, who lives down on the river with
his black mistress and their outcast children.
Miss Maudie leaves no doubt, however, that there are other
“people like us,”371 and Scout suggests why:
Because its primary reason for existence was government, Maycomb
was spared the grubbiness that distinguished most Alabama towns
its size. . . . Maycomb’s proportion of professional people ran high:
one went there to have his teeth pulled, his wagon fixed, his heart
listened to, his money deposited, his soul saved, his mules vetted.372
Maycomb, it seems, is something of a professional enclave, “an island
in a patchwork sea of cottonfields and timberland.”373 Education, par-
ticularly professional education, is its bulwark against the backward-
ness of the countryside and the racism that arises there.374
Lee’s aristocrats are always reading.375 Atticus starts every
morning, in proper professional fashion, with the newspaper, and he
spends each evening with a book.376 Sitting in his lap each night, Scout
learned to read so effortlessly that Jem brags she was born knowing
how. Her teacher looks foolish for failing to appreciate her preco-
ciousness as a student and Atticus’s genius as a teacher. Calpurnia,
best of the black folks, taught Scout to write.377 Calpurnia herself
learned from “Miss Maudie Atkinson’s Aunt, old Miss Buford,” who
371. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 228.
372. Id. at 141.
373. Id. Early in the novel, Scout provides a comic description of North Alabama as “full of
Liquor Interests, Big Mules, steel companies, Republicans, professors, and other persons of no
background.” Id. at 23.
374. See JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 60 (“Jem is probably not far from correct in supposing
that education makes the crucial difference between white social classes.”).
375. See id. at 107-11 (discussing the importance of literacy to the virtuous characters in
Mockingbird, and the novel’s tendency to symbolize virtue itself with reading.).
376. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 23, 98; see also JOHNSON, supra note 12, at
110 (“The most civilized, the most humane, the wisest character is the one who reads obses-
sively.”); RADWAY, supra note 13, at 338 (“In my mind there was more than a chance connec-
tion between the endless scenes of Atticus reading at night in the halo of light and his quiet de-
termination to defend ‘the Negro,’ Tom Robinson . . . .”).
377. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 23-25.
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taught her from a copy of Blackstone’s Commentaries, a gift from At-
ticus’s father.378 Calpurnia’s son Zeebo, a garbage collector, appears
in the story principally to make the point that she taught him to read
from the Bible and Blackstone,379 and that his literacy makes him a
leader in their church despite his humble occupation.380 Jem, for all
his adolescent male energy, is addicted to books.381 Miss Maudie At-
kinson, despite her gardener’s conviction that “time spent indoors
was time wasted,”382 quotes Holy Writ to the consternation of lower-
class literalists, the Primitive Baptists, from “out of the woods.”383
If lower-class whites are united in their ignorance and racism,
they are divided by another distinctly moral quality: their industri-
ousness. The Cunninghams, the eponymous people “of the woods,”
are, as we have seen, paradigmatic Jeffersonian yeomen, indefatiga-
ble workers of proud peasant stock.384 The Ewells “of the dump” are
congenitally lazy, ever on the dole. If the Cunninghams are backward
and ignorant, it is the fault of economic forces beyond their control;
the Ewells’ misery is of their own making. Walter Cunningham, Sr.,
declines a WPA job rather than risk losing his ancestral farm and his
political independence;385 Bob Ewell “made himself unique in the an-
nals of the nineteen-thirties” as “the only man . . . who was fired from
the WPA for laziness.”386 Walter Cunningham, Jr., clad in “a clean
shirt and neatly mended overalls,” has hookworms because he has no
378. Id. at 135-36. Janice Radway observes that “it is essential to note that the extension of
literacy and recognition of [Calpurnia’s] individuality that seem to follow from it are conferred
by authoritative, white men.” RADWAY, supra note 13, at 341.
379. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 135-36.
380. See id. at 131-32. Zeebo does make one other appearance, in his capacity as garbage
collector, to remove the corpse of a mad dog Atticus has slain. See id. at 106-07.
381. See id. at 39 (“[N]o tutorial system devised by man could have stopped him from get-
ting at books.”).
382. Id. at 49.
383. Id. at 51, 170. The literacy of Maycomb’s better sorts is reflected in their language as
well. Scout reports that “[Maudie’s] speech was crisp for a Maycomb County inhabitant,” id. at
49, and that, although Calpurnia’s grammar lapses unconsciously when she is excited, see id. at
31, and intentionally when she is among other blacks, see id. at 136, “[w]hen in tranquility, her
grammar was as good as anybody’s in Maycomb,” id. at 31, because, as Atticus has explained,
“Calpurnia had more education than most colored folks,” id.
384. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
385. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 27.
386. Id. at 261.
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shoes;387 Bob Ewell’s son Burris, whom Scout calls “the filthiest hu-
man I had ever seen,” has head lice because he refuses to bathe.388
Burris’s sister Mayella, by contrast, is habitually clean. What
arouses Scout’s sympathy for her is not so much her poverty, or even
her abuse at the hands of her father, as her efforts to keep herself
clean and raise herself up. She eminently qualifies as one of tradi-
tional philanthropy’s favorites, the deserving poor. In the Gospel that
informs Scout’s story, even the least complacent of Christians prefer
to help those who help themselves.
What distinguishes the deserving poor whites is thus their indus-
triousness and their amenability to self-improvement: led to water,
they not only drink, they wash.389 Industriousness, moreover, is criti-
cally linked to education, here as in the mythology of Lincoln’s log
cabin.390 Citing Walter Cunningham, her classmate, Scout contests
Jem’s identification of education and family background: “That Wal-
ter’s as smart as he can be, he just gets held back sometimes because
he has to stay out and help his daddy.”391 By contrast, the evil Burris
Ewell defies the teacher to keep him in school, slurring her as a slut
and stomping home to the dump, thus confirming the Ewells’ reputa-
tion for recalcitrance and truancy.392
Jem’s deserving poor, “the Cunninghams out in the woods,” are
thus redeemable in a way that the Ewells of the dump are not.393
What the Cunninghams need are stable markets for their crops and
education for their children—the very benefits promised by the mod-
est reforms of the New Deal, mediated by progressive local lawyers
like Atticus. As we have seen, Atticus is ever willing to lend a helping
hand not only in the microcosm of Maycomb, but also in the legisla-
ture in Montgomery. Beyond that, Lee is careful to tell us, he is a
387. Id. at 25.
388. Id. at 33.
389. Aunt Alexandra, predictably, misses this distinction, dismissing the Cunninghams as
“trash” and insisting that their visits be strictly business, never social. See id. at 237.
390. See, e.g., CARL SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE PRAIRIE YEARS 71 (1926):
The farmboys in their evenings at Jones’s store in Gentryville talked about how Abe
Lincoln was always reading, digging into books, stretching out flat on his stomach in
front of the fireplace, studying till midnight and past midnight, picking a piece of
charcoal to write on the fire shovel, shaving off what he wrote, and then writing
more—till midnight and past midnight. The next thing Abe would be reading books
between the plow handles, it seemed to them.
391. Id. at 240.
392. See id. at 33-34.
393. Cf. Shaffer, Growing Up Good, supra note 5, at 547-51 (stating the view that, in the
implicit theology of Atticus and his family, their community is already redeemed).
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supporter of the macroeconomic program of the New Deal. When
Scout asks what happened to Maycomb’s “NRA—WE DO OUR
PART” stickers, Atticus replies that “nine old men” killed the Na-
tional Recovery Act.394
Maycomb’s religion reflects the same patterns of class and race.
At the top, good Christianity reflects and reinforces good citizenship.
The religion of the upper-class whites is uniformly low-church Protes-
tant,395 internally divided along lines of racial sympathy. On one side
of that divide are the hypocrites, epitomized by hyperemotional
women who worry over foreign missions while ignoring their own
injustice to local blacks generally and to Tom Robinson in particu-
lar.396 On the other side are the “true Christians,” who support Atti-
cus’s position.397 Implicitly representing lower-class white religion are
the foot-washing, Bible-thumping Primitive Baptists. They rail at the
virtuous regular Baptist, Miss Maudie, for her vain interest in the
beauty of her flowers, and she cites their benighting influence on Boo
Radley’s father as a principal source of Boo’s misery.398 What is more,
as Miss Maudie points out, “foot-washers think women are a sin by
definition. They take the Bible literally, you know.”399 These are the
folks of the Monkey Trial—and, of course, of Tom Robinson’s jury.
Among blacks, religion is a source of comfort and community, as
Scout and Jem see when they accompany Calpurnia to her church,
First Purchase African M.E. Church (so called because it was bought
with the first earnings of freed slaves). Black religion is not an un-
mixed blessing: the preacher lapses into an antediluvian misogyny
that offends Scout,400 and Sister Lula affronts both the children and
her fellow parishioners with a most inhospitable prototype of black
separatism.401 Black religion, like black life generally, bears the scars
of disreputable white racism: on weekdays white men defile the black
394. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 264.
395. Aunt Alexandra’s missionary circle is Methodist; her guests are Presbyterian and Bap-
tist. See id. at 242. Atticus cannot remember any Roman Catholics in Maycomb, but there is at
least one Jewish family, the Levys, who are in the dry goods business. See id. at 157.
396. See id. at 240-51.
397. See id. at 228 (recounting Miss Maudie’s explanation to Jem that “[w]e’re so rarely
called on to be Christians, but when we are, we’ve got men like Atticus to go for us”).
398. See id. at 51-53.
399. Id. at 52.
400. See id. at 132 (“Again, as I had often met it in my own church, I was confronted with
the Impurity of Women doctrine that seemed to preoccupy all clergymen.”).
401. Miss Lula says to Calpurnia: “I wants to know why you bringin’ white chillun to nigger
church.” Id. at 129.
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people’s sanctuary with gambling.402 But the black church provides
wise—which is to say, deferential—leadership as well: Jem and Scout
sit in the black balcony with the Reverend Sykes at Tom’s trial, and
he bids them rise with his flock in silent tribute as Atticus, their
knight-errant, leaves the courtroom.403 As he had told them when
they worshiped with him, “[t]his church has no better friend than
your daddy.”404
In summary, then, Maycomb’s class structure is essentially as
Jem describes it, once we supplement that description with Atticus’s
and Miss Maudie’s moral insights. At the top is an educated, urban
professional class, drawn from the rural aristocracy. This class is sub-
divided into those who, like Atticus, are enlightened on racial matters
and those who, irrespective of their aristocratic pedigrees, are the
moral equivalent of “trash.” The true trash, socially and morally, are
the undeserving poor like the Ewells, irredeemably racist and lazy.
Other lower-class whites, represented by the Cunninghams, are poor
and benighted but diligent and educable, and thus redeemable
through a combination of their own efforts and modest progressive
reforms. At the bottom are blacks, whose permanently underprivi-
leged status is the foundation of the moral community. Whites who
are truly virtuous, those with genuine background, mitigate black suf-
fering; whites who oppress them, from whatever class, are the most
vicious.
Only one group is omitted, and tellingly so: people of mixed
race. In explaining to Scout what mulattos are, Jem describes their
pariah status: “They don’t belong anywhere. Colored folks won’t
have ’em because they’re half white; white folks won’t have ’em
’cause they’re colored, so they’re just in-betweens, don’t belong any-
where.”405 In explaining Mayella Ewell’s false testimony against Tom
Robinson, Atticus sounds the same theme: “I say guilt, gentlemen,
because it was guilt that motivated her. She has committed no crime,
she has merely broken a rigid and time-honored code of our society,
a code so severe that whoever breaks it is hounded from our midst as
unfit to live with.”406
402. See id. at 128.
403. See id. at 224.
404. Id. at 133.
405. Id. at 172.
406. Id. at 216.
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b. Intruder. Like Atticus’s son, Jem, Gavin’s nephew, Chick,
also muses on the composition of his community and on his own
place in it. As he drives with his uncle into the hill country for the
second, official opening of Vinson Gowrie’s grave, “he seemed to see
his whole native land, his home . . . unfolding beneath him like a map
in one slow soundless explosion . . . .”407 At the same time, he
remembers his uncle’s account of his people, which he matches to the
topography.408 As Jay Watson has shown, “[t]his great patchwork
quilt of a landscape . . . is the visual equivalent—indeed the
embodiment—of all that Gavin has orally brought to life for Chick in
his Yoknapatawpha tales and legends.”409 It is a stratification
superficially congruent with Jem’s “four kinds of folks”; it includes an
urban professional class allied with the plantation-owning country
gentry, two categories of lower-class white farmers, and an underclass
of black peasants. But closer inspection reveals some very different
features and relationships.
In the hill country live the Gowries and their ilk, the constituents
of Lucas’s expected lynch mob. They choose to live in the hills, as
Gavin has told Chick, because these hills are like those from which
they came—the Highlands of Scotland by way of the Appalachians of
the Carolinas.410 And these Mississippi hills are equally harsh and
lawless; the hillfolk can grow just enough corn to manufacture illegal
whiskey,411 which they still call by its ancient Scots Gaelic name,
usquebaugh.412 Their folk, furthermore, are largely illiterate, their
very names the barely recognizable corruptions of the Highland clan
rolls.413
407. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 148.
408. See id.
409. WATSON, supra note 15, at 127. For Gavin’s own survey of the same terrain and his-
tory, see FAULKNER, The Town, supra note 286, at 621-24.
410. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 145; see also FAULKNER, The Town, supra
note 286, at 623 (providing Gavin’s own account).
411. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 146.
412. See FAULKNER, The Town, supra note 286, at 623.
413. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER at 146; see also WILLIAM FAULKNER, Monk, in KNIGHT’S
GAMBIT, supra note 295, at 39, 41; cf. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 16 (describing the
Cunninghams as “an enormous and confusing tribe”); id. at 176 (recounting a Dickensian law-
suit in which the son testified that “his mother spelled it Cunningham on deeds and things, but
she was really a Coningham, she was an uncertain speller, a seldom reader, and was given to
looking far away sometimes when she sat on the front gallery in the evenings”).
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In their outlawry and illiteracy, these hillfolk are reminiscent of
Lee’s Ewells, themselves a Scottish clan.414 Yet, their highland aerie is
the antipodes of the Ewells’ dump; the very air they breathe, in
sharpest contrast to the Ewells’ reeking dump, is intoxicatingly rare-
fied, acting on the lungs as wine on the stomach.415 They are not so
much lawless as autonomous, a law unto themselves.416 Though ready
on Saturday evening to wreak blood-vengeance on the murderer of
their kin, they, with the inflexible Sabbatarianism of the Ulster Scots,
will forebear until Sunday midnight.417 It is from the perspective of
their plateau that Chick looks back over everything else. Their
synecdoche is not the dump down below town, but a chapel high
above it:
[A] plank steepleless box no longer than some of the one-room
cabins hill people lived in, paintless too yet (curiously) not shabby
and not even in neglect or disrepair because he could see where sec-
tions of raw new lumber and scraps and fragments of synthetic
roofing had been patched and carpentered into the old walls and
shingles with a savage almost insolent promptitude, not squatting
nor crouching nor even sitting but standing among the trunks of the
high strong constant shaggy pines, solitary but not forlorn, intracta-
ble and independent, asking nothing of any, making compromise
with none and he remembered the tall slender spires which said
Peace and the squatter utilitarian belfries which said Repent and he
remembered one which even said Beware but this one said simply:
Burn . . . .418
There are some significant connections to be noted here. First,
the essential features of the church, and by extension its congre-
gants—poor but self-reliant, “solitary but not forlorn, intractable and
414. There are, indeed, Ewells in Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha. See, e.g., FAULKNER, The
Mansion, supra note 19, at 706 (describing Walter Ewell and Ike McCaslin, Lucas’s white
cousin, as “the best hunters in the county”).
415. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 98.
416. Cf. JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 98 (“The villainy of Mayella’s father, Bob Ewell, arises
from his unwillingness to be governed by any law, either internal or external . . . .”).
417. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 33 (“[They] were waiting . . . simply be-
cause it would be Sunday in three hours now and they didn’t want to have to hurry, bolt
through the business in order to finish it by midnight and not violate the Sabbath . . . .”); id. at
47 (referring to keeping the Sabbath holy). When Tom Robinson is returned to Maycomb on
the Sunday before his trial is to begin, Atticus observes that the Old Sarum crowd “don’t usu-
ally drink on Sunday, they go to church most of the day.” LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at
156. But “someone” ominously points out that “this a special occasion,” id. at 157, and the
lynch mob arrives at the jail shortly after Atticus’s children’s bedtime, id. at 159-66.
418. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 153-54.
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independent”419—are precisely the features of Lucas’s cabin and, of
course, of Lucas himself. Lucas’s free, almost wild, aloofness has, in
Lucas’s own mind, a source that is essentially the same as that of his
nemeses. His measure of himself is his grandfather, old Carothers
McCaslin, a Highland Scot who came to Mississippi by way of Caro-
lina.420
Second, these are, as we have seen, essential qualities of Miss
Habersham,421 some of the very virtues that enable her to help Chick
rescue Lucas by violating the sanctity of this same churchyard. In-
deed, at the end of his quest, when Chick leaves his uncle to walk
back into the silent and dark town square, he himself manifests these
same heroic virtues, virtues shared with all the aristocratic elements
in his culture and community. He is “unhurried and solitary but
nothing at all of forlorn.”422 Only at that point does he feel a degree of
reintegration with his people, “a sense a feeling not possessive but
proprietary, vicegeral, with humility still, himself not potent but at
least the vessel of a potency.”423
As Claudia Durst Johnson has observed, “Bob Ewell is the an-
tithesis of Atticus,”424 the one’s home the inversion of the other’s.425
To Chick and Gavin, by contrast, hillfolk like the Gowries are any-
thing but alien. Chick recognizes their hills as rising “in similitude of
the actual mountains in Carolina and before that in Scotland where
his ancestors had come from but he hadn’t seen yet.”426 He knows
these distant mountains from his beloved uncle’s firsthand ac-
counts,427 and in time he will make his own hadj, Gavin’s gift for his
graduation from Harvard.428 The chapel of Chick’s highland compa-
triots bears the ancient Roman name of their common homeland:
Caledonia.429
419. Id.
420. See FAULKNER, MOSES, supra note 3, at 254 (recording Lucius Quintus Carothers
McCaslin’s birth in “Callina” in 1772 and death in “Missippy” in 1837).
421. See supra notes 300-27 and accompanying text.
422.  FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 206.
423. Id.
424. JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 99.
425. See id. at 102.
426. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 99.
427. See id.
428. See FAULKNER, The Mansion, supra note 19, at 864-65.
429. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 67.
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The Gowries and their ilk, then, are not lumpenproletarians like
the Ewells, exemplars of the basest vices. They are, rather, remnants
of heroic ur-ancestors, living near the source of elemental virtues.
Their very insistence on blood-vengeance for the death of a kinsman
affirms their affinity to Lucas’s own heroic value system. They are
not killing Lucas because he is black, but because their own obliga-
tions of kinship require it.430 They are reminiscent of Nietzsche’s
proto-heroes, the much-misunderstood “blond beasts.”431 Though
Chick must and will transcend them, he cannot ultimately repudiate
them. Like Lucas, he must acknowledge their virtues as essential
parts of himself, even as he incorporates them into a superior synthe-
sis.
In Chick’s survey of Yoknapatawpha, its lowland farmers get
shorter shrift than these highland folk: “And in the valleys along the
rivers, the broad rich easy land where a man can raise something he
can sell openly in daylight, the people named Littlejohn and Green-
leaf and Armstead and Millingham and Bookwright . . . .”432 The
equivalent of Lee’s Cunninghams, they bear obviously Anglo-Saxon
surnames, rather than Celtic, and their pursuits are those of law-
abiding, yeoman farmers, not brawling moonshiners. Yet, they do not
hesitate to join the throngs who flock to see Lucas lynched—if not as
active participants, then at least as eager, even insistent, spectators.433
Blacks symbolically live—more precisely, “elect” to live—in
both the highlands and the lowlands. According to Gavin, “they elect
both because they can stand either [and] because they can stand any-
thing.”434 Gavin very much admires this capacity for endurance.435 As
the word “elect” suggests, the patience of Gavin’s blacks is not to be
confused with helplessness or passivity. To the contrary, it is the
foundation of what he calls “homogeneity,” a deep cultural rooted-
430. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 30, at 124 (observing that, in a heroic
society, “[i]f someone kills you, my friend or brother, I owe you their death and when I have
paid my debt to you their friend or brother owes them my death”).
431. For Nietzsche’s initial comparison of his heroes to the “blond beast,” see NIETZSCHE,
supra note 144, at 40. See also id. at 40-41 n.3 (summarizing position of Walter Kaufman and
Arthur Danto that problematic “blondness” refers to the heroes’ prototype, the lion, not to ra-
cial features of the heroes themselves).
432. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 146.
433. See id. at 46-47, 143.
434. Id. at 146.
435. See id. at 146-47, 153.
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ness436 that he sees as the precondition of all virtue437 and the defining
quality of all southern culture, white as well as black.438 Indeed, ac-
cording to Gavin, the rootedness of the Yoknapatawpha black ex-
ceeds that of its whites, a superiority proved by “finding himself roots
into the land where he had actually to displace white men to put them
down . . . .”439 If Gavin had his way, southern whites would “confeder-
ate” with blacks to produce a strong, organic national character
drawing especially on blacks’ superior capacity “to wait and endure
and survive.”440
Thus, though Gavin uses the disparaging generic “Sambo” to re-
fer to blacks, he apparently uses it ironically, for he is quite explicit in
his admiration.441 He has, moreover, conveyed this admiration to
Chick. Approaching the pinnacle from which he surveys Yoknapa-
tawpha’s sociogeography, Chick spots “the land’s living symbol,” a
man plowing with a mule.442 Of course, it is a black man.443 Most of the
black laborers are discreetly indoors, and most of their white coun-
terparts have flocked into Jefferson for the spectacle about to be
made of Lucas. But, as Gavin reminds Chick, “somebody’s got to stay
home and work . . . .”444 On the boy’s first trip along this road, the trip
that consciously marked his earliest emergence from “the long tradi-
tion of his native land,”445 the absence of blacks along the way had re-
vealed to him their central position in the moral as well as political
economy of the county: “[T]he deliberate turning as with one back of
the whole dark people on which the very economy of the land itself
was founded, not in heat or anger nor even regret but in one irreme-
diable invincible inflexible repudiation, upon not a racial outrage but
a human shame.”446 When Lucas is finally free, we are not surprised
436. See BROOKS, supra note 141, at 421 (“In calling a people homogeneous Gavin can only
mean that they have a community of values that is rooted in some kind of lived experience.”).
437. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 151 (“[O]nly from homogeneity comes
anything of a people or for a people of durable and lasting value . . . .”).
438. See id. at 150-51.
439. Id. at 152.
440. Id.
441. See BROOKS, supra note 141, at 421 (“We may feel that Gavin’s rhetorical device is
strained or in bad taste, but we misread if we say that he uses Sambo in order to deprecate Lu-
cas Beauchamp and the race he represents.”).
442. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 144.
443. See id. at 145.
444. Id. at 145.
445. Id. at 95.
446. Id.
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that these people do not regale Gavin and his family with the folksy
country breakfast that Maycomb’s blacks give the Finches.
Jefferson, the county seat, shares in the county’s shame to a
much greater extent than Maycomb. The countryfolk flood into Jef-
ferson to attend the lynching, confident that the town is “theirs . . .
since it existed only by their sufferance and support to contain their
jail and their courthouse . . . theirs the right not just to mere justice
but vengeance too to allot or withhold.”447 They find in Jefferson itself
the willing help of more distinctly urban sorts—clerks, shopkeepers,
and tradesmen generally,448 many of whom are their recently trans-
planted rural neighbors.449 And, as Chick ruefully notes, this crowd
has the tacit support “behind the drawn shades of the offices them-
selves” of those who indisputably belong to the professions.450 Scout
sees Maycomb as a tidy professional island secure against a sea of
rowdy rural griminess;451 against the blue-green panorama of his
homeland, Chick sees “the faint stain of smoke which was town.”452
Chick’s survey of his home county, finally, sweeps in “the long
reach of rich bottom land marked off into the big holdings, the plan-
tations.”453 He realizes in the same thought that these are the sites of
miscegenation, “where the present Edmonds and Lucas both had
been born, stemming from the same grandfather.”454 In his account,
people of mixed race cannot be officially omitted and said paren-
thetically not to belong anywhere. They spring from the same stock
as the socially superior, and sometimes they surpass them; if they lie
generally outside society, in mutual shame and shared pathos, at least
one of them stands self-consciously above society, in independent
pride.
These plantations, like those in Mockingbird, are typically the
ancestral homes of the urban professional class. Chick recalls that his
447. Id. at 143.
448. See id. at 198, 209.
449. Gavin reserves some of his sharpest scorn for these urbanized rustics, whom he charac-
terizes as having brought along all the prejudices of their parochial backgrounds without any of
the compensating virtues. See id. at 46-48.
450. Id. at 209; see also WATSON, supra note 15, at 129 (“The volatility first assigned to the
mob alone now extends to the whole town, and the passage makes clear that all levels of white
male society are implicated in Beauchamp’s fate.”) Bassett is thus wrong to suggest that “[n]o
Jefferson bourgeoisie, only the scruffier elements, are involved.” Bassett, supra note 19, at 216.
451. See supra notes 372-74 and accompanying text.
452. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 148.
453. Id. at 149.
454. Id.
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grandfather, a judge, was a cousin of one of the great landowners,
Major de Spain.455 As we saw at the outset, Chick’s family recipro-
cates hospitality with Lucas’s cousin Edmonds, present lord of the
McCaslin lands. But even his uncle Gavin, most educated of these
aristocratic urban professionals, is not untainted by racism. He is al-
lied to the racism of the lower elements in ways wholly absent in At-
ticus.
Near the outset, on their way to meet Lucas in jail, Gavin lec-
tures Chick on the lynch-mob mentality of lower-class whites.456 Al-
though he does not condemn the lynchers and, indeed, sees a certain
logic in their thinking, his condemnation of the practice is clear:
“Which proves again how no man can cause more grief than that one
clinging blindly to the vices of his ancestors.”457 He is, moreover,
ready to stand against the lynchers, against overwhelming odds, to
the last.458 Beyond that, Gavin makes quite clear that blacks should be
given their full civil rights, “economic and political and cultural.”459
Even on the very sensitive issues of voting and public education, he is
unequivocally progressive.460
But there are two critical qualifications to Gavin’s progressive-
ness. First, Gavin is a gradualist.461 He quite explicitly believes that
these reforms, necessary and desirable as they are, are not to be
wrought overnight,462 though he thinks the worst abuses will end
“[s]oon now.”463 Not an activist, he has no particular agenda or posi-
tive reform program. More precisely, his reform platform has a single
plank, that southern whites will be the liberators of southern blacks.
He explains that southern whites deserve “the privilege of setting him
free ourselves.”464
455. See id. at 92.
456. See id. at 48. After a conversation with a white shopkeeper whose sympathies lie with
the lynch mob, Gavin explains to Chick: “[N]ow the white people will take him out and burn
him, all regular and in order and themselves acting exactly as [the shopkeeper] is convinced
Lucas would wish them to act: like white folks; both of them observing implicitly the rules . . . .”
457. Id.
458. See id. at 53.
459. Id. at 153.
460. See id. at 151-52.
461. See BROOKS, supra note 141, at 422-24. Gavin’s gradualism nicely reflects that of
southern liberals generally, as analyzed in David Potter, A Minority Within a Minority, 46
YALE REV. 264-65 (1957).
462. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 152, 211.
463. Id. at 151 (referring to lynching).
464. Id.
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Conversely—and this is the second qualification of Gavin’s re-
formism—efforts to reform at a faster pace and through other agen-
cies than southern whites are to be condemned and actively resisted.
This is especially true of northern efforts to ameliorate the condition
of southern blacks through federal legislation.465 Gavin points back to
the failure of Radical Reconstruction and extrapolates from that the
futility of all such efforts in the future. Not only will they fail; they
will set the course of black liberation back even as, in his mind, radi-
cal abolitionism did.466 Like a mantra, he repeats the conditions of
liberation: “[O]nly we must do it and we alone without help or inter-
ference or even (thank you) advice.”467
At one level, this sectionalism has a certain symmetry. It can be
seen not just as a tribal “myself against my brother; my brother and I
against all outsiders,” but also as an insistence on taking upon oneself
the sins of one’s brother as the only real expiation. But it fails in two
related ways. In its rejection of the alien North, it frustrates real re-
form, sacrificing aid to the repressed on the altar of redemption, or
perhaps just face-saving, for the oppressor. As we shall examine in
more detail below, this makes it unacceptable to most readers.468
Moreover, in its embrace of the solid South, which is our focus here,
Gavin’s sectionalism violates its own premise. The basis for Gavin’s
critique of his fellow southerners is the harm done by blindly follow-
ing ancestral errors. But this is exactly his basis for defending them:
the ancient insistence on not having the slave freed by outsiders, “the
privilege of setting him free ourselves.”469 Gavin’s prescription for ra-
cial reform thus threatens to collapse into the very atavistic and self-
perpetuating harm to self and other that Gavin at the outset deplores.
The untenability of Gavin’s position is underscored not only by
this internal tension, but even more by a critical situational irony.
Even as Gavin is arrogating to himself the right to liberate blacks,
praising their patience in awaiting his conferral of equality and
treating Lucas as an eponym for blacks generally, the very course of
Lucas’s case is negating each of these assumptions. In their first en-
465. See id. at 152, 199, 210-11; see also FRANK FREIDEL, F.D.R. AND THE SOUTH 83-89
(1965) (describing successful opposition of southern congressmen to federal anti-lynching leg-
islation early in the New Deal era).
466. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 199, 210-11.
467. Id. at 211. In a previous passage, Gavin says almost identically: “We must expiate and
abolish it ourselves, alone and without help nor even (with thanks) advice.” Id. at 199.
468. See infra notes 646-48 and accompanying text.
469. Id. at 151.
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counter, Lucas tried Gavin and found him wanting; Lucas has already
seen to his own liberation, a liberation that will not confer upon him
a mere legal equality, but restore to him the physical freedom with
which to resume his long exercise of natural superiority.
Gavin’s general disquisitions on race relations suffer the same
deficiency that Miss Habersham sees in his dealing with Lucas’s case:
he is too caught up in his preconceptions and preoccupations to see
the very facts before him. When Gavin predicts the effect of Lucas’s
release from jail on the white citizens of Yoknapatawpha County, he
gets it exactly wrong: “[W]e shall watch right here in Yoknapatawpha
County the ancient oriental relationship between the savior and the
life he saved turned upside down: Lucas Beauchamp once the slave of
any white man within range of whose notice he happened to come,
now tyrant over the whole county’s white conscience.”470 As we have
seen, Lucas never kowtowed to anyone; as Chick is soon to learn, the
county forgets its wrongful assumption of Lucas’s guilt before the
week is out.471
Beyond these weaknesses, Gavin’s position poses two further
problems, each of which we shall take up later. For readers of In-
truder, it has been profoundly off-putting, particularly for those who
glibly attribute Gavin’s views to Faulkner.472 Second, and more sig-
nificantly, Gavin’s opinions threaten to corrupt Chick, the novel’s
central figure of hope and redemption.473
3. Lawyers and the North. In both books, the southern setting is
essential, and the characters’ southernness is underscored, especially
in the case of the lawyers. Both books deal not only with relations
between lawyers and “outsiders” within their culture, but also with
one group literally outside that culture, the North. Attitudes toward
the North, however, differ significantly between the two novels. In
Mockingbird, references to the North are the source of little more
than mild and minor interregional humor. Such references reveal the
provinciality of the children and highlight the quaintness of some of
the more droll adult characters, a background against which Atticus’s
progressiveness stands out all the more sharply. In Intruder, by
contrast, the North is serious stuff indeed. As we have already begun
470. Id. at 194-95.
471. See id. at 209.
472. See infra notes 646-48 and accompanying text.
473. See infra notes 493-97, 551-55 and accompanying text.
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to see,474 lingering animosity toward the North on the part of the most
enlightened of southerners, Gavin himself, threatens to divide
reformist southerners from their counterparts in the North and to
unite them with racists at home in a reactionary common front
against the outside.
a. Mockingbird. In Mockingbird, continued animosity toward
the North appears in the form of comic figures like cousin Ike Finch,
Maycomb County’s sole surviving Confederate veteran, who is ever
ready to refight the battle of Shiloh from his porch rocker.475 The
basically decent but blustering newspaper editor, Braxton Bragg
Underwood, is undone by “a fey fit of humor” that gave him his
name, and Scout observes, “Atticus said naming people after
Confederate generals made slow steady drinkers.”476 The higher the
general’s rank, apparently, the greater the harm: Bob Ewell is the
namesake of none other than Robert E. Lee.477 As Claudia Durst
Johnson concludes, “the destructive and powerful influence of the
past is linked with another characteristic of the Gothic—the theme of
decay and degeneration . . . .”478
Recalling sectional conflict too vividly is a mark of consummate
kookiness. The sanctimonious Mrs. Merriweather, champion of
keeping Alabama blacks in their place while saving souls in Africa,
ironically berates the Yankees for their hypocrisy toward blacks.479
The devilish and drug-addicted Mrs. Dubose brandishes a Confeder-
ate pistol, and, as we have seen, Atticus carefully redirects the lesson
of her courage from the Lost Cause to the liberal cause. 480 In invoking
the stolidness of their Confederate kin, Atticus can assure Scout, “It’s
different this time. . . . This time we’re not fighting the Yankees,
474. See supra notes 465-69 and accompanying text.
475. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 84.
476. Id. at 167.
477. See id. at 181; see also JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 49 (“It is probably no accident that
the most racist character in the novel is given a name associated with old South gentility—Rob-
ert E. Lee Ewell.”).
478. JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 49.
479. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 247 (“People up there set ’em free, but you
don’t see ’em settin’ at the table with ’em. At least we don’t have the deceit to say to ’em yes
you’re as good as we are but stay away from us.”).
480. See JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 48 (“Mrs. Lafayette Dubose . . . is in many ways the
epitome of the worn-out, old southern past.”); supra notes 265-81 and accompanying text.
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we’re fighting our friends.”481 At least implicitly, the Yankees are in
important respects the model he holds up to his children. Having
pressed Jem to the limits of his understanding, Atticus would assign
him the speeches of Henry W. Grady,482 whose New South creed
preached assimilation to northern industrialism as the South’s road to
salvation after the Civil War.483
The children’s own attitude to the North is one of mild bemuse-
ment. In explaining why the déclassé Dolphus Raymond sends his
mixed-race children, “in-betweens, [who] don’t belong anywhere,”
North to school, Jem observes that “[t]hey don’t mind ’em up
north.”484 Scout relates that their old family home at Finches’ Landing
has “the usual legend about the Yankees.”485 It is a comic tale of a
young bride-to-be getting stuck in a stairway after she “donned her
complete trousseau to save it from raiders in the neighborhood.”486
As it turned out, the Finches were “stripped of everything but their
land.”487 The culprit, however, was not the North, but “the distur-
bance between the North and the South,” which their antebellum an-
cestor “would have regarded with impotent fury.”488 Adult thought on
the conflict thus comes to us in the present perfect conditional, with a
futurity odder than its futility; there simply is no looking back in an-
ger.489 The war Jem and Scout are taught to remember hardly seems
like Hell; it is a comically understated “recent unpleasantness” no
more unpleasant than recent.
Atticus’s only negative comments about the North are oblique
and ambiguous. They appear in the peroration of his closing argu-
ment, as he is laying the foundation for his ultimate appeal to equal-
ity before the law. He is careful to distinguish more radical notions of
equality, which he vaguely equates with the North. Jefferson’s “all
481. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 84. Implicitly, of course, as we shall see below,
the tables are even more dramatically turned: the Yankees are Atticus’s silent partners. See
infra notes 653-58 and accompanying text.
482. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 156.
483. See WOODWARD, supra note 122, at 145 (documenting Grady’s industrialist ideas, the
messianic tone of his message, and its popularity in the post–Civil War South).
484. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 172.
485. Id. at 88.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 10. Scout also recounts Halloween pranks played on two elderly deaf women,
“the Barber ladies,” reported Republicans who moved to Maycomb from northern Alabama
with “Yankee ways,” such as their insistence that their house have a cellar. Id. at 265.
488. Id. at 8.
489. See id.
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men are created equal,” he laments, is “a phrase that the Yankees
and the distaff side of the Executive Branch in Washington are fond
of hurling at us.”490 The disapproving allusion to Eleanor Roosevelt
would certainly have carried racial connotations for his audience, but
his examples of acceptable inequality all have to do with natural dif-
ferences in individual endowments.
Atticus in his closing must distinguish carefully between the First
Lady’s locally unpopular integrationist views and the cause of justice
in Tom’s trial, if the latter is to have any chance of prevailing over his
lower-class compatriots’ prejudices against both northerners and
blacks. This is not a particularly strong indication that he himself
shares the former prejudice any more than the latter. Indeed, when
Mrs. Roosevelt’s integrationist ideas, along with those of the North
generally, come in for direct censure, it is with heavy irony. Mrs.
Merriweather, the target of Miss Maudie’s subtle barbs and the most
transparently hypocritical member of the ladies’ missionary society,
declares, “People up there set ’em free, but you don’t see ’em settin’
at the table with ’em.”491 Whatever Atticus himself thinks of “the dis-
taff side of the Executive Branch,” he is, as we have seen, a general
proponent of the New Deal against the courts.492
b. Intruder. Gavin’s aversion to things northern, by contrast,
could not be deeper or more explicit. Moreover, Gavin’s sectionalism
is not that of the parochial redneck or the nostalgic ne’er-do-well. He
has been not only to Harvard, but also to Heidelberg. When a
wealthy and well-educated northerner, besotted with champagne,
crashes his convertible into a Jefferson storefront and comes to ad-
mire the town’s rustic jail, it is the cosmopolitan Gavin who acts as
ambassador. He brings the stranger home to dinner, where they
“talked for three hours about Europe and Paris and Vienna.”493
Gavin’s southern patriotism, particularly his animosity toward the
North, is disturbing precisely because it cannot be easily dismissed as
silly or self-serving.
490. Id. at 217; see FREIDEL, supra note 465, at 84-87 (describing Eleanor Roosevelt’s in-
tervention with FDR on behalf of civil rights leaders, especially in support of federal anti-
lynching legislation).
491. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 247.
492. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
493. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 54. For Faulkner’s history of the jail, see
FAULKNER, REQUIEM, supra note 120, at 183-225.
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This is underscored by the fact that Chick initially shares Gavin’s
sentiment. Here is the North’s place in the cosmology Chick envi-
sions from the Gowries’ highland redoubt:
[T]he uttermost rim of earth itself, the North: not north but North,
outland and circumscribing and not even a geographical place but an
emotional idea, a condition of which he had fed from his mother’s
milk to be ever and constant on the alert not at all to fear and not
actually anymore to hate but just—a little wearily sometimes and
sometimes even with tongue in cheek—to defy: who had brought
from infancy with him a childhood’s picture which on the threshold
of manhood had found no reason or means to alter and which he
had no reason to believe in his old age would alter either . . . .494
These ideas come principally from Gavin, as Chick acknowl-
edges at each of their several iterations.495 But it is especially impor-
tant to note, in light of what we have seen of the role of women in the
novel, that these ideas come from the maternal side as well.496 These
idées fixes about the North, particularly the role of the North in ame-
liorating the condition of blacks, seriously jeopardize real reform.
Whether and how Chick can transcend this mindset is a critical issue
up to the final pages of the novel. As we shall see in the next section,
it is not comfortably resolved, though there is genuine room for op-
timism.497
4. Lawyers and Innocents. We see each story largely through the
eyes of an innocent, Atticus’s daughter, Scout, and Gavin’s nephew,
Chick. Each is related to the respective lawyer figures by much more
than mere consanguinity; they are quite distinctly protégés and
understudies. Yet, as their relationships with their mentors develop
through the course of their stories, they diverge sharply. Childlike
innocence, though critical in both stories, works in very different
ways. In Mockingbird, it is the tabula rasa on which Lee writes us
Atticus’s moral message; in Intruder, it is the window through which
494. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 149.
495. See, e.g., id. at 210.
496. Nor is this feminine source of animosity historically unlikely. See ERIC L. MCKITRICK,
ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 39-40 (1960) (“The women, far from performing
for their people any of the gentler rites of peace, were the bitterest of all,” even after Confed-
erate veterans themselves were reconciled). Faulkner makes this explicitly a theme in one of
his more historically rooted works, Requiem for a Nun. See supra note 120.
497. See infra notes 520-60 and accompanying text.
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Faulkner shows Gavin—and, through Gavin, us—an alternative not
only to Gavin’s world, but also to our own.
a. Mockingbird. Scout’s story sees her coming to appreciate,
and revealing to us in the process, the fundamental virtue of her
father and the essential rightness of his view—indeed, of his life. At
the beginning, she thinks he is embarrassingly boring and not worth
much;498 by the end, he is the bravest man that ever was.499 Atticus, it
turns out, is right not only about Tom Robinson, Mayella Ewell’s
mischosen Lancelot, but also about Boo Radley, Scout and Jem’s
unlikely guardian angel. His unorthodox child-rearing practices are
implicitly vindicated in the very lives of his children, as his litigation
strategy would have been, we are led to believe, if only Tom
Robinson had listened and waited.
Atticus insists that Scout, in good lawyerly fashion, fight evil
with her head, not her fists.500 In skillfully dispatching a mad dog with
a single rifleshot, he shows her that he does not lack more manly vir-
tues, but transcends them. He gives Scout the slightly offbeat, child-
friendly version of the Golden Rule that she tries to apply through-
out the book: “You never really understand a person until you con-
sider things from his point of view . . . until you climb into his skin
and walk around in it.”501 And his central parable of good and evil,
killing a mockingbird,502 informs her understanding of both Tom and
Boo and, of course, gives the story its title and theme. If everyone
were like Atticus, Scout comes to understand, all would be well. Yet,
all the while, in her daughterly way, she reveals enough of Atticus’s
fatherly foibles to prevent him from hardening into a marble man.
Atticus is the ideal father, the perfect prototype for the projec-
tions of paternalistic religions.503 His benevolence is not quite om-
498. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 97-99.
499. See id. at 109.
500. See id. at 84.
501. Id. at 36. Atticus later applies this maxim to Bob Ewell, see id. at 231, and Boo Radley,
see id. at 290-91.
502. See id. at 98. Instructing Jem on the proper use of an air rifle, Atticus says: “I’d rather
you shot at tin cans in the back yard, but I know you’ll go after birds. Shoot all the bluejays you
want, if you can hit ’em, but remember it’s a sin to kill a mockingbird.” Id.
503. See SIGMUND FREUD, MOSES AND MONOTHEISM 172-73 (1939) (“We know that the
great majority of people have a strong need for authority which they can admire, to which they
can submit . . . . It is the longing for the father that lives in each of us from his childhood days . .
. .”); see also THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 59-71 (1935) (applying
Freud’s dynamics to the justice system, with the law in the place of the father); cf. JOHNSON,
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nipotent, but he is wise to the point of omniscience. He cannot de-
liver his client, the Christ-like Tom, from death, but Tom’s death is
not in vain. Rather, through it Atticus delivers his younger protégés,
Scout and Jem, from the besetting sin of their southern idyll, racism.
Lee makes it quite clear that it is not the children who deliver Atticus
from racism, but very much the other way around. They are already
imbibing its poisonous assumptions by the time of Tom’s trial,504 and
Atticus is explicit about the source of their problem and its cure. In
describing the difficulties of Tom’s case, Atticus tells his brother, “I
just hope that Jem and Scout come to me for their answers instead of
listening to the town.”505 Nor does Atticus leave this to chance. Scout
herself comes to understand that he arranged for her to overhear this:
“I never figured out how Atticus knew I was listening, and it was not
until many years later that I realized he wanted me to hear every
word he said.”506 
The truth about racism, revealed to them by Atticus through the
trial of Tom, frees them from it. There remains, however, a final
temptation, particularly for the older, more idealistic Jem: bitterness
toward and hatred of their racist neighbors and fellow citizens. Here
again, the lesson is familiar and ultimately well learned: “[F]orgive
them; for they know not what they do.”507 This is not to denigrate this
message, in the context of either the story or the southern civil rights
movement. In that latter, larger context, after all, it was the message
                                                                                                                                     
supra note 12, at 99 (observing that, in the Finch household, “the saintly Atticus, Christ-like in
his code of honor, bestows a system of benevolent laws”).
504. See JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 38 (“What keeps these two children from practicing
the same cruelty as the other children is a father, a supreme adult, who speaks to them as
adults.”).
505. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 97.
506. Id. Claudia Durst Johnson speaks with obvious approval of this father-knows-best
family:
Of all the societies that the children will ever encounter, their familial one is the most
whole, and therefore, the most sane. Heart and head rule in harmony, inner and
outer laws work in tandem, for there are no hidden agendas, no double standards, no
dark secrets in their home.
JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 101. Even she, however, points to an oddly stifling element. After
describing in detail the subversive, indeed patricidal, aspects of children’s games, especially
playacting, as evidenced in Jem and Scout’s dramatizing of what they imagine to be the Radley
family story, id. at 77-82, Johnson concludes with this pregnant observation: “In light of this
view of the ritual, it is interesting that it is Atticus who calls a halt to the little drama.” Id. at 82-
83. In light of Johnson’s psychoanalytic account, surely at least a clinical “hmm” is in order
here.
507. Luke 23:34 (Revised Standard Version). Illustrating the lesson, Atticus describes Wal-
ter Cunningham, Sr., on the day after his joining a lynch mob as “basically a good man” with
“his blind spots along with the rest of us.” LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 168.
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of Dr. King himself from the very beginning.508 The point here is that,
in the context of the novel, forgiveness is Atticus’s message, espe-
cially his message to his children. As such, it is further evidence of
Atticus’s moral superiority to the innocents around him.
In a revealing coda at the novel’s conclusion, Scout does seem to
teach Atticus an important moral lesson. But this is the exception
that proves the book’s otherwise unvarying rule; the lesson she
teaches him is none other than his own. Boo Radley has killed Bob
Ewell, who had waylaid Jem and Scout in an effort to kill them.
Sheriff Tate, as we have seen, finally convinces Atticus to help him
cover up the truth about Ewell’s death, to save Boo from public at-
tention. It remains for Atticus to explain this apparent lapse from
truthfulness to Scout, who has overheard and understood the sheriff’s
evasions. “Can you possibly understand?” Atticus asks.509
He need not have worried: “Atticus looked like he needed
cheering up. I ran to him and hugged him and kissed him with all my
might. ‘Yes, sir, I understand.’”510 And indeed she does: “Well, it’d be
sort of like shootin’ a mockingbird, wouldn’t it?”511 She is, of course,
referring Atticus to the ultimate moral authority, himself, with all the
tentativeness and tenderness of a devoted daughter. She has learned
at last the lesson of Maycomb’s southern womanhood, of Miss
Maudie and Calpurnia, even of the initially critical Aunt Alexandra:
help your man stand by his own principles.
In his dealings with the childlike Boo, Atticus also shows himself
to be ultimately in charge. At one level, of course, it is Boo who saves
Atticus by saving his children, and this salvation takes Atticus by sur-
prise. But that is hardly the whole story. Atticus has taken up for Boo
from the beginning,512 and his surprise at Boo’s beneficence is a func-
tion of its timing, not its source. Beyond that, we have a strong hint
that Boo shares Atticus’s sense of what is wrong with the world. In
the throes of his alienation from his community after Tom’s trial, Jem
508. See DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 59-61 (1986) (recounting Dr. King’s con-
ciliatory message immediately after the bombing of his home in Montgomery during the Bus
Boycott).
509. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 291.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. See id. at 47, 56 (forbidding Scout and Jem to dramatize Boo’s rumored condition in
their games).
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diagnoses Boo’s problem: he does not want to come out; he cannot
bear the evil of the world.513
Boo only ceases to be pathetic when he briefly abandons his ar-
rested-adolescent world-aversion and comes out to play his role, ac-
tively and manfully, in Atticus’s cause. And if the logic of his position
is close to that of Atticus, the dramatic relation is closer still: it is a
matter of cause and effect. Atticus’s defense of Tom ignites Bob Ew-
ell’s murderous rage, which brings Boo out to defend Atticus’s chil-
dren. Atticus thanks Boo at the end for giving him his children’s lives.
But it was through Atticus’s own endangering of his children that
Boo’s life gained its modicum of moral meaning as a tragedy rather
than merely as a mystery or a monstrosity.
And yet, in the last analysis, it is Atticus who ensures that the
moral meaning of Boo’s life is but minimal. In protecting his mock-
ingbird from the town’s attention, Atticus keeps him caged in his own
severe, and unaddressed, psychopathology. Boo’s transcendence of
his reclusiveness is most transient; after this appearance, Scout her-
self never sees him again.514 Atticus’s paternalism, for all its kindness,
is not without its costs, not least of which is its undiluted transmission
to Scout’s generation.
And if Scout has, by the end, become a supporter of this pater-
nalism, she has also become its victim. She is poignantly aware that
Boo saved her life, that, in a deeply moral sense, he was “our neigh-
bor.”515 She knows, too, that “neighbors give in return” and that she
has in that sense not been a proper neighbor to Boo: “[W]e had given
him nothing, and it made me sad.”516 Her sadness bespeaks the ulti-
mate inadequacy of Atticus’s gift, protection, and points to what their
relationship with each other and with Boo essentially lacks: reciproc-
ity. Boo never becomes a full member of their community; he liter-
ally disappears within it, protected from it rather than helped by it or
reintegrated into it.
More tragically, Scout and Atticus themselves show little sign of
entering into a fuller communion with each other. Even as she feels
the inadequacy of Atticus’s way of dealing with Boo, she is unable to
try to save his life in return, because she is unable to question Atti-
513. See id. at 240; JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 59 (noting Jem’s association of “acrimony
between social classes” and Boo’s alienation).
514. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 293.
515. Id.
516. Id.
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cus’s way, to acknowledge that it might be other than absolutely
right. To the end, she is the protégé. She does, of course, mature, but
her maturer vision is only clearer insight into her father’s infallibility.
On the very night that she has barely survived a murderous as-
sault, Atticus reads her a story in which an initially scary character
turns out, like Boo Radley, to be, as she puts it, “real nice.”517 Atticus
makes clear that it is not a story he has read before, but no matter: it
strikingly parallels Scout’s own story, and all stories point in one di-
rection. As he tucks her in, Atticus affirms her liberal optimism
(which is, of course, really his own) in his final words to her: “Most
people are [nice], Scout, when you finally see them.”518 She has seen
Bob Ewell with the ultimate finality, and to the end he was not very
nice; one suspects the irony here is unintentional.
But perhaps not. By the end of Mockingbird an innocent has
seen radical evil, and she can safely forget about it, literally lulled to
sleep by its denial. Scout has the last word in her story, and she seems
to say that Atticus the protector will always be there: “He turned out
the light and went into Jem’s room. He would be there all night, and
he would be there when Jem waked up in the morning.”519
b. Intruder. It is emphatically otherwise between Gavin and
Chick. As we have seen, it is Chick who returns to Lucas in jail, who
believes his story, and who acts on his instructions, all without the
aid, or even the understanding, of Gavin. And it is through Chick that
we see, dimly but definitely from the very beginning, the
inassimilable excellence of Lucas. Chick’s innocence is our window
on what even the most receptive and childlike of the white male
adults in his world cannot see. He does not come around, like Scout,
to seeing how and why his mentor is always right; he sees, from fairly
early on, why his mentor misses not only most of what is really true
and virtuous about his client, but also much of what is false and
vicious about his world.
Quite the opposite of Scout, Chick begins with the assumption
that his uncle is an oracle: “[H]is uncle who had for everything an ex-
planation not in facts but long since beyond dry statistics into some-
517. Id. at 295.
518. Id. at 296.
519. See id.; JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 92 (“As Atticus puts Scout to bed, she summarizes
the Tom Swift tale for him, finding herself merging the fiction of one of their favorite books
with their experience with Arthur Boo Radley and the inner and outer terrors with which they
have become friendly.”).
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thing far more moving because it was truth: which moved the heart
and had nothing whatever to do with what mere provable informa-
tion said.”520 But the end of Chick’s enlightenment is not the antipo-
des of his beginning; his earlier adoration is not merely negated. He
comes around at the end, not to dismissing his uncle, but to arguing
with him.521
As Chick accepts the job of helping Lucas, he realizes why his
uncle could not accept it and why Lucas ultimately declined to offer it
to him. The job is nearly impossible for Chick to conceive of under-
taking and obviously impossible for him to perform in the time avail-
able. It is the very sort of job the comprehension and undertaking of
which requires suspending belief in the ordinary limits of the possi-
ble. When he sees it as such, Chick remembers the words of old
Ephraim, the elderly father of his mother’s housemaid:
‘Young folks and womens, they aint cluttered. They can listen. But a
middle-year man like your paw and your uncle, they cant listen.
They aint got time. They’re too busy with facks. In fact, you might
bear this in yo mind; someday yo mought need it. If you ever needs
to get anything done outside the common run, dont waste yo time on
menfolks; get the women and children to working at it.’522
Grown white men are bounded by the rationality of their mundane
worlds; only those not so bounded can see beyond the horizon to pos-
sibilities otherwise unthinkable.
Having realized that, Chick also realizes how close Lucas had
come to confiding in Gavin and how nearly worthy of that confidence
Gavin was. He remembers “that quality in his uncle which brought
people to tell him things they would tell nobody else, even tempting
Negroes to tell him what their nature forbade them telling white
men.”523 On most occasions Gavin “had had no more trouble than he
believing things that all other grown people doubted for the sole rea-
son that they were unreasonable . . . .”524
But at the critical juncture when his client’s life hangs in the bal-
ance, that childlike quality fails Gavin. Lucas has seen both the pos-
sibility of his transcendence and its failure. Gavin, like the other adult
520. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 49.
521. See id. at 233-34 (disputing Gavin’s disquisition on men, women, and the automobile).
522. Id. at 70; see also FAULKNER, MOSES, supra note 3, at 13 (conveying the same essential
message, from Lucas’s father, Tomey’s Turl, in a somewhat comic setting).
523. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 68.
524. Id. at 70.
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male citizens of Jefferson, reasons from their flawed premises about
Lucas’s character to the only conclusions consistent with those
premises and the facts before them. Having imbibed—albeit less fully
than most—the racism of the contemporary adult world, Gavin as a
lawyer cannot presume his own client’s innocence and cannot even
listen to that client long enough to hear, much less believe, the truth
that would ultimately exonerate him. For that, as Miss Habersham
immediately understood, Lucas needed an innocent, an outsider.
Chick’s innocence has an equally important converse aspect. As
we have just seen, unlike Gavin (and presumably in common with
most of us readers), Chick is more innocent of racism and thus more
capable of seeing something in Lucas, a black man, that Gavin, a ma-
ture white southerner of the 1930s, cannot see. But in common with
Gavin, and opposed to us—or most of “us”—Chick is “innocent” in a
very different, and more problematic, way. He is “innocent” of the
notion, deeply ingrained in the prevailing ethos of the modern liberal
West, that what Lucas really is, Lucas’s real character, cannot be
called—indeed, experienced as—“good.”525
For us, the essential aspects of Lucas’s character—his aloofness,
intractability, intolerance, and inflexibility—oft-repeated in Faulk-
ner’s account, are eccentric at best, and more properly antisocial. The
more sophisticated among us, trained in the pluralist school of, say,
Sir Isaiah Berlin and, before him, Giambattista Vico,526 may acknowl-
edge, at a rational level, that such features counted as virtues in long-
lost, if not purely mythic, heroic societies.
For Chick, by contrast, they are the very features that marked
his own grandfather, although in less high relief than Lucas.527 And
Chick’s relationship with his grandfather, unlike ours with the heroes
525. See King, supra note 6, at 236 (analyzing Lucas as Faulkner’s failed effort to create an
autonomous black man, resulting in “a backwoods Nietzschean superman, serene in his indif-
ference to most recognizable human motivations”).
526. See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 10-13 (1990); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 299-300 (1988) (characterizing ours as an age of
relativism and observing that many of the values and virtues of literary heroes are reprehensi-
ble by modern standards).
527. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 8, 12, 24. Chick understands quite clearly
that it is his southernness that enabled him to respond to Lucas:
the earth which had bred his bones and those of his fathers for six generations and
was still shaping him into not just a man but a specific man . . . even among a kind
and race specific and unique . . . since it had also integrated into him whatever it was
that had compelled him to stop and listen to a damned highnosed impudent Ne-
gro . . . .
FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 148.
    
698 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [49:601
of myth and saga, is quite literally immediate, unmediated by transla-
tion, either linguistic or cultural. To the extent that we can empathize
with Chick and thus share his “innocence” of our modern liberalism,
we not only come into direct contact with the embodiment of a very
alien set of values; we can also experience those values as familiar,
even familial. At the very least, we can see that, through the eyes of
an engaging young person not alien to ourselves, Lucas is virtuous.
We may also see, in the example of Lucas, a different Jeffersonian vi-
sion, not a radical egalitarianism but a natural aristocracy of talent.
Chick himself stands, even as Gavin brings him to understand it,
in a position of leadership in his community. His deep, familial identi-
fication with local aristocrats like his grandfather enables him to see
and to affiliate with Lucas’s nobility in a way that other whites might
have missed. Here, Chick has already transcended Gavin as a leader
against his own people’s racism. Yet, on the other, external front, he
is very much at risk of following in Gavin’s anti-northern footsteps.
That is the unresolved tension within the book, and, as we shall see,
an essential part of the book’s ambiguous relationship with its read-
ership.528
Faulkner underscores Chick’s position of leadership with an ex-
tended theatrical metaphor.529 The scene is set with the urban crowd
before the jail “in that preliminary settling down like the before-
curtain in a theatre,”530 awaiting the lynch mob’s performance of Lu-
cas’s tragic fate. When, to the crowd’s consternation, Chick and his
collaborators exonerate Lucas, the crowd flees the scene of its hu-
miliation, exiting the stage even as the focus of the drama shifts to its
own flight. Chick is angry that they have sullied the part he per-
formed in freeing Lucas; he had wanted to act with them, not against
them.531
Only later does he realize how their parts are related. Leaving
his uncle, Chick reenters a now-vacant square
with a sense a feeling not possessive but proprietary, vicegeral, with
humility still, himself not potent but at least the vessel of a potency
like the actor looking from wings or perhaps empty balcony down
upon the waiting stage vacant yet garnished and empty yet, never-
528. See infra note 665 and accompanying text.
529. See WATSON, supra note 15, at 136-38 (analyzing the metaphor and explaining Chick’s
role as healer in “a community that cannot or will not heal itself”).
530. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 134.
531. See id. at 177-90.
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theless where in a moment now he will walk and posture in the last
act’s absolute cynosure, himself in himself nothing and maybe no
world-beater of a play either but at least his to finish it, round it and
put it away intact and unassailable, complete . . . .532
On further reflection, he realizes the square is not empty, any
more than it was the night of the expected lynching.533 The town had
not abandoned the square, “but only withdrawn giving room to do
what homely thing must be done in its own homely way without help
or interference or even (thank you) advice.”534 This is precisely the
language Gavin uses with respect to the North, and it is, in fact, its lo-
cal equivalent: aristocrats like Chick will lead their own people in
both internal reform and external defense. The crowd abandoned this
critical public space to those who would do what needed doing not
just better, but right:535 Chick and Miss Habersham, with their assis-
tant, Aleck Sander, and with the help of the sheriff, Gavin, and Lucas
himself.536
But exactly what is to be done, beyond wrapping up Lucas’s case,
is painfully unclear to Chick, as is how to do it. All through this dra-
matic section, the interaction between Chick and Gavin is critical,
and critically ambiguous. Gavin insists that Chick not repudiate his
community; Chick accuses Gavin of excusing, or even defending,
lynchers, then of asking too much of him. Gavin recognizes Chick’s
sanctimoniousness toward his fellows, forgives it, and insists that he
keep on going. Their dialogue becomes intense and elliptical:
‘Dont stop what?’ he said again. But he knew what now; he said,
‘Aint it about time you stopped being a Tenderfoot scout too?’
‘This is not Tenderfoot,’ his uncle said. ‘This is the third degree.
What do you call it?—’
‘Eagle scout,’ he said.
‘Eagle scout,’ his uncle said. ‘Tenderfoot is, Dont accept. Eagle
scout is, Dont stop. You see? No, that’s wrong. Dont bother to see.
Dont even bother to not forget it. Just dont stop.’
532. See id. at 206-07.
533. See id. at 208.
534. Id. at 209-10.
535. See id. at 204.
536. See id. at 205, 210.
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‘No,’ he said. ‘We dont need to worry about stopping now. It seems
to me what we have to worry about now is where we’re going and
how.’537
These questions are never explicitly answered; as is often the
case in Socratic dialogues, the answers must be extrapolated from the
interaction of the interlocutors, the dramatic matrix in which the
dialogue itself develops.538 Ultimately, these dialogues are about the
nature of communal life,539 and critical hints about how that life is to
be structured are given in the way the speakers interact, between
themselves and with other members of the community, in addressing
these very issues.540 Thus, if Chick and Gavin never give a definitive
answer to the broader aspects of the question of “where we’re going
and how,”541 the way they go about inquiring may itself contain the
answer.
It becomes clear that Chick and Gavin, between themselves, will
answer these questions in continued conversations. Gavin, who has
always attended to Chick’s questions, now attends increasingly to his
answers; indeed, Gavin revises his own answers in light of Chick’s
objections. In this sense, Gavin implicitly but unmistakably takes
Chick into full partnership in a shared moral life, a shared moral life
of a distinctly Socratic sort. Their court of ultimate resort on funda-
mental moral issues is each other, through the medium of mutually
respectful conversation. In an important sense, the question of
“where we are going” is answered in how they go about getting there;
through their dialogue, they are creating a mutually acceptable moral
world.
But if the nature of the community between Gavin and Chick is
thus clear, at least in outline, the nature of their relation to the larger
community remains very much in doubt. At a minimum, as we have
seen in the several acts of the town square drama, Gavin’s conversa-
537. Id. at 205-06.
538. See OLGA W. VICKERY, THE NOVELS OF WILLIAM FAULKNER 142-44 (rev. ed. 1964)
(analyzing the dialogue between Gavin and Chick); Bassett, supra note 19, at 208, 212 (dis-
cussing the relationship between Gavin and Chick as dialectical).
539. See BROOKS, supra note 141, at 292 (“[I]n Intruder in the Dust the meaning of the
community is uppermost in the minds of Gavin and Charles and constitutes the chief topic of
their speculation and dialogue.”).
540. See James Boyd White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato’s Gorgias and the Modern Law-
yer, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849, 851, 861-71 (1983) (demonstrating that dialectic expresses and
shapes a person’s character, life, and community).
541. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 206.
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tions with Chick prevent Chick’s repudiating his fellow white citi-
zens.542 Beyond that, in the scene where Chick reenters the square
alone, Chick assumes that his role will be front and center, that he
will be the drama’s star and enact its conclusion. In his frequent invo-
cation of Gavin’s “solid South” orations, we have reason to fear that
Chick simply sees himself as uncritically picking up his uncle’s ban-
ner.
But the novel’s final scene opens with Chick a spectator again,
looking down with Gavin from the latter’s law offices onto the square
below. The square itself, the equivalent of Socrates’s agora in con-
sciously neoclassical Jefferson, has become incapable of sustaining
reasoned discourse. Jammed with Saturday commercial and recrea-
tional traffic, it is too crowded and too noisy. The blare of bourgeois
sales pitches and the blast of working-class radio music cancel each
other out in pure cacophony. Lucas strides through this chaos, across
the square, to settle his account with Gavin. Lucas, not Chick, be-
comes “the cynosure”543 of the drama’s final scene.544
Lucas shifts the focus of discussion back to the place of Chick’s
original enlightenment, Lucas’s house, by inviting Chick to come
there again.545 Chick’s oblique reference to Miss Habersham, “sitting
in her own hall now, mending the stockings until time to feed the
chickens,”546 reminds us that this is at once the place of “the other,”
the outsider, and the aristocratic, ancestral hero. This is an order of
apparent opposites that she and Lucas have merged in their persons
and, more particularly, in their homes, the seats of hereditary aristo-
crats who are also social outsiders. Moreover, Lucas invites Chick to
reenter that order, at once outside and above the bourgeois town, on
radically altered terms. This time Chick is not to come as a suppli-
cant, arriving by accident and staying at the sufferance of the land-
lord, but at his lord’s express invitation, voluntarily to assume his po-
sition as a proper member of that order himself.
This altered relationship is apparent in the chivalrous banter of
Lucas and Chick’s final exchange:
542. See BROOKS, supra note 141, at 288 (“The tension . . . is between a boy’s ties with his
community—his almost fierce identification with it—and his revulsion from what the commu-
nity seems committed to do.”).
543. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 207; supra notes 529-32 and accompany-
ing text.
544. See id. at 229-33.
545. See id. at 235.
546. Id. at 231.
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‘Young man—’ courteous and intractable, more than bland: down-
right cheerful almost, removing the raked swagger of the hat: ‘You
aint fell in no more creeks lately, have you?’
‘That’s right,’ he said. ‘I’m saving that until you get some more ice
on yours.’
‘You’ll be welcome without waiting for a freeze,’ Lucas said.547
Lucas thus reminds Chick of how their relationship began, the
source of quasi-feudal obligation that Chick has obviously acknowl-
edged and reciprocated in saving Lucas’s life. Chick responds with
the self-deprecating humor of the noble who is also a vassal, free to
joke with his overlord, but in a way that accedes to a subordinate
role. Accepting this tacit affirmation of their respective roles, Lucas
in turn invites Chick back to his cabin on the McCaslin place. It is an
invitation that parallels Edmonds’s rabbit-hunting invitation to Chick
at the outset. But now it comes from the plantation’s true lord, Lucas,
to Chick in his own right, not as the nephew of Gavin. And, implicitly
at least, it is not about boyish stuff like rabbit-hunting, but the serious
matter of remaking their common world.
 Yet, there hangs in Lucas’s invitation an unmistakable, almost
painful irony. He leaves us with the fear that Chick will not come un-
til that proverbial freeze, ever invoked by the defiant and the de-
spairing alike: not until Hell freezes over. Before, Lucas had orches-
trated Chick’s rescue; this time, Chick must save himself. To enter
the kingdom of God, Chick must have heard, one must become as a
little child;548 whether his original baptism at Lucas’s hands can sur-
vive his impending immersion in the adult white male world of his
uncle is, at the end, poignantly in the balance.
Yet again, the end of the novel is encouraging on this point. As
we have seen, the final word in the novel is Lucas’s,549 and in it he
547. Id. at 235. Although this analysis differs with Cleanth Brooks on precisely who is in-
debted to whom, and how, Brooks is certainly right that “[p]eople who understand and feel af-
fection for each other can turn the most serious matter into a joke, and may prefer the affec-
tionate joke for expressing, without embarrassing sentimentality, the deepest kind of
understanding.” BROOKS, supra note 141, at 294.
548. See Mark 10:15.
549. See supra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
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shows, to both Gavin and Chick,550 the superiority of his world to
Gavin’s, even as Gavin, in his turn, had shown Lucas his fealty to
Miss Habersham. Gavin’s giving Lucas his receipt, like Chick’s re-
turning to Lucas’s cabin, lies outside the literal scope of the book.
Yet, we know Gavin will give the receipt immediately, and we have
reason to hope Chick will eventually return the visit.
What gives us that hope is what we have come to know about
Chick’s relationship with Gavin, which takes a critical turn in the fi-
nal chapters. At numerous junctures in the novel, Chick answers
questions, from the most practical to the most profound, from minor
issues of local lore to fundamental matters of morality, with the re-
membered lectures his uncle has given him.551 When he finally faces
the critical dilemma of his place in their deeply flawed community, he
finds he is at a crossroads:
Gavin is the person who would naturally talk to the boy about the
problems that are disturbing him, and the adult’s notions about the
community, the Negro, and the nature of law and justice represent
for the boy at once a resource and an impediment. It is against these
that his own developing notions must contend and it these views that
he must accept, repudiate, or transcend.552
Chick is by then painfully aware that his uncle had radically misun-
derstood Lucas, and he has taken to heart Miss Habersham’s critique
of adult male problem-solving. Moreover, he has proved himself able
to act on these insights.
Just before Lucas crosses the square at the end of the novel,
Chick contradicts Gavin most explicitly. Gavin has delivered his dis-
quisition on America’s love affair with the automobile, and its result,
the frigidity of American women. Chick, who early in the novel had
identified his uncle’s discourse with Truth itself, says simply, “That’s
550. See MINROSE GWIN, THE FEMININE AND FAULKNER: READING (BEYOND) SEXUAL
DIFFERENCE 93 (1990) (arguing that Lucas “demonstrates to Chick the invalidity of his desire
for mastery”).
551. Jay Watson has identified these incidents and analyzed their importance in detail. See
WATSON, supra note 15, at 121-28.
552. BROOKS, supra note 141, at 288. Jay Watson makes much the same point: “All in all,
Gavin’s spoken stories and anecdotes instruct Chick in communal values and assumptions even
as they sometimes kindle in him an urge to challenge these values and assumptions.” WATSON,
supra note 15, at 127; see also Bassett, supra note 19, at 210 (“Chick, driven by guilt more than
by liberalism, is not simply an open-minded youth: to the extent he acts commendably, he is a
disciple of Gavin.”).
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not true.”553 Gavin offers the evidence of his personal experience, but
Chick is unmoved, for his own experience has by this time been dif-
ferent. He has worked with Miss Habersham, and he will have none
of Gavin’s misogyny: “I still dont believe it.”554 It is Gavin who relents
and, beyond that, encourages Chick’s dissent: “‘That’s right,’ his un-
cle said. ‘Dont. And even when you are fifty and plus, still refuse to
believe it.’ And that was when they saw Lucas crossing the Square,
probably at the same time . . . .”555 They literally see, together, the
personified refutation of Gavin’s prejudices, and Gavin has prepared
Chick for further insights by encouraging Chick to continue to argue
with him.
Atticus, it must be conceded, is in some respects a good mentor.
He teaches painful but invaluable lessons about virtue, particularly
about courage. He does not merely lecture about goodness; he leads
a good life, practicing instead of preaching. At the end of his story,
we hope Jem will grow up to be like him. But we know Scout is
bound for a very different fate. In our time, we see that the lessons
Atticus taught, the very life he lived, are inadequate. Most critically,
his lessons leave people out, in ways of which he himself was un-
aware, even as he tries to take care of them.556 He is a fine father, but
he is only as good a person as a paternalist can be. As Thomas Shaf-
fer has eloquently demonstrated, the ethic of the southern gentleman
is itself ultimately inadequate if Atticus Finch, its most famous exam-
ple, is also its exemplar.557
But he is not. Uncle Gavin is a paternalist, too, but he is also
something else altogether. He is no Socrates, but he is a Socratic
teacher. From him Chick learns, not merely how to be good, but how
to make the good—or at least the received wisdom about “good”—
better: he learns how to engage in constructive dialogue with not only
his mentor and other people “like us,” but also with “others,” those
who are racially, and even more radically, different. Looking to the
future, faced with the awful prospect that his protégé will exceed him,
even leave his world behind, Gavin has a consistent, indeed resolute,
553. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 234.
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. See SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 25, at 86-97 (showing that the gen-
tleman’s legal ethic ultimately fails by attempting to “protect the weak who are not weak”).
557. See id. at 93, 95 (discussing Atticus’s moral failures). Shaffer himself fails to sharply
distinguish between Gavin and Atticus, treating them both as prime examples of the southern
gentleman ethic but giving greater attention to Atticus.
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response: “Just dont stop.”558 And his continued encouragement is a
large part of what enables Chick to go on, to transcend, to create a
better world than the one Gavin’s discourse has yet given him.
Critics originally focused almost exclusively on Gavin’s tendency
to serious moral and political error, particularly in defense of the es-
tablished southern order.559 Only recently have they come to appreci-
ate his capacity not only to accept correction, but also to create his
own best critic, his nephew Chick, the potential co-creator of a radi-
cally new order.560 Chick’s ultimate assessment of Gavin, from the
perspective of his own Harvard education and post-graduation Euro-
pean tour, is this:
Because he is a good man, wise too except for the occasions when he
would aberrate, go momentarily haywire and take a wrong turn that
even I could see was wrong, and then go hell-for-leather, with abso-
lutely no deviation from logic and rationality from there on, until he
wound us up in a mess of trouble or embarrassment that even I
would have had sense enough to dodge. But he is a good man.
Maybe I was wrong sometimes to trust him and follow him but I
never was wrong to love him.561
E. Lawyers and the Law
Both Tom Robinson and Lucas Beauchamp are in serious trou-
ble with the law, and both secure the services of lawyers. Legal proc-
ess, moreover, is a source of potential relief to both, a plausible place
from which to expect justice. In both accounts, law is not an autono-
mous system of rules and procedures, but, as the Legal Realists saw
it, a complex of social interactions ultimately inseparable from soci-
ety itself. Moreover, neither Gavin nor Atticus is a fetishist of legal
form; each takes liberties with the law’s letter to achieve what he sees
as substantive justice. Yet, they have very different relationships with
558. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 206.
559. For a summary of these early critics, see BROOKS, supra note 141, at 280-81; WATSON,
supra note 15, at 111; WEISBERG, supra note 14, at 82-83.
560. This is especially true of both Jay Watson, see WATSON, supra note 15, at 112 (“To do
justice to the novel demands doing justice to all sides of [Gavin’s] character.”), and Richard
Weisberg, see WEISBERG, supra note 14, at 84 (arguing that, for all his faults, Gavin ultimately
develops a willingness to take risks in the service of what he considers right), although on some
important matters they differ with both the preceding analysis and each other. Cleanth Brooks,
as we have seen, was an important early precursor of Gavin’s recent defenders. See supra note
552 and accompanying text.
561. FAULKNER, The Mansion, supra note 19, at 884.
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the law, and the law plays very different roles in their respective sto-
ries.
1. Intruder: Law Burdened by Busyness. A salient aspect of
Intruder is the extent to which legal process is repressed into the
background. Lucas is arrested off-stage, as it were, and the charges
against him are dropped behind the scenes. Moreover, what little
formal legal process there is is highly irregular. Lucas’s arrest is
primarily a matter of protecting him from a lynch mob, and only
secondarily a prelude to trial and legal conviction or vindication. His
official release is the mere ratification, the rubber-stamping, of the
exonerating evidence gathered in a technically illegal exhumation
and never formally presented. The anticipated drama of criminal
trial, with all its ritual and regularity, its unequivocal verdict, is
anticlimactically absent. Not only is Lucas exonerated without trial;
the real culprit, Crawford Gowrie, dies without one.562
This striking absence, and awkward presence, of formal legal
procedure is less a fault of law itself than it is of law’s functionaries,
those whose job it is to invoke and apply formal legal process. Deeply
ingrained racism, as we have seen, keeps Gavin and other agents of
the law from seeing Lucas as he is, and thus from invoking proper le-
gal process in his defense.563 But more than racism is at fault here.
Understanding Lucas’s paradoxical nobility, the precondition of ap-
preciating his innocence, is but one instance of a general category of
experience closed to adult white men. Old Ephraim had identified
such experience as “something outside the common run.”564 It is not
the case, then, that law is inherently “male,” principled rather than
practical, rule-bound and harsh rather than fact-sensitive and equita-
ble.565 The absence of legal process in Intruder indicates not so much
law’s inadequacy as an instrument for handling Lucas’s problem, as
the inability of law’s principal agents, adult white men, to preside
over its application in his peculiar case.
562. The sheriff seems to have let him kill himself in jail with his own pistol, the same one
with which he killed his brother. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 231.
563. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
564. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 70. Chick later recalls the words of old
Ephraim. See id. at 110.
565. On the split between law and equity, or between rule and act consequentialism, see
POSNER, supra note 526, at 108-10, 122-26 (2d ed. 1998) (contrasting “legalistic” and “non-
legalistic” conceptions of law, noting that all systems involve elements of both, and refusing to
identify either as “male” or “female”).
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Moreover, as Miss Habersham and Ephraim understand it, the
ultimate problem lies no more in the whiteness or maleness of the
law’s agents than it does in the nature of law itself. The problem lies,
in both their views, in white men’s being too busy, in their not having
time, or not being able to take time, to listen. The conscientious
agents of law, men like Gavin and the sheriff, fail to understand, but
not because they are too obtuse to hear or too committed to main-
taining the status quo to listen. They are quite simply too caught up
in the busyness of mundane affairs to attend, to harken, to the ex-
traordinary. The press of business—the need to process not just
“cases,” but “facts,” the very raw data of experience itself, through
standard categories, “the common run”—has closed their minds to
radically different ways of seeing, and thus of being.566
Yet, significantly, the mind of the most perceptive of law’s
agents, Gavin, is not closed to that very insight.567 Indeed, Gavin is
able to assimilate the need to listen to outsiders to a part of their
common cultural perspective, to an existing category—albeit, signifi-
cantly, a religious, rather than strictly legal, category. Upon learning
of the results of the exhumation that Chick, Aleck Sander, and Miss
Habersham had performed, Gavin concedes, “Out of the mouths of
babes and sucklings and old ladies—.”568 Chick immediately recog-
nizes this as a paraphrase of Jesus’s paradoxical teachings,569 teach-
ings about radical epiphanies, indeed, teachings that were themselves
radical epiphanies.570
566. Richard Weisberg argues that “Gavin Stevens becomes the first major literary lawyer
to develop positively as a human being in the direction of, and not in rebellion against, his pro-
fessional strengths.” WEISBERG, supra note 14, at 84. This, of course, runs counter to the cri-
tique of busyness that Faulkner is making in Intruder, where even Weisberg admits Gavin has
not reached his full maturity. That maturity comes, in Weisberg’s view, in The Town. See id. at
86-92. Contrary to Weisberg’s suggestion, however, see id. at 85, Gavin is not younger in In-
truder and Knight’s Gambit. In the title story of Knight’s Gambit, Gavin gets married; in the
Snopes trilogy, his marriage comes in The Mansion, which follows The Town. Though the pre-
cise internal dating in Intruder is uncertain, see supra note 19, both of the two plausible time
frames have to fall after the events of The Town. Chick is 12 when his encounter with Lucas
begins in Intruder; The Town opens with Chick’s saying of the story he is about to relate, “I
wasn’t born yet . . . .” FAULKNER, The Town, supra note 286, at 353.
567. See Bassett, supra note 19, at 209 (noting that Gavin “shows a capacity to question his
own assumptions”).
568. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 105.
569. See id.; accord Matthew 21:15-16.
570. See PAUL RICOUER, Listening to the Parables of Jesus, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL
RICOUER 239, 245 (Charles E. Reagan & David Stewart eds., 1978) (analyzing Jesus’s parables
of the kingdom as calls for openness toward the radical reorientation of one’s being in the
world).
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Law, then, is not so much pushed to the side in Intruder, dis-
missed as unnecessary, as it is marked for radical recentering, reori-
enting. Law, as practiced by men of affairs, is limited by their limita-
tions. In order for law to work, those who work with it must broaden
their horizons, lift their heads from the mill. Lucas’s case shatters
conventional paradigms of justice and equality, not only in his time,
but also in ours. As he himself posits, he is not a “nigger,” someone
less than equal under segregation law, but neither is he merely a man.
He is more than a man,571 a notion our egalitarian law can scarcely ac-
commodate. To be equal to the demands of justice in such a case, law
must not be bound by those paradigms.
The problem of lawyerly busyness occurs at two levels, which
overlap in Lucas’s case. At the first level, the problem reflects the
oft-noted tension between law and equity, between what old Ephraim
calls “the rules and the cases,” with which men like Gavin work, and
“the circumstances,” the intricate and immediate, sometimes
anomalous, details with which women and children work. Pressed to
get results, to finish business, lawyers and other agents of the law rely
on simplifying heuristics in dealing with facts and broad principles in
applying law; in a word, they become “legalistic.”
Gavin critically overlooks Lucas’s innocence because he is inter-
preting the facts before him—a long-harassed and proud black man
caught standing over the slain body of a white man—according to
implicitly plausible assumptions about how such men act in such mat-
ters. As Miss Habersham puts it, he is concerned with “prob-
abilit[ies],”572 with what is likely to happen most of the time, in the
mill run of cases. Similarly, when Chick relates to him Lucas’s alter-
native account, he dismisses it out of hand; it is precisely the kind of
account that he knows, as an experienced lawyer, the guilty of Lu-
cas’s class and race typically concoct.573
But, as I have been at pains to show, Lucas is not typical, much
less stereotypical, and the nature of his uniqueness takes us to the
second level at which the problem of lawyerly busyness operates.
Any legal system must balance the streamlining achieved by simpli-
fying rules and evidentiary assumptions against their cost, the inequi-
ties of their application, in anomalous, atypical cases. If this balance
571. See FAULKNER, MOSES, supra note 3, at 46-47.
572. See FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 88.
573. See id. at 78-79.
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is properly struck, the gains in the mill run of cases offset the costs of
injustice in the few.
The rules applied in Lucas’s case reflect this instrumental logic
remorselessly. The unwritten but clearly operative procedural and
substantive rules in Lucas’s case are these: as a matter of substance,
blacks must act at their own risk when they presume to help whites;
as a matter of procedure, “uppity” blacks are presumed to react ex-
plosively, even murderously, when years of pent-up rage inevitably
boil over. Both rules rest on an implicit constitutional principle,
which itself rests on an unquestioned empirical assumption: blacks do
not deserve the equal protection of law because they are inherently
inferior beings by every relevant measure, worth less than whites, if
not quite worthless.
Lucas’s case is not just that of an innocent black suffering under
these implicitly racist rules. Nor, unlike Tom’s case, does it call into
question merely a few of the basic assumptions and ancillary rules—
in Tom’s case, that all blacks are lechers and liars, and therefore that
no blacks are to be believed or trusted with white women. Lucas’s
embodiment of heroic human excellence—his natural superiority to,
not just equality with, whites—undermines the very premise of these
racist rules, black inferiority, and thus it threatens to topple the logic
of the entire racist legal edifice built upon that premise.
It calls, in other words, for a paradigm shift—not for a lament at
the injustice of a good rule in a hard case, nor even for the recali-
brating of a particular rule, but for the root-and-branch reformation
of an entire legal system. Yet, that call is inaudible even to so atten-
tive a lawyer as Gavin, precisely because he is distracted with the
day-to-day workings of that very system. On the other hand, what
makes Gavin capable of achieving this insight indirectly through the
“outsiders,” Chick and Miss Habersham, is precisely the features that
push him to the very margin of the practical, “insider” world of men:
his childishness, his antiquarianism, his bookishness, his adolescent
romanticism, a persistent quixotic streak. As we shall see in detail
below, this view of law and lawyers is radically at odds with the
dominant vision of the current lawyer professionalism movement.574
Before turning to that, however, we need to examine Atticus’s very
different relationship to the law, a relationship much more in har-
mony with prevailing contemporary tastes.
574. See infra Part III.B.
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2. Mockingbird: Lawyers Liberating the Laity. In Mockingbird,
the paradigm of legal process, a criminal trial, lies at the center. All
the critical action in the book flows into and out of that watershed
event. As in Intruder, the formal mechanism of law is up to the task
before it, but that task is very different here. Racism and busyness
divert people from their proper functions under law, but those
diversions are not shown as particular problems for the principal
agents of law—the trial judge, the sheriff, and Atticus. Moreover, the
insights of women and children at most confirm Atticus’s views,
rather than challenge them.
Lucas, insightful enough to see Gavin’s blindness, puts his case
in the hands of outsiders, irregulars who in their turn enlighten
Gavin. Tom, too impatient to see Atticus’s chance of winning on ap-
peal, fatally takes matters into his own hands, providing a vital object
lesson on the virtues of Atticus’s way. Atticus’s deep, technical, prac-
titioner’s expertise in the law, unlike Gavin’s, does not obscure the
need for radical reform. On the contrary, it allows him to see that
Tom’s case is essentially ordinary. If only jurors generally accorded
blacks the formal legal guarantee of equality, innocent blacks like
Tom would not be scapegoated in murder trials; all would be well.
Jem, fundamentally shaken by the miscarriage of justice in
Tom’s trial, insists on radical reforms, but Atticus patiently rebuts
each point, on practical grounds and from the perspective of his ex-
perience in both courts and the legislature.575 The ever-wise Atticus
cannot avoid an air of condescension. Faced with Jem’s wounded
adolescent idealism, “Atticus tried hard not to smile but couldn’t
help it.”576 When Jem is adamant that juries should be abolished, At-
ticus points to the racism of jurors, not to the jury system itself, as the
problem.577 Jurors, Jem remembers, “all come from out in the
woods.”578 “You never see anybody from Maycomb on a jury . . . .”579
Atticus, who “[f]or some reason . . . looked pleased with Jem,”
explains that one reason is the legal exclusion of women from Ala-
bama juries.580 This initially affronts Scout, but Atticus eventually
brings her around. He points somewhat scornfully to the asserted
575. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 232-34.
576. Id. at 232.
577. See id. at 233.
578. Id. at 234.
579. Id.
580. Id.
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need to “protect our frail ladies from sordid cases like Tom’s,”581 but
then humorously raises the deeper, converse concern, the need to
protect the law from the ways of women: “I doubt if we’d ever get a
complete case tried—the ladies’d be interrupting to ask questions.”582
Scout laughs inwardly at the prospect of Miss Maudie and Mrs. Du-
bose on a jury, and she concludes, “Perhaps our forefathers were
wise.”583 Gavin concedes Miss Habersham’s womanly perspective and
persistence to be essential to the doing of justice in Lucas’s case; At-
ticus presents the prospect of women’s playing an integral role in the
law as laughable per se, a meddlesomeness that would bring legal
proceedings to a halt.
The problem of juries for Atticus, then, is not the exclusion of
women (not to mention the exclusion of blacks). It is, rather, the re-
fusal of educated white male urbanites to assume their civic responsi-
bilities. Atticus, unlike Gavin, is aware that business is the culprit.
But it is business in a narrower and less fundamental sense than in
Intruder, a sense that emphatically does not include Atticus.
According to Atticus, otherwise virtuous bourgeois like Tom
Robinson’s employer are afraid that serving on juries will require
taking sides and thus losing customers in their commercial enter-
prises. Even the anonymity of jury votes is not enough, because there
is a further problem: “Serving on a jury forces a man to make up his
mind and declare himself about something.”584 This, Atticus explains,
is something men don’t like to do, because “[s]ometimes it’s unpleas-
ant.”585 Atticus, of course, has never had such a failure of nerve, even
when the consequences threatened to be far worse than “unpleas-
ant.”
Business in the narrow sense—trade and commerce—contributes
to what Atticus presents as the main problem of Tom’s case. Virtuous
people fail to stand together behind experienced legal professionals
like him, against the subversion of law’s unquestionable guarantee of
equality. The practice of law, presumably because it is a profession
581. Id.; see also GOODMAN, supra note 338, at 13 (describing the exclusion of all females
and males under 21 from the testimony of alleged rape victims in the Scottsboro case).
582. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 234.
583. Id.
584. Id.
585. Id.; cf. GOODMAN, supra note 338, at 175-76 (explaining that a young doctor who ex-
amined the alleged Scottsboro rape victims and doubted their accounts felt that he “couldn’t”
testify for the defense because, if he had, “he would not [have been] able to return to Scotts-
boro”).
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and not merely a business, reveals to Atticus both the fundamental
substance of the law, equality, and its basic procedural virtue, pa-
tience. What the law needs is for its proper agents in the laity, en-
lightened male urbanites, to have more of what Atticus, the ideal
lawyer, has: civic virtue.
In Intruder, business in the broad sense—getting the job done, in
the professions as well as in trade—blinds even the most virtuous of
its practitioners to the flaws, the necessary slights and omissions, in
their routine. Moreover, they miss not only the hard cases that call
for equitable flexibility, but the badness in law itself that calls for
fundamental change. To this latter, in Mockingbird, there is simply
no parallel; the law is fundamentally right as it is. Insights from out-
siders, accordingly, are not so much unwelcome as unneeded. The
law and its principal agents are the protectors of the weak and ex-
cluded, not their students; law and lawyers have much to give, but
nothing much to learn.
In Intruder, it is Ephraim—among the most marginalized of
blacks, an ancient old man who lives in a cabin in Gavin’s backyard,
dozing all day with an empty pipe and aimlessly walking the deserted
roads all night—who shows Chick the fundamental flaw in his uncle’s
legal method, the flaw that makes Lucas turn to law’s outsiders to get
him out of jail. Chick remembers this lesson, reinforced by Miss
Habersham, and together they hasten to Lucas’s extralegal—indeed,
illegal—liberation. In Mockingbird, it is Calpurnia, the best of blacks,
surrogate mother “in a lawin’ family,”586 educated on Blackstone him-
self, who tells a neighbor’s cook, in Scout’s presence, how Tom has
lost hope in jail despite Atticus’s assurance that he is doing his best to
get him free.587 On the next page, we learn that Tom is dead, shot
while dashing in desperation for his freedom. Atticus laments his in-
ability to wait on the law for his deliverance.588
In Intruder and Mockingbird, classic notions of noblesse oblige
predominate, a predominance set early in their parallel hospitality
scenes. But they give radically different versions of who the obliging
nobles are. The ascendancy of the urban professional class, typified
by Atticus in Mockingbird, starkly contrasts with the disappearance
of the rural aristocratic class, typified by Lucas and Miss Habersham
in Intruder.
586. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 247.
587. See id.
588. See id. at 248-49.
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Innocent black defendants embody basic values, but Tom’s
saintly and engaged Christianity could not be further from Lucas’s
pagan and aloof heroism. White lawyers come to their defense, aided
by innocent white protégés and virtuous white women. But Atticus’s
aid is early and central; Gavin’s, late and peripheral. Scout ultimately
comes to see the wisdom of her father’s way; Chick learns at last to
question the lectures of his uncle. Atticus’s women stand on the side-
lines, cheering him on and maintaining the civil façade that is the
background for his heroism. Miss Habersham leads the highly ir-
regular cavalry that rides to the rescue in Lucas’s case, defying con-
ventional time and space, while Gavin literally slumbers in his stereo-
types. Law as Gavin practices it is deeply flawed; we simply have to
wait for Atticus’s law to take its course for all to go well.
II. LESSONS FOR LAW AND LITERATURE
Having identified these divergences, what are we to make of
them? In this part, we will first look at the lessons they hold for the
jurisprudence of law and literature. In the next part, and on a some-
what more immediately practical level, we will examine their lessons
for lawyers.
A. Divergent Parallels and the Search for Transcendent Norms
One prominent branch of the law and literature movement, pio-
neered by Richard Weisberg and Robin West, directs us to literature
as a means of redressing the normative gap postmodernism has cre-
ated in both law and ethics. Professor West seeks in canonical litera-
ture “universal descriptions of human nature” as the basis for criti-
cizing contemporary law and ethics.589 Professor Weisberg hopes to
“fill the ethical void”590 with insights from literature, to reach “the
correct, not merely the desired, outcome,” particularly in law’s treat-
ment of outsiders.591 The divergent parallels we have noted between
the ethical worlds of Mockingbird and Intruder illustrate the serious
problems with this approach and suggest a very different service that
literature can provide at the normative foundations of law and ethics.
589. ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 6-7 (1993). Professor West further
“judge[s] institutions . . . by reference to how well they meet our very real human needs.” Id. at
148. Additionally, she cites natural and animal selves, respectively, as the basis for her critique
of social and professional self. See id. at 165, 172.
590. WEISBERG, supra note 14, at 4.
591. Id. at 41.
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1. Critique of the Weisberg-West Project. Admittedly, as we
have seen, there are parallel moral perspectives in the two books. At
a fairly superficial level, both works show us that racism may lead us
to overlook legal innocence and thus that at least the more lumpen
forms of racism are in that sense bad. At a somewhat deeper level,
they both tell us that racism blinds us to seeing fundamental human
virtues in the “other”; specifically, racism prevents white people from
seeing in black people the virtues they value in themselves and their
heroes. But these are not particularly controversial points among
people of even marginal conscientiousness, either within the stories
or in the world outside the stories. Agreement at this level, therefore,
is not especially helpful.
Outside the stories, it does not give us much guidance on how to
face very real contemporary problems of race relations. Inside the
stories, beyond this fairly thin layer of agreement, conscientious
opinion could and does diverge sharply. This is evident by comparing
the deeper moral messages of the stories themselves, as we saw in
Part I. They offer strikingly different perspectives on issues of race,
gender, class, and age, and on law as a means of resolving these is-
sues. Juxtaposing Mockingbird and Intruder suggests that literature
does not speak with one voice or convey one set of values. How
might West and Weisberg address these divergences?
One possibility would be to dismiss them as resting on inade-
quate descriptions in one book or the other. Under this view, one ac-
count would be factually inaccurate, in the sense that it falsifies his-
tory or lacks verisimilitude. Such would be the case, for example,
with a story that purported to illustrate as real or realistic the racist
attitude that Atticus condemns in his closing argument: “the evil as-
sumption—that all Negroes lie, that all Negroes are basically im-
moral beings, that all Negro men are not to be trusted around our
women . . . .”592 Such a story would simply fail as credible fiction. But
this cannot be said of Intruder and Mockingbird. At this most basic
level, their accounts have both historical foundation and verisimili-
tude; they meet one of Aristotle’s principal tests of literary merit.593
592. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 217.
593. See ARISTOTLE, The Art of Poetry, in ARISTOTLE 301 (Philip Wheelwright trans., Od-
yssey Press rev. ed. 1975) (“The poet’s function, then, is to describe . . . the kind of thing that
might well happen—i.e., what is [dramatically] possible in the sense of being either plausible or
inevitable.”).
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One could, alternatively, argue that many, if not all, of the diver-
gent descriptions are not so much inconsistent as supplemental. This
was the method early textual critics used to reconcile conflicting
Gospel accounts: if Luke and Matthew describe Jesus’s visit to Jeru-
salem differently, maybe he visited more than once. Faulkner gives us
a black man and an elderly white woman who are noble and a white
male lawyer benighted by racism; Lee gives us a meek and charitable
black man, an enlightened white male lawyer, and an elderly white
virago. These are not mutually exclusive by any means. They all
could easily live in neighboring county seats on opposite sides of the
Alabama–Mississippi line; indeed, both Maycomb, Alabama, and Jef-
ferson, Mississippi, should be comfortably big enough for all six.
But there are serious problems with this approach. To begin
with, selection, focus, and arrangement are not unimportant. Who is
at the center and who is at the periphery—not to mention who is left
out altogether—very much affect the story being told. A story about
a black man saving himself with the help of an elderly white woman
does not preclude an equally credible story about a white man saving
a helpless black man, but those stories are very different. Here the
descriptive and the normative tend to meet, if not to merge; what the
author chooses to describe has normative implications beyond the ac-
curacy or credibility of the description. If all your exciting stories are
about firefighters and all your firefighters are men, you have
learned—or taught—an important, albeit merely implicit, moral les-
son.
But this suggests another possible reconciliation, one that takes
us more directly into the normative realm. A slightly different effort
at minimizing the divergences between Mockingbird and Intruder
might run along these lines: where their descriptions diverge, they
nevertheless share a normative baseline. Thus, for example, the
women’s worlds that they describe differ radically. But (so this ac-
count might run), while Faulkner means to hold up the world of Miss
Habersham as admirable and its marginalization as lamentable, Lee
means to hold up the equally marginal but otherwise very different
world of Miss Maudie and especially Aunt Alexandra as perverted.594
We are, under this view, to see both the difficulty of the boy Chick’s
594. See WEISBERG, supra note 14, at 120 (describing the commonality that exists “whether
we are reading Richard Wright’s Native Son or William Faulkner’s Intruder in the Dust, or for
that matter Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird. What is going on is a progressivism beyond
labels, an attack on the virtues of male-dominated WASP institutions.”).
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entering Miss Habersham’s virtuous female world and the inevitabil-
ity of the girl Scout’s entering the artificial female world of Aunt Al-
exandra as parallel tragedies.
Whatever its general, logical merit, the textual evidence cannot
sustain this line of argument as applied to the divergences in question
here. For one thing, Scout’s ultimate entry into the female world is
portrayed heroically. Furthermore, this is not a stoic resignation to
defeat; it is an acceptance of her proper place in a properly subordi-
nate, supporting role. For another, this world is subordinate to a
world that is quite clearly higher and better, though meant for others.
In Intruder, by contrast, the world of men suffers considerably in
comparison to Miss Habersham’s female world. As we have seen, At-
ticus’s male world of law is inherently good, the hope of both the
helpers and the helpless; Gavin’s male world of busyness is essen-
tially bad, the bane of the better. And this is, of course, but a single
example. More generally, as we have seen, Mockingbird elevates the
“insider” world of law; Intruder warns against ignoring voices outside
the adult white male world.
The fact that the novels thus recommend and condemn particu-
lar moral positions and perspectives precludes another possible rec-
onciliation. This one would hold that what the author is doing is de-
scribing a world with great accuracy, revealing it to us as it is and
leaving it to us to make the normative call, to see human nature as it
is, with its normative implications. This may well be what some
authors do, but it is not what Lee and Faulkner are doing in the sto-
ries before us. Moreover, to take this position would be to abandon
much of the ground of West and Weisberg, who seem to believe that
such clear—if, for the most part, merely implicit—moral positions are
what we are to seek in literature, or at least in some literature.595
This distinction between merely depicting a character and rec-
ommending a character as a moral ideal is often overlooked or
blurred in the current debate about the moral standing of Atticus.
Atticus’s critics quite rightly point out his moral limitations, particu-
larly his paternalism and his insensitivity to the sexism and subtler
forms of racism in his community.596 More dubiously, they tend im-
595. See id. at 4, 41 (defining “poethics” as that which seeks “to fill the ethical void in which
legal thought and practice now exist”); WEST, supra note 589, at 6, 7 (arguing that the humani-
ties can serve to define “the commonly shared moral beliefs with which we typically criticize
law”).
596. See Freedman, Right and Wrong, supra note 13, at 480-81 (asserting that Atticus’s re-
luctance to represent Tom demonstrates that he “is a man who does not voluntarily use his le-
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plicitly to condemn Mockingbird because it has a flawed character at
its center.597 Faulty characters make famously good moral instructors
by way of negative example.598 The problem with Mockingbird is that
Lee holds up Atticus as a virtually flawless character, as an almost
purely positive, rather than significantly negative, example.599 This is
not to say that authors’ voices are always, or even often, to be heard
in central or significant characters. As we shall see, critical reception
of Intruder was initially skewed by a demonstrably wrong attribution
of Gavin’s views to Faulkner.600 But in Mockingbird, Lee’s recom-
mendation of Atticus’s position is unmistakable, and by our lights
much of that position is quite gravely mistaken. In assessing the
moral merit of the book, that has to matter.
One of Atticus’s principal critics—and one of the book’s main
admirers—makes the opposite error. Rather than fault the book for
holding up the flawed figure of Atticus as a role model, Thomas Shaf-
fer praises Mockingbird for revealing those very flaws. He finds Atti-
cus’s concealment of Boo’s role in Bob Ewell’s death a serious moral
error, and a symptom of the ultimately unsatisfactory paternalism
that subverts Atticus’s gentlemanly ethical system.601 Shaffer fails to
take adequate account, however, of the fact that the book’s lesson is
precisely the opposite on both points: Lee holds up the particular un-
truth in the case of Boo as the capstone of Atticus’s way of life, chiv-
alrous protection of the weak and innocent.
Shaffer is quite right to say that the book is a great teaching de-
vice;602 his own scholarship is proof enough of that. But, as he himself
uses the book, it is great in a very distinctive, and very limited, way. It
                                                                                                                                     
gal training and skills—not once, ever—to make the slightest change in the pervasive social
injustice of his own town”); Phelps, supra note 13, at 518, 530 (describing Atticus as “both law-
yer and lawmaker,” who is as “implicated in the town’s delusions” as the rest of Maycomb).
597. See Freedman, Right and Wrong, supra note 13, at 482 (claiming that Atticus “is not an
adequate role model for today’s lawyer”); Phelps, supra note 13, at 515 (“We readers, like the
citizens of Maycomb, see what we want to see and are blind to much else. We, like Atticus, are
implicated in the town’s delusions as long as we read To Kill a Mockingbird with uncritical ad-
miration.”).
598. See, e.g., Atkinson, Butler, supra note 25, at 180 (offering the butler’s flawed profes-
sional norms in The Remains of the Day as instructive for the development of better norms).
599. See JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 33 (rejecting any suggestion that Mockingbird’s point
of view is ironic and insisting that “though the tone is childlike, the reader is prone to trust the
judgments and values of the narrator”); id. at 96 (“The novel itself is, in part, [Scout’s] con-
vincing brief for her father’s sainthood . . . .”).
600. See infra notes 647-48 and accompanying text.
601. See SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 25, at 93.
602. See SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 176, at 5.
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shows us, by way of extended example, the critical flaw in an elabo-
rate ethical system, a system that is essentially an extrapolation from
Atticus’s flawed character. We recognize these flaws on the basis of
moral criteria not only extrinsic to those of the book, but at variance
with those that the book is implicitly commending. Mockingbird
makes an idol of Atticus; Shaffer points to imperfections in the cast-
ing, if not clay in the feet. He brings his insights into the flaws of At-
ticus’s character and ethic to the book; he neither finds those insights
in the book nor derives them from it.603
Given these very real, irreducible normative differences between
the ethical perspectives of Mockingbird and Intruder, what are those
who look to canonical literature for a consistent moral message to
do? The most radical resolution of the problem would be to reject
explicitly their fundamental premise—namely, that such lessons are
appropriately to be found there. This anti-didacticism has, of course,
a host of defenders,604 but, for West and Weisberg’s purposes, it
proves too much. The cost of reconciling the inconsistent moralities
of Intruder and Mockingbird along this line would be rejecting the
very enterprise that made their inconsistency a problem in the first
place—the quest for monolithic moral messages in canonical litera-
ture.605
Rather than reject the moral lessons of literature wholesale, one
could reject them retail, at the level of individual works, or even par-
ticular aspects of individual works. Thus, one might reconcile In-
truder and Mockingbird by arguing that the ethic of one or the
other—or both—is wrong, in whole or in part. Because one or the
other fails to present an adequate morality, so the argument would
run, it does not belong in the canon. If the sources of our moral
norms are limited to canonical works, then the conflict in moral
norms between a canonical and a noncanonical work ceases to be a
problem.
603. John J. Osborn, Jr., similarly confuses our moral perspective with that recommended
in Mockingbird when he says that “it is the first great film of the Sixties that makes a convinc-
ing case that a new kind of lawyer is needed, one who will fight to eliminate the ‘system’ rather
than participate in it.” John J. Osborn, Jr., Atticus Finch—the End of Honor: A Discussion of
To Kill a Mockingbird, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1139, 1142 (1996). Again, as with Shaffer, this is not
the message Osborn draws from the story, but the one he brings to it.
604. For Posner’s critique of didacticism, see POSNER, supra note 526, at 305-44 (2d ed.
1998).
605. Their form of didacticism may not be viable, but others do not share its weaknesses,
although they may suffer their own.
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This approach avoids jettisoning West and Weisberg’s didacti-
cism only by violating an equally important assumption of their sys-
tem. A basic purpose of their brand of law and literature, as we have
seen, is to derive moral messages from canonical literature. They turn
to that source, they tell us, because others are not available after the
postmodern critique of law and ethics.606
But here that premise itself becomes a problem. How is a par-
ticular moral norm in one canonical work to be judged against con-
flicting norms in another? It cannot be, without assuming what West
and Weisberg hope to prove by reference to literature—that is, a
norm-laden human nature. Stated otherwise, where would these ex-
tra-canonical criteria come from? To say that they come from other
canonical works is to risk an infinite regress or an unrevisable canon.
And to say that they come from direct observation of moral nature is
to say that we did not need to look for them from literature in the
first place. Only at risk of circularity can one exclude works from the
canon on the grounds that they do not possess a qualification that is
said to be drawn from the canon itself.
If Faulkner, for example, succeeds in showing us a credible Lu-
cas, one with whom we can empathize, what more proof can they ask
of him? And if we find his depiction compelling, what more can they
ask of us? They can ask us to reject as morally unsatisfying what they
concede to be a live possibility of being, but they will then have to
look past their ethical naturalism. At very least, they cannot point to
a single, identifiable way of being human as good; they must find
some additional reason for choosing an alternative.
It is important to note, however, that this is not a problem for all
normative uses of literature. As we shall see below, it is not a prob-
lem for my position, which rejects the notion that absolute or univer-
sal moral norms are to be found anywhere. It is possible, in other
words, to affirm the postmodern metaethical predicament and to
concede that literature is no more secure a normative source than,
say, law or philosophy. Nor is it a problem for those who, like Tho-
mas Shaffer, deny that the postmodern ethical predicament is in fact
a real predicament. As we have seen, Shaffer says that Atticus’s way
is fundamentally flawed. Unlike West and Weisberg, Shaffer can say
606. See WEISBERG, supra note 14, at 3-5 (observing that postmodernist thought has sug-
gested an absence of ethical constraints on law and that literature can fill that ethical void);
WEST, supra note 589, at 2-8 (suggesting that literature can address the “critical dilemma” of
“how to criticize the law from a moral point of view, if the law itself so heavily determines so
much of our moral sense”).
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that without contradiction, because he affirms what they and other
postmodern moralists deny, a traditional access to moral truth. (In his
case, the means seems to be the Thomist combination of religious
faith and speculative philosophy.)
A similar, and similarly problematic, answer to the moral con-
flict between Intruder and Mockingbird would suggest that we look
to canonical works, not for moral frameworks or ethical systems, but
for the manifestation of general virtues. Thus, for example, in the sto-
ries before us we would not be concerned primarily with racial or
gender justice, with who is oppressed, and by whom, but with courage
or with empathy for the downtrodden, without particular regard for
the form courage takes or the nature of those with whom one empa-
thizes. Atticus’s story, on that view, shows us courage in standing by
Tom, as does Gavin’s in standing by Lucas. Beyond that, the stories
diverge, but there the moral message is unnecessarily, and perhaps
unduly, specific. Beyond the appropriate level of moral analysis, dif-
ferences are as irrelevant as, say, typefaces or paper stocks.
But how are we to know the appropriate level of analysis? How
general is general enough? Perhaps the clue will be implicit in the
text. But here it is not: both texts seem to recommend with fairly
great particularity, and, as we have seen, what they recommend dif-
fers not only in important particulars, but at the highest level of gen-
erality, the very ethos of the central characters. Again, if we are to
import the criterion of appropriate degree of detail from outside, we
are begging a question closely related to that which turning to litera-
ture was supposed to solve. We would be asked to bring with us to
literature, not the particular substantive moral standards for which
we are looking, but a kind of procedural standard for determining the
degree of particularity at which we can expect to find useful guid-
ance. If such a standard exists outside literature, the postulated post-
modern normative crisis is not so severe as we have been asked to as-
sume.
The current debate over the ethics of Atticus suggests a final
avenue for reconciling the moral worlds of Intruder and Mockingbird,
but it, too, is closed to moral absolutists like West and Weisberg. At-
ticus’s defenders tend to concede that certain aspects of his life are
unacceptable by contemporary standards, but to insist that, by the
standards of his time, his ethic is unassailably progressive. To judge
    
1999] LIBERATING LAWYERS 721
him by the standards of our time, they maintain, is to commit an un-
fair form of ethical anachronism.607
If, as I have argued, Intruder offers an alternative ethic for Atti-
cus’s time and place, then this anachronism defense would have to
take a somewhat different form. One possibility, of course, would be
to say that Atticus’s way is right, and Faulkner’s implicit indictment
of it, wrong. For reasons we have already examined, that argument is
not one that West and Weisberg can enter, for it assumes a moral
standard outside the stories themselves by which their conflicting
moralities can be judged.
That problem could be surmounted by a different anachronism
argument. It would focus, not on the time in which the stories are set,
but on the time in which they were written. This way, their very dif-
ferent ethics could both be “right”: Faulkner’s by the standards of
1948; Lee’s by those of 1960. We need not pursue this line of argu-
ment further to see that it is not available to those who are seeking a
set of natural, universal, and eternal values. The problem here lies in
the very nature of the anachronism defense. Such a defense implies,
of course, that what is right at one time may be wrong at another, an
implication at odds with West and Weisberg’s quest for ethical abso-
lutism.
A final line of attack would be to question the canonicity of the
offending book on nonmoral grounds—on formal aesthetic grounds,
for example. That would take us beyond the scope of this paper, and,
more importantly, beyond the works of West and Weisberg, the law
and literature scholars with whom we are most concerned here. Each
of them tends to take the canon as given, under criteria they do not
elaborate, and to derive moral messages from works included under
those other, nonmoral criteria. Weisberg, moreover, quite clearly
views Intruder as canonical,608 and his treatment of Mockingbird
places it alongside, if not on a full parity with, canonical works.609
607. See Freedman, Right and Wrong, supra note 13, at 477 (identifying and responding to
charges of “presentism”).
608. Intruder is explicitly in his canon. See WEISBERG, supra note 14, at 120. But see Rich-
ard H. Weisberg & Karen L. Kretschman, Wigmore’s “Legal Novels” Expanded: A Collabora-
tive Effort, 50 N.Y. ST. B.J. 122, 130 (1978) (listing Faulkner’s Sanctuary but omitting Intruder).
609. See Weisberg & Kretschman, supra note 608, at 130 (including Mockingbird on their
“revised list” of legal literary works); see also WEISBERG, supra note 14, at 41 (listing Mock-
ingbird along with Faulkner’s Sanctuary, Bernard Malamud’s The Fixer, and Fyodor Dostoyev-
sky’s The Brothers Karamazov as unusual cases in which “storytellers do create idealist lawyers
to defend the nonpowerful”); id. at 53 (listing Atticus among “[t]he category of nice lawyers
who lose their cases”: “More poignantly yet, the sympathetic family man Atticus Finch does
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Moreover, law and literature bibliographies typically list both works,
at least implicitly acknowledging the canonicity of each.610
In summary, the conflicting moral worlds of Intruder and
Mockingbird illustrate a problem for those who would find universal
moral norms in literature as a source for criticizing contemporary
norms, both legal and moral. A comparison of these two books sug-
gests that literature gives us no single Archimedean point from the
perspective of which we can criticize, and perhaps move, our norma-
tive world: it gives us many. Moreover, it gives us no template for de-
termining which of these multiple fulcrums is the one and true. Lit-
erature seems to leave us with the very difficulty from which the
West and Weisberg school of law and literature sets out to deliver us:
the postmodern clash of theoretically irreconcilable values.611 Turning
to literature to solve this problem in law and ethics gives us not new
answers to the original problem, but the old problem in a new con-
text. Natural and universal norms are no easier to find in literature
than elsewhere in law or in ethics.
2. An Alternative Project. But the difficulty of natural law the-
ory, here as elsewhere, is the opportunity of its opponents. The
problem, after all, is an embarrassment of riches: not too few values,
but too many. A close study of literary classics reveals not that they
contain no viable visions of being a good person or reforming society,
but that they reveal competing visions. And, as these stories illus-
trate, these competing visions are not merely vague generalizations
about life at large, private or public. They operate in particular con-
texts, and they imply fairly specific responses to real problems. They
address oppression, and they deal with the lawyer’s role in combating
it; they involve lawyers and liberation.
                                                                                                                                     
not have the necessary skills (admittedly Herculean in nature) to prevent a jury from convict-
ing his innocent client, Tom Robinson, in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird.”). Weisberg’s
citations of Mockingbird are sometimes a bit begrudging, but never wholly dismissive. See, e.g.,
Weisberg & Kretschman, supra note 608, at 120 (“or for that matter Harper Lee’s To Kill a
Mockingbird”).
610. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Seri-
ous Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1978 (1991) (compiling bibliographical references to
Mockingbird).
611. See, e.g., Book Note, Do the Right Thing, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1352 (1993) (dis-
missing Weisberg’s premise in Poethics: “This is a fatal mistake: given literature’s intrinsic ethi-
cal diversity and many lawyers’ sympathy for less-than-admirable clients, simply studying lit-
erature is unlikely to produce the shared sense of right and wrong that Poethics hopes to
instill.”).
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As we have seen, Intruder and Mockingbird present very differ-
ent messages about critical aspects of liberation: who is oppressed
and how, by whom and by what, with which hope of help and which
vision of deliverance. But this need not drive us to despair, any more
than do parallel developments in other areas of normative discourse,
in particular, law and ethics.612 For what we have reached, on each of
these parallel paths, can be seen not as an impasse, but as a fork. Our
situation is not that we can go no further; it is that we must choose
which way to go.
Nor is this to say that we are left without help in the choice and
that literature cannot be uniquely helpful. Other branches of norma-
tive discourse—again, law and ethics come to mind—can offer us de-
tailed maps of what lies ahead. Supplementing these more abstract
discourses, literature can show us what it is like to go one way or the
other. It can show us what it is like to be the kind of person who af-
firms one set of values over another, to live in a world where certain
potential human capacities and relationships, on the part of some
people or all, chronically are left unrealized. It can place not just
Tom’s humble charity, but also Lucas’s heroic virtue, in opposition to
prevalent racial stereotypes—and to each other. It can show us more
than just the obvious fact that convicting innocents because they are
black is a gross miscarriage of liberal justice. It can suggest that the
businesslike methods of liberal law may conceal from us who the in-
nocent victims really are and how they are best to be helped. It can
contrast Miss Habersham’s mode of practical reasoning with that of
Gavin and Atticus, and her woman’s sphere with that of Miss Maudie
and Aunt Alexandra. 
We must be careful, however, not to reject too much in aban-
doning the search for universal natural norms in literature. The
“ought” notoriously implies the “can”; so, too, does the “may.” In a
natural law system, it makes no sense to say that we morally must do
the physically impossible; it likewise makes no sense, in a non–natu-
ral law system, to say that we may. In that sense, human psychology is
as much a matter of natural law as gravity, and it is relevant to ethics
in precisely the same way, as an outer limit on the possibilities of hu-
man being. But psychology is relevant much more often, and much
612. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REV.
853, 854-55 (1992) (outlining a lawyer’s ethics based on meta-ethical skepticism); Joseph Wil-
liam Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1984)
(advocating the view that “[l]aw and morality have no rational foundation that once and for all
compels all persons to prefer certain institutions and rules above all others”).
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more interestingly, and literature has much more to reveal about it.
Accurate description of human nature is relevant to showing what we
are capable of being, even if, in the wake of normative skepticism, it
has no use in showing us what we ought to be. Literature, in other
words, can help us see the real limits of human nature as well as its
potential.
B. The Medium and the Message
As we have already noted, my disagreement with Weisberg and
West’s effort to find transcendent values in literature agrees with
them at a more fundamental level: I share their assumption that we
can legitimately look for moral messages in literature. Our compari-
son of Mockingbird and Intruder suggests, furthermore, that certain
moral messages, if not absolute and eternal, may nevertheless be
both more enduring and more widely relevant than others. Mocking-
bird, as we have seen, holds up Atticus’s attitude toward race, and
less directly his attitude toward gender and class, as essentially cor-
rect, for his time and perhaps for all time. These attitudes are already
showing serious signs of wear, not just as permanent standards, but
even as standards appropriate to his own time.613
Intruder, by contrast, has what at first seems a more negative
moral message: Gavin’s lawyerly way, the way of white male busy-
ness, is fundamentally flawed. Even its more positive messages—that
Lucas’s aristocratic character cannot safely be ignored and that Miss
Habersham and old Ephraim have something basic to teach about le-
gal process—are significantly tentative. They are not, strictly speak-
ing, negative; beyond calling into question Gavin’s way, they solve a
particular problem, establishing Lucas’s innocence. But at the end,
the principal recipients of their lesson, Chick and Gavin, are not at all
sure what to do next. Unlike Jem and Scout, safely tucked in with At-
ticus firmly in charge, Chick and Gavin are left at a palpable loss, a
loss of their old secure world of racial and gender superiority, without
the clear outlines of an acceptable new world.
613. For example, Atticus addresses his client as “Tom” when he is on the witness stand
and allows the prosecutor to call him “boy” and “Robinson.” LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note
1, at 202-10. By contrast, counsel for the Scottsboro defendants objected to the prosecutor’s
addressing black witnesses by their first names. See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A
TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 198 (1969); GOODMAN, supra note 338, at 122.
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At this juncture, as we have seen, the form of their story merges
with its content.614 If a cliché can be excused where it does good serv-
ice, the medium in a significant way becomes the message. Gavin and
Chick proceed in a dialogue, and, in so doing, they lay the procedural
foundation of their new life. We have already noted the parallel with
Plato’s dialogues, among the West’s most enduring forms of moral
fiction. It remains to be noted here that, further paralleling Plato, the
dialogue has another aspect: the author not only shows us the charac-
ters in dialogue; he implicitly invites us to join them, and him. As the
project turns from the largely negative task of analyzing an inade-
quate moral system to the primarily positive task of creating a new
normative synthesis, the author implicitly acknowledges that he
needs our help. In placing the stuff of a new synthesis before us,
Faulkner becomes our Gavin, even as Plato, engaging us in the dia-
logues, becomes our Socrates.615
This is not, of course, in any sense essential or inevitable. The
author could lecture to us, in the way that one suspects has helped
give didactic literature its very bad name and didacticism’s critics
much of their best ammunition. But in inviting us to participate and
in implying that the participation is open to all, he calls us back to
and affirms very deeply shared values, even as he calls on us to aban-
don other, implicitly subordinated values.
C. “Insiders” and “Outsiders”
Law and literature scholars from a wide range of perspectives—
here Weisberg and West are very much in the vanguard—urge that lit-
erature open law to the perspective of outsiders.616 Among literary
614. See supra notes 537-41 and accompanying text.
615. See White, supra note 540, at 850-51 (describing Plato’s Gorgias as a dialogue “meant
to exemplify the kind of life Socrates calls ‘dialectic’”).
616. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 526, at 282-87 (2d ed. 1998) (asserting that “there is no
better advice to a legal advocate than to empathize” with the outsider, a technique one can
learn “from the example of the great writers of imaginative literature”); Kathryn Abrams,
Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, passim (1991) (defending the value of feminist
narrative as a form of legal persuasion); Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 610, at 1934-39, 1950-
53 (examining the possibility that “outsider” treatments of homosexuality and race could have
helped judges avoid “serious moral error” in cases such as Dred Scott v. Sanford and Bowers v.
Hardwick); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 607 (1994)
(employing gay and lesbian narratives to argue that storytelling can expand legal debate and
drive social transformation); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies
and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (suggesting that “looking to the
bottom—adopting the perspective of those who have seen and felt the falsity of the liberal
promise—can assist critical scholars in the task of . . . defining the elements of justice”).
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critics generally, there is considerable enthusiasm for opening the lit-
erary canon itself to the voices of outsiders. A sympathetic response
has been to note how often canonical “insiders” offer radical cri-
tiques of traditional values.617 In presenting the perspectives of out-
siders, Intruder succeeds far better than Mockingbird. But Intruder
does more than meet this widely shared normative requirement. It
not only questions the implicit contours of that demand in its pre-
dominant present form; it also expands it in useful new directions.
Our comparison of Intruder and Mockingbird offers a corrective
to the simplistic polarization of “insider” and “outsider.” On the one
hand, that comparison reminds us that an “outsider” can present
what amounts to an apologia for very conservative, even patriarchal,
values. Harper Lee’s filial piety shines uncomfortably clearly through
what she herself characterized as essentially a love letter to her fa-
ther.618 Her testimonial for Atticus attests that a writer’s membership
in a traditionally disadvantaged group does not automatically confer
special insights into that group’s disadvantages. Moreover, member-
ship in a disadvantaged class obviously does not preclude member-
ship in privileged classes—Lee was a woman, but she was also white
and the daughter of a lawyer.
Faulkner’s case reminds us of the converse. An insider can pres-
ent critiques of the inside from an outsider’s perspective, as Faulkner
has done through Chick, Miss Habersham, and Lucas. And those who
are insiders in some respects can be outsiders in others. Gavin may
have been born and bred in Mississippi, but he was educated at Har-
vard and Heidelberg. Faulkner himself was not merely white, male,
and upper-class; he was raised in a South that was as ruined as it was
rural. In an era when the intellectual establishment was distinctly
northeastern and urban, this very much affected the critical reception
of Intruder.
This is not to say that the categories “insider” and “outsider” are
meaningless or that they inevitably collapse. Nor is it to turn us from
the “outsiders” to whom law and literature scholars generally urge us
to attend—traditionally oppressed and excluded groups like women,
ethnic, and especially racial, minorities, and the poor. It is rather to
617. See WEISBERG, supra note 14, at 117-23 (arguing that both feminists and people of
color can gain something from a study of canonical texts); WEST, supra note 589, at 13-14 (“A
tremendous amount of canonical literature is highly critical of law, and of the arguments typi-
cally put forward to support its moral authority.”).
618. See Timothy Hoff, Influences on Harper Lee: An Introduction to the Symposium, 45
ALA. L. REV. 389, 392-94 (1994).
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say that, to have any analytic power, the terms “insider” and “out-
sider” must be used in reference to a particular social world, and that
the bipolar social world often implied by those terms is pathetically
impoverished.
Intruder also shows how those who are both insiders and outsid-
ers can act, in an almost literal way, as mediums. Within the story, as
we have seen, the innocent Chick opens a window for us into Lucas’s
heroic—and, for most of us, profoundly alien—character. Features of
a lost heroic order become accessible to us through Chick, who, hav-
ing known his grandfather and Lucas, recognizes those features im-
mediately. Lucas, the supreme outsider in Chick’s world, manifests
the ideal features of aristocratic, white, landowning southerners, Mis-
sissippi’s traditional “insiders.”619
It is important to note, however, that the heroic features of Lu-
cas, the paradigmatic “other,” are not necessarily good. Similarly, the
outsider position of Miss Habersham need not be—and from our per-
spective, certainly it is not—pure, resting as it did on a foundation of
slavery and reflecting its continuing effects. Our apprehension of the
“other” gives us a perspective from which to examine our own posi-
tion, as the mainstream of law and literature scholars have pointed
out.620 But, contrary to what they sometimes imply,621 the perspective
of the “other” is not necessarily or uniquely right. Nor, to offer a us e-
ful critical perspective, need it be. What we need to critique our posi-
tion is not necessarily a position that is better in an absolute sense, or
even one that we would subjectively or idiosyncratically prefer to oc-
cupy. What we need, more simply, is just a perspective that is both
accessible to us and outside our own: not so much God’s perspective,
as that of the devil’s advocate.
619. Lucas, of course, is the epitome of these values; he is better than the best of their tradi-
tional exemplars. It may well be the case that some blacks will occupy the opposite position.
They may pervert the cruder forms of heroic values in such primitives as the Gowries. For an
argument that the most violent of ghetto youths are bringing to fruition the hypersensitive code
of honor of their slave ancestors’ overseers, see FOX BUTTERWORTH, ALL GOD’S CHILDREN:
THE BOSKET FAMILY AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF VIOLENCE 327-29 (1995). This is an
ironic twist on the old “massive resistance,” Dixiecratic canard that the traditional southern
elite know blacks better than northern white liberals. If All God’s Children is right, northern
white liberals must come to know not just Gavin, but also Nub Gowrie, if they are to under-
stand problems much closer to home than Mississippi.
620. See supra note 616 and accompanying text.
621. See WEISBERG, supra note 14, at 41-47 (“And in the same stories that most feature
skillful communication, the correct outcome is conveyed by the law’s treatment of the outsider,
the ‘other.’”).
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Unless they are to claim a privileged position above their own
critical stance, this should apply to the central tenets of the law and
literature movement itself. One of those tenets is empathy with pre-
viously excluded others. As generally understood, this has come to
mean not just seeing those others as they are or seeing the world as
they see it, but moving either to ameliorate their practical situation
or to adopt their theoretical or political perspective. It has come to
mean, in other words, not so much empathy as sympathy. As West
expresses it:
An act of power in public life as well as in private life that is praise-
worthy is an act of power that, in short, is loving: it is the act that
originates in the heart and is prompted by our sympathy for the
needs of others, and empathy for their situation.622
Yet, on this very point, Lucas’s case offers a dual critique. In the
first place, as we have already seen, Lucas’s position is not altogether
lovely; he is neither the kind of stereotypically downtrodden person
with whom we can easily sympathize nor the kind of altruistic hero
whom we are accustomed to emulate. And that raises the second, and
more fundamental, point: Lucas, the novel’s paradigmatic outsider, is
not himself a model sympathizer. Not only does he not evoke the
sympathy we conventionally reserve for the unfortunate; he himself
does not evince it toward them. Looking into Lucas’s face from the
freezing waters of the creek, Chick does not see the face of Christian
charity or liberal sympathy:
[H]e looked up at the face which was just watching him without pity
commiseration or anything else, not even surprise: just watching
him, whose owner had made no effort whatever to help him up out
of the creek, had in fact ordered Aleck Sander to desist with the
pole which had been the one token toward help that anybody had
made.623
Lucas, quite significantly, is “without pity.” Lucas does, of course,
save Chick from the creek. But the motive is not altruistic regard for
the needs of another; it is the pure, unselfconscious outworking of his
own noble nature.
Lucas’s notable, and explicitly noted, absence of pity is entirely
consistent with his heroic character. As Nietzsche, the great exponent
622. WEST, supra note 589, at 175.
623. FAULKNER, INTRUDER, supra note 4, at 6-7.
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of such character, emphasized, pity was not only absent from it, but
also radically inconsistent with it.624 Moreover, Nietzsche was at pains
to argue the point:
[T]his overestimation of and predilection for pity on the part of
modern philosophers is something new: hitherto philosophers have
been at one as to the worthlessness of pity. I name only Plato, Spi-
noza, La Rochefoucauld and Kant—four spirits as different from
one another as possible, but united in one thing: in their low estima-
tion of pity.625
This is not to say that Nietzsche is right in his own low estima-
tion of pity, nor even in his marshaling of these other philosophers in
his camp. It is rather to say that pity as the touchstone of all acts of
power, the point that West takes for granted, is very much a debat-
able point. Lucas in his person shows us what Nietzsche in his writ-
ings described, a viable noble life. If we genuinely empathize with
Lucas, we thus encounter a paradox: the recommended method of
law and literature reveals to us a character very much at odds with
the character that the mainstream of the law and literature move-
ment presupposes to be good. Only if, therefore, the law and litera-
ture movement can meet Lucas on its own terms, which requires en-
countering him on his own terms, can it fulfill its own promise: calling
received norms radically into question.
Here again, a comparison with Mockingbird is instructive. Robin
West states the empathetic methodology of the law and literature
movement in almost exactly the terms Atticus recommends to Scout:
“We learn what it is to walk in another’s shoes.”626 As we have seen,
West’s substantive commitment, like his, is to help others, especially
unfortunate others. Yet, as we have also seen, the ultimate effect of
Atticus’s story is to reaffirm his place at the apex of both the moral
and social world. Even if we ultimately come to commit ourselves—
as I earnestly hope we shall—to helping others, we must, if we are to
be honest with ourselves, ask ourselves the source of that commit-
ment. As Phillipa Foot has pointed out, Nietzsche cannot, by his
624. See NIETZSCHE, supra note 144, at 19 (arguing that it is precisely in the “instincts of
pity, self-abnegation, [and] self-sacrifice” that lies “the great danger to mankind, its sublimest
enticement and seduction”).
625. Id.
626. WEST, supra note 589, at 425. Atticus says to Scout: “You never really understand a
person until you consider things from his point of view . . . until you climb into his skin and
walk around in it.” LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 36.
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methodology or perhaps any other, prove that altruism is a bad thing.
But he may convince us that, in our own individual cases, we have
chosen altruism for deeply selfish reasons.627 It is entirely consistent
with the most orthodox versions of Christian charity itself to affirm
that “[t]he last temptation is the greatest treason: [t]o do the right
deed for the wrong reason.”628
Finally, even if our motives are the purest, a measure of humility
may be in order for a very different reason. Intruder suggests that our
interventions, even our message of liberation, may be resented, and
not because they are wholly self-serving or hypocritical, or even be-
cause they are insufficiently altruistic or sincere. They may be re-
sented not because of their bad motivation, but despite their good
motivation—simply because they are ours, and we are others. Gavin,
the most enlightened of Faulkner’s Mississippians, is, at bottom, nei-
ther bad nor benighted. He is no xenophobe and certainly no scoun-
drel, but he is irreducibly a patriot. If not before we declare, as some
of us are all too ready to declare, the triumph of liberal democracy
and even the end of history,629 then at least before we claim that tri-
umph as our own, we would do well to empathize with him, too. For
he likely has his counterparts in all the lands we would liberate: Haiti
and Hanoi, Bosnia and Beirut, Iraq and Northern Ireland, South Af-
rica and Afghanistan. The fact that those counterparts may not be
white should not obscure the fact that they, too, are proud.
D. Writers and Lawyers, Literature and Law
It is famously possible to make too much of the relations of
authors’ lives to their works; much—perhaps too much—has been
made of the influence that lawyers in their lives had on the writings
of Lee and Faulkner.630 Reversing the usual terms of the debate, I
want to suggest that the lawyers in their works may tell us something
important about Lee and Faulkner’s respective relations to law and
lawyers in their lives.
As others have shown, Lee had her Atticus in her father, and
Faulkner something like his Gavin in his older contemporary and
627. See Phillipa Foot, Nietzsche’s Immoralism, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 13, 1991, at 18.
628. T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 44 (1935).
629. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
630. See WATSON, supra note 15, at 6-16 (analyzing Faulkner’s fictional lawyers in terms of
his relationships with the lawyers in his life); Joseph Blotner, William Faulkner: Author-at-Law,
4 MISS. C. L. REV. 275, 278-81 (1984) (same).
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mentor, Phil Stone.631 Lee dedicated her sole work “for Mr. Lee and
Alice in consideration of Love and Affection”;632 Faulkner dedicated
the book that has Gavin most clearly at its center, The Town, to Phil
Stone, “[who] did half the laughing for thirty years.”633 Their relation-
ships with the principal lawyers in their lives were, as these dedica-
tions suggest, in many respects quite different.
Lee has called her work a love letter, and, if she has never re-
vised or retracted the missive, she has also never written another.
Her single, if singular, literary contribution is a paean to paternalism.
Like Scout, she never seems to come out from under her father’s
spell.634 It is tempting to speculate—though speculation is admittedly
the most I can call it—that her failure to write again is related to the
content of the original message,635 a message that I suspect she came
to question, if not quite to regret.
Mockingbird is, after all, the retrospective of a precocious little
girl whose father always knew best. Might not the phenomenal suc-
cess of that story—a success that we must examine in its own right
below—itself have impeded the development, at least in print, of a
more mature, more questioning message? In the last analysis, Harper
Lee had but to look about her. For all its anonymous black martyrs
and heroic white lawyers, the ultimate hero of the civil rights move-
ment—and not just in Alabama—is Dr. King. Here was a black man
whose virtue was passive only by the grossest misnomer and whose
method was lawful only because it stretched our understanding of le-
gality beyond any limit that Tom Robinson and Atticus Finch ever
dreamed of approaching. And long before that, George Eliot’s Mid-
dlemarch should have laid to rest the reverie of any young woman
hoping to find fulfillment in building a monument to an old man.636
631. See generally Susan Snell, Phil Stone and William Faulkner: The Lawyer and “The
Poet”, 4 MISS. C. L. REV. 169 (1984) (recounting Faulkner’s friendship and working relation-
ship with Stone); Morris Wolff, Faulkner’s Knowledge of the Law, 4 MISS. C. L. REV. 245
(1984) (describing Faulkner’s close and working friendship with Phil Stone).
632. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at dedication.
633. FAULKNER, The Town, supra note 286, at dedication.
634. See JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 96 (“The novel itself is, in part, her convincing brief for
her father’s sainthood, an ironic reversal of the usual novelistic cliché of adolescent (and
Gothic) patricide.”).
635. See id. (“That Lee’s readers, who are in a sense her jury, so readily and perpetually
render a decision in Atticus’s favor, closing the case, as it were, may in some way account for
the silence of this authorial voice thereafter.”).
636. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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Faulkner, on the other hand, famously fell out with his mentor.
His writing took turns of which Stone disapproved, and Stone grum-
bled that the Nobel laureate had developed “Nobelitis.”637 But if
Faulkner could never quite restore the breach, neither did he ever
quite reciprocate the hostility. Indeed, Chick’s lawyerly mentor
seems to have done what his creator’s could not: come to terms with
a creature greater than he.
Harper Lee attended law school but never finished;638 William
Faulkner steadfastly resisted parental and social pressure to follow in
the footsteps of numerous relatives, including a grandfather, great-
grandfather, uncle, brother, and cousin.639 No doubt many factors
contributed to this resolution, not least of them Faulkner’s ultimately
accurate assessment of his literary talent. But, I suspect that, early on,
there must have been the seed of the insight that bore fruit in the
law-oriented fiction of his mid-career: that the law that lawyers do,
day in and day out, ultimately has less to do with the kind of libera-
tion Faulkner wanted to be about. Well before his 1950 Nobel accep-
tance speech, he had not only declined to accept the end of human-
ity;640 he had set about to improve its condition.641 He had discovered,
and was putting into practice, the dictum of Shelley: “Poets are the
unacknowledged legislators of the world.”642
III. LESSONS FOR LAWYERS
As we have seen, we can go to literature for insight into what we
should be like, or, as I prefer, what we can be like. Either way, we
search the scriptures of the literary canon for normative guidance, for
help on what good is, or how we might become better. But the rela-
tionship between the seeker and the sought is curiously reciprocal.
Every self-improvement plan, from the ancient Greeks’ “Know thy-
self” to today’s multifarious twelve-step programs, begins with de-
637. See Snell, supra note 631, at 192.
638. See Timothy Hoff, Influences on Harper Lee: An Introduction to the Symposium, 45
ALA. L. REV. 389, 396 (1994).
639. See Blotner, supra note 630, at 276, 278-81 (enumerating Faulkner’s lawyer-relatives
and describing his relations with his own lawyers); Wolff, supra note 631, at 245 (same).
640. See WILLIAM FAULKNER, Address upon Receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature
(Dec. 10, 1950), in THE PORTABLE FAULKNER, supra note 19, at 724 (“I decline to accept the
end of man.”).
641. See id. (“The poet’s voice need not merely be the record of man, it can be one of the
props, the pillars to help him endure and prevail.”).
642. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 644 (rev. 4th ed. 1996).
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scription rather than prescription. Diagnosis necessarily precedes
cure.
Where we go to look for guidance, and what guidance we take to
heart, may tell us a great deal about what we think our problem is,
and thus about who we are. As Nietzsche noted, the kind of good we
seek to become may be a painfully accurate index of the kind of bad
we already are.643 As scholars of law and literature have more recently
observed, the kind of stories we read and recommend tells us as much
about the values we already have as about those we might or should
acquire.644
With that in mind, I want to examine what I think are reasons
why To Kill a Mockingbird has had a much greater appeal to the
public generally, and to lawyers particularly, than Intruder in the
Dust. I want to be careful at the outset, however, not to claim too
much for my methodology. I abjure at the start the ambitious—and, I
think, hopeless—task of proving the cause, or even the extent, of the
former book’s greater popularity. Looking more narrowly at critical
reception and subsequent commentary—hardly ideal indexes of
popularity or influence—I shall try to identify plausible sources of
appeal. Beyond that, I shall, in the spirit of Nietzsche’s genealogy of
morals,645 ask you to look with me at why we—not the world, but you
and I—might be inclined to favor one book over the other, and to re-
flect on what that tells us about ourselves, for better and for worse.
A. Looking Backward
Both books came at critical junctures in the modern civil rights
movement, and their initial receptions were certainly colored by that
timing.646 The year of Intruder’s publication, 1948, was the year of
643. See NIETZSCHE, supra note 144, at 36-40 (discussing the development of differing con-
ceptions of morality).
644. See BROOK THOMAS, CROSS-EXAMINATIONS OF LAW AND LITERATURE 3 (1987) (“A
major purpose of my study is to use selected literary texts from the American Renaissance to
help define the legal ideology of the period.”); id. at 5 (“One way to accomplish this task [of
reconstructing the cultural narratives that grant the law its authority] is to compare a culture’s
law with its literature, since literature, in a much more obvious way than law, reveals the stories
that a culture tells about itself.”).
645. Indeed, this enterprise can be seen as a particular application of Nietzsche’s more gen-
eral critique. Examining why the morals of particular literary works have deep psychological,
pre-moral appeal is a special case of examining why particular moral systems as a whole have
such appeal.
646. See BROOKS, supra note 141, at 281 (observing that “[t]he supercharged atmosphere in
which [Intruder] has been read played all sorts of tricks on its reviewers” from the beginning);
    
734 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [49:601
Truman’s integration of the armed forces. This, along with other as-
pects of his position on civil rights, precipitated the secession of
Strom Thurmond’s “Dixiecrats” from the Democratic Party.
Against this background, elite eastern reviewers, following the
lead of Edmund Wilson in the New Yorker,647 tended to read Gavin’s
speeches on race and sectionalism as Faulkner’s manifesto against
the contemporary civil rights movement.648 The South’s foremost
author, soon to be a Nobel laureate, was heard to say, through the
Harvard- and Heidelberg-educated Gavin, that blacks could help
themselves through evolutionary means, and that white southern pa-
triarchs not only had any local excesses well in hand, but would not
brook any outside interference. Indeed, in the face of such interfer-
ence, they would ally with the redneck rabble, wrapping a solid white
South in the Stars and Bars—ready, again, for defeat, but not for sur-
render.
Nor was Lucas Beauchamp, the real hero of the novel, particu-
larly appealing. Indeed, for all his negation of Christ-like qualities,
the message implicit in his character had the Gospels’ paradoxically
double distaste among the established order. As the resurrection
proverbially stood as a stumbling block to the Jews and an absurdity
to the Greeks,649 so must Lucas’s aristocratic blackness have put off
traditional southern conservatives and northern liberals alike. If he
was a strong black character, his was no Uncle Tom’s cabin. To the
consternation of northern liberals, he embodied distinctly southern
aristocratic values. Yet, to the irritation of southern conservatives, he
embodied those values in a black skin, and he transcended even his
eponymous white ancestor. Asked if he were the model for Gavin in
Intruder, one of Faulkner’s uncles answered unequivocally and, we
may guess, not atypically: “Me, that nigger-lovin’ Stevens? Naw, I
don’t read Billy’s books much. But he can write them if he wants to. I
guess he makes money at it—writing those dirty books for Yan-
                                                                                                                                     
JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 12 (“[T]he reception of [Mockingbird] was profoundly affected by
the events of the 1950s.”).
647. See Edmund Wilson, William Faulkner’s Reply to the Civil-Rights Program, NEW
YORKER, Oct. 23, 1948, at 106 (“The book contains a kind of counterblast to the anti-lynching
bill and to the civil rights plank in the Democratic platform.”).
648. See BROOKS, supra note 141, at 279, 281 (discussing misconceptions of Wilson and
other reviewers). But see Bassett, supra note 19, at 208 (“Only a few critics unsympathetic to
Faulkner tend to identify his views with Gavin’s.”).
649. See 1 Corinthians 1:23.
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kees.”650 Even Lucas’s potential point of common appeal, aloof self-
reliance, presented a problem: it rested on a nexus of reciprocal obli-
gations with women, both black and white, and with children.
As C. Vann Woodward has demonstrated, northern audiences
had been accustomed, almost from the moment of Robert E. Lee’s
magnanimous surrender, to having their arriviste, urban, industrial
culture criticized from the perspective of aristocratic and agrarian
Confederate veterans.651 These figures of chivalrous defeat were a
stark contrast with the excesses of the victors, especially the robber
barons of the Gilded Age, and they represented classical values that
both sections could remember to have been shared in the early re-
public, before the crisis of slavery.
These southern figures, however, appeared in the works of
authors who were themselves northern—Herman Melville, Henry
Adams, and Henry James—not southerners like Faulkner. Moreover,
these fictitious southerners were expatriates resigned to defeat; un-
like Gavin, they were not speaking from Mississippi and spoiling for
another fight.652 But, from the other side, they were unlike Gavin in
another critical respect: they were not tainted with busyness (or, for
that matter, business). The message of Miss Habersham and Ephraim
is that all men of affairs, even the most consciously and loyally south-
ern, are mired in busyness. In Intruder, the problems of adult male
business are not Yankee imports, or, if they are, they have insidiously
captured the South’s ablest cultural defenders.
To Kill a Mockingbird came at a later, and arguably more se-
vere, impasse in the civil rights movement, the era of “massive resis-
tance” after Brown I.653 It offered, however, a much more conciliatory
message. Indeed, if Intruder was doubly offensive, Mockingbird had a
650. JOEL WILLIAMSON, WILLIAM FAULKNER AND SOUTHERN HISTORY 270 (1993). Ac-
cording to Williamson, this comment “caught accurately the mood of southern white response.”
Id.
651. See C. VANN WOODWARD, A Southern Critique of the Gilded Age, in THE BURDEN OF
SOUTHERN HISTORY 109, 109-110 (rev. ed. 1968) (“The crudities, excesses, and shams of the
Gilded Age presented the Southern critics and moralists with the broadest target they had ever
had above the Potomac. . . . [C]hampions of the Lost Cause continued to pronounce judgment
upon the shortcomings of the new Yankee order.”).
652. See id. at 110-11 (“In each of these works a Southerner, a veteran of the Confederate
Army, is introduced in a sympathetic role.”).
653. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). This national climate is discussed in
JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 11-12 (observing that a full appreciation of Mockingbird derives
from a grasp of the conflict over civil rights in 1950s Alabama).
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dual appeal.654 Mockingbird depicted the traditional white leaders of
the South, the counterparts of men like Atticus and their female
helpmates, as fully on the side of the northern angels. Individual jus-
tice in individual cases, they were able to hear, was what those of
their class had always stood for.655 Northerners, on the other hand,
remained conveniently offstage, up North but not upstage. Unlike
Gavin in the discursive dicta of his incendiary set-pieces, Atticus kept
to the morally easy facts of the case before him.
Here the daughter of an Alabama lawyer, himself a sympathizer
with the Scottsboro defendants, had a reassuring message for north-
ern audiences: on the fundamental point of equality before the law,
we are with you (and you need not worry with the details). Atticus
was thus not only a hero of whom elite southerners could be proud;
he was also someone with whom liberal Yankees could work—or,
better yet, trust to do their good works for them. 656 With the elegantly
aristocratic easterner Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy presiding in
Camelot, three years before The Feminine Mystique,657 the supporting
role of elite southern ladies was not likely to come in for heavy cen-
sure. And when it did, when scholars like Thomas Shaffer began to
question Atticus’s paternalism, the egalitarian answer was ready at
hand: ladies can be gentlemen, too.658
Mockingbird’s message about southern blacks and poor whites
should also have been reassuring to northern and southern elites.
Blacks were asking most politely for very little, and they were effu-
sively grateful when they got nothing but conscientious failure. Red-
necks’ ignorance and intransigence were the principal evils; their ac-
cepting the leadership of their betters, the principal hope. Where
Intruder threatened to take both northern and southern elites down,
654. For a survey of the generally favorable critical reaction to Mockingbird, see JOHNSON,
supra note 12, at 21-25.
655. But see id. at 15 (noting that the first wave of efforts to censor Mockingbird came from
“southern conservatives,” without identifying their social class).
656. See id. at 16-17 (arguing that the North’s stereotypes of southerners, drawn from such
sources as “the jaded degeneracy of William Faulkner’s characters in Absalom, Absalom!,”
were “moderated by the civilized, highly-educated, morally courageous Atticus Finch”).
657. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
658. See SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 25, at 95 (“I try . . . and almost always
fail, to persuade [law students] that Atticus Finch made moral mistakes. The students will not
stand for it. They confront the fact that Atticus is a man with a patriarchal ethic by saying that
ladies can be gentlemen too.”); see also RADWAY, supra note 13, at 346 (observing that Mock-
ingbird opens its patriarchy only to those women and blacks who successfully remake them-
selves in the image of white men like Atticus).
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and more than just a notch, Mockingbird justified ample self-
congratulation for everyone who was already at the top. Being on the
side of the angels is very much what Mockingbird is about, as even its
name implies. How long must anyone’s moral compass float on its
bearings before pointing fixedly away from killing mockingbirds?
Here is a strikingly straightforward, even Manichean, morality; here,
I think, lies much of the breadth of its appeal.659 The best of the good
guys, Atticus, is presented as virtually perfect; the worst of the bad
guys, Bob Ewell, scarcely needs a black hat. The book’s moral crisis
occurs at the level of the lowest common denominator: falsely ac-
cusing and violently slaying someone who is not only obviously inno-
cent, but also actively virtuous, purely because he is black. All the
right-thinking people in the book are appalled, and their counterparts
in the book’s readership are invited to join in their outrage and to
bask in their approbation.
To be sure, there is danger in Mockingbird, but it is danger of a
Gothic, almost fairytale genre.660 Troglodytes hurl crude epithets and
spit tobacco juice at the hero. They attempt clumsy assaults on the
hero’s friends and family, only to be thwarted by a guardian angel of
the most improbable sort. A mockingbird does, indeed, die, but eve-
rybody who is anybody learns a very important lesson: it is a sin to
kill them. The only real surprise is why: “[T]hey don’t do one thing
but sing their hearts out for us.”661
In an important sense, Mockingbird is not liberating, but en-
thralling, both to the outsiders within it and to its readers, looking
from the outside in. That is a severe charge, and one that I am happy
not to have to make on my own. Here I am following one of the
novel’s most enthusiastic champions, the author of its first book-
length analysis. Her conclusion, ironically consistent with my own,
warrants quoting at length:
659. On the breadth of that appeal, see generally JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 13-14 (citing
statistics indicating the popularity of To Kill A Mockingbird). Thomas Shaffer has observed
that “Atticus Finch . . . is better known to the average American twenty-year-old than King
David is.” SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 25, at 3. The reason is not hard to find:
“[T]he novel has appeared on secondary school reading lists as often as any book in English.”
JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 14. Indeed, in a 1991 survey under the auspices of the Book of the
Month Club and the Library of Congress’s Center for the Book, only the Bible edged out
Mockingbird as “most often cited as making a difference in people’s lives.” Id.
660. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 39-93 (analyzing the Gothic elements in
Mockingbird).
661. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 98.
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Not only are characters in the Gothic enthralled, but the reader of
the Gothic is as well. In the case of [Mockingbird], readers learn of
the enthrallments of Jem, Dill, and Scout. But the reader of their
story is also enthralled, not by the horror of racial mixing or the
Dracularian Boo, but by the reminders of a lost innocence, of a time
past, as unreal, in its way, as Transylvania. We, as readers, encounter
the ghosts of ourselves, the children we once were, the simplicity of
our lives in an earlier world. While the children’s voyeurism is
Gothic, our own as readers is romantic. In either case, the encounter
is with the unreal. The children’s encounter is in that underworld
beneath reality, and ours is in a transcendent world above reality,
which nostalgia and memory have altered. It is a world where chil-
dren play in tree houses and swings and sip lemonade on hot sum-
mer days, and in the evenings, sit in their fathers’ laps to read. Real-
ity and illusion about the past is blurred.662
Eagerness to escape the complexities of our present into such
fantasies about the past is very much with us, as lawyers and as citi-
zens. In the practice of law, as the American Bar Association’s own
encyclical on professionalism has observed, “[p]erhaps the golden age
of professionalism has always been a few years before the time that
the living can remember.”663 In the area of civil rights, with a demo-
cratic President having signed into law admittedly radical and puni-
tive welfare legislation, the rush to press the recent spate of church
burnings into the comfortable category of racist conspiracy reflects a
yearning for morally simpler times, the days when the bad guys wore
white hoods (and the good guys, dark suits).664
Intruder does not indulge this perennial nostalgic turn. Its past is
as complex and disturbing as any present, including our own. The
best of the conventionally good, Gavin, is persistently and annoyingly
misguided. The principal victim not only declines to take his preor-
dained fall, but also retains a prickly sense of superiority to his pri-
mary rescuer. No songs for “us” from him; unlike mockingbirds, real
and symbolic, Lucas calls his own tune. Whether good will triumph in
his story is very much an open question at the end; by then, it is clear
662. JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 112.
663. A.B.A. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 55 (1986).
664. See Michael Kelly, Playing with Fire, NEW YORKER, July 15, 1996, at 28 (“There is a
final, emotional reason that the idea of a national epidemic of racist whites burning black
churches has such resonance. It taps the culture’s profound longing for a return to a time of
moral clarity.”).
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that no sympathetic character’s original vision of the good is entirely
intact. Their best hope seems to lie not in converging on a common
answer, but in continuing a fragile conversation.665
But I must be careful here. I clearly think that Intruder is the
better book, at least in terms of its implicit moral message. And I
have given less than flattering reasons why its inferior companion has
a larger following, why, indeed, many of us have been in that follow-
ing. To put it succinctly—and bluntly—it tells us what we want to
hear about ourselves and our world. If I were to censure Mocking-
bird’s adherents for their alignment, however, I would myself very
much miss the central moral insight of Intruder.666
First, and most fundamentally, I might be wrong, and wrong in
ways that I have not even imagined. That, after all, is the lesson that
Gavin’s protégé learned, and taught him. For obvious reasons, that is
not a problem with which I can deal adequately here. I can only make
explicit an invitation that must be implicit in every academic paper:
let me know what you think, particularly where you think I am
wrong.
But even if I am right about the morally superior vision of In-
truder, moral censure of Mockingbird’s adherents does not follow.
Contrary to the moral psychology of Mockingbird, Intruder does not
depict moral life as primarily a matter of will, of whether one has or
lacks the courage to make the right choice. Logically anterior to that
is the capacity to see the choices available as choices at all.667 Re-
flecting the moral theology of Augustine and Calvin,668 both deeper
665. On the superiority of Intruder’s complexity, see Bassett, supra note 19, at 216 (“The
very shortcomings and confusions in the novel, however, may keep it alive longer than clearer,
more liberal Southern novels like Strange Fruit and To Kill a Mockingbird.”).
666. I would also perhaps follow in the dubious footsteps of those of Janice Radway’s pro-
fessors who pressed upon her the painful choice between their elite, formal literary tastes and
her parents’ “middlebrow,” morally impassioned readings. See RADWAY, supra note 13, at 119-
22, 311-13.
667. This is not to ignore the critical insight of virtue theory, that moral life is not isolated
choices. It is rather to affirm what I and others have said elsewhere: the ultimate unit of moral
analysis under virtue theory, a life, consists of the choices that determine, by their cumulative
weight, character. See Atkinson, Butler, supra note 25, at 217-18.
668. For the classic treatments, see SAINT AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL
(Anna S. Benjamin & L.H. Hackstaff trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1964) (ca. 395); JOHN CALVIN,
INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 255-70 (John T. McNeill ed. & Ford Lewis Battles
trans., The Westminster Press 1960) (1559); see also MARTIN LUTHER, THE BONDAGE OF THE
WILL (James I. Packer & O.R. Johnston trans., Fleming H. Revell 1957) (1525) (affirming and
extending Augustinian doctrine and anticipating Calvin’s position).
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and darker than Atticus’s Methodism,669 Intruder suggests that the
will itself is not essentially free; something outside the will must de-
liver it from bondage. As Chick’s involuntary baptism implies, we
have to be born again before we can see, much less seek, the light.
We cannot, on our own, seek the truth; the truth must first make us
free. In Intruder, as in the Augustinian tradition, salvation is the gift
of grace, not the purchase of good works.
Under the implicit moral psychology of Intruder, it should come
as no shock, and certainly as no great shame, that lawyers, particu-
larly practicing lawyers, have chosen the morally simple world of
Mockingbird over the more complex alternative Faulkner offered. In
a word—Miss Habersham and Ephraim’s word—they (and here it is
fairer to say “we”)—may have been too deeply immersed in “busy-
ness.” It was the busyness of a world in which lawyers were assumed
to have the answers to the fundamental problems of social justice,
and a world in which, for much of the careers of many of us, lawyers
were assumed to be white and male.670
But this analysis may assume too much. For all its plausibility,
there may be a more elegant, and more accurate, explanation for
Mockingbird’s greater appeal: in a word, default. Many lawyers who
have read Mockingbird, or at least seen the movie version, have sim-
ply never heard of Intruder. Many who have, have not read it; until
five years ago, long after I had become an academic, neither had I.
There is an important lesson here for lawyers, not least for lawyers
who are also legal educators.
B. Looking Forward
Judge Harry Edwards has lamented that legal scholarship has
become too esoteric and in-grown—at times, indeed, too self-
indulgent—to be useful to practicing lawyers and sitting judges.671
669. John Wesley, Methodism’s founder, expressly repudiated the Calvinist doctrine of the
will. See JUSTO L. GONZÁLEZ, 3 A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT 283-84 (1975).
670. See RADWAY, supra note 13, at 351:
Perhaps it was the very intensity of the particular desires these [Book-of-the-Month
Club] books cultivated that prevented so many of us from seeing that the value of the
knowledge and expertise they celebrated was dependent in the end on a prior act of
exclusion whereby the alternative knowledges possessed by others were construed as
ignorance or naivete or, even worse, as lack of ambition in the first place.
671. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Le-
gal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 35 (1992) (“[I]t is my impression that judges, administra-
tors, legislators, and practitioners have little use for much of the scholarship that is now pro-
duced by members of the academy.”).
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What they need, according to Judge Edwards, is help with traditional,
doctrinal analysis, the kind of help once offered by the classic trea-
tises, Wigmore and Williston, Corbin and Moore.672 Of course, there
is an element of truth to Judge Edwards’s critique, as even its original
targets concede.673 But his critique is, I am afraid, itself symptomatic
of a deeper problem, a problem to which a close reading of the novels
before us should have alerted us.
If Miss Habersham is right, one of the central problems of our
legal culture, and by extension our larger culture, is that lawyers are
too much with the world, too oriented toward business. I hasten to
add that this is not merely “commercialism,” the getting and spend-
ing bemoaned in today’s professionalism movement; Intruder’s cri-
tique of business cuts much deeper. It points, as we have seen, to the
ordinary press of day-to-day demands to get one’s job done, to pass
cases and clients, even novel cases and unique clients, down familiar
channels. This was, of course, the very pressure that led even the usu-
ally perceptive and reflective Gavin to misunderstand Lucas’s case
and, even more basically, Lucas’s character. And this is, I am con-
vinced, the press behind judges’ and practitioners’ calls for academic
lawyers to do more doctrinal analysis and to teach more practical
skills674—to help them and the next generation of lawyers get down to
business.
As a second-year law student, following the custom at my alma
mater, I spent a day interviewing with Wall Street law firms. Near the
close of what had seemed a pleasant half-hour with a mid-level litiga-
tion partner in the Cravath firm, I ventured to ask him what he did
when he was not working. That was clearly the wrong question. He
snapped, “What do you want to do, write novels?” I had not yet
heard of Auchincloss, and in any event I was flustered by the change
in tone. All I had the presence of mind to say was, “No, sir, but I
would like to read them.”
Before long I came to share his frustration. As a junior associate
at a large K Street firm, I watched my salary rise in the wake of Cra-
vath’s landmark decision to inject an unprecedented level of price-
672. See id. at 43 (“The paradigm of ‘practical’ legal scholarship is the treatise.”).
673. See George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial
Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1929,
1930 (1993) (“I can appreciate the source of Judge Edwards’ dismay.”).
674. See TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP,
ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, STATEMENT OF
FUNDAMENTAL LAWYERING SKILLS AND PROFESSIONAL VALUES (1992).
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competition into the recruitment of law firm associates.675 Predictably,
my annual billings also rose, and I learned a localized lesson in legal
realism: the “official” eighteen-hundred-hour year that brought
smiles in 1985 could raise eyebrows in 1986 without ever ceasing to
be “official.” Not finding myself with much time to read novels, I ap-
proached a member of the firm’s unofficial steering committee676 with
a proposal. During the next recruiting season, why not market our
firm to the usual target audience—students at elite schools—as a
more humane place, where one could do exciting legal work, but with
more time for other things (and, offsettingly, for less pay)?
I tell these stories with some trepidation. I know that traditional
scholars, both the doctrinal and the theoretical, frown on personal
narratives as scholarship,677 and I doubt that narrativist scholarship,
traditionally the province of the “outsider,” will welcome a white boy
straight from South Carolina into its midst. But traditional, doctrinal
analysis had no answer to my proposal, and no helpful way of assess-
ing it. From that perspective, the problem we at my firm faced was
invisible; indeed, it was not even a legal problem at all.
Non-doctrinal, interdisciplinary scholarship was to offer real in-
sight. My proposal was, in essence, a practical groping toward under-
standings of law firm structure that the law and economics movement
was just beginning to provide; I had stumbled onto an aspect of
sharing among the human capitalists.678 These scholars had not yet
explained why a related set of solutions—part-time work and other
675. See Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Paley, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-
Partner Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747, 753 (1990) (“As
firms have grown and required larger numbers of qualified associates, recruitment activity has
intensified, and starting salaries have increased dramatically.”).
676. As I recall, that person was Douglas Rosenthal, a former pupil of Isaiah Berlin who
had written a pioneering empirical study of the legal profession. See DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL,
LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? (1977).
677. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 809 (1993) (“In general, we conclude that legal story-
telling can contribute to legal scholarship. We also believe, however, that storytellers need to
take greater steps to ensure that their stories are accurate and typical, to articulate the legal
relevance of the stories, and to include an analytic dimension in their work.”). See generally
Arthur Austin, Evaluating Storytelling as a Type of Nontraditional Scholarship, 74 NEB. L.
REV. 479, 507-22 (1995) (discussing methods of evaluating legal storytelling).
678. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 313, 320 (1985) (describing how law firms provide the opportunity for individual lawyers
to diversify the risks inherent in human capital).
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alternative associate career paths—had failed to emerge at that stage
of corporate law firm evolution.679
In its own terms, my proposal tried to incorporate fairly intuitive
economics, lessons widely taught in law schools by the early 1980s. I
proposed to ask very bright people to make a trade, at the margin, of
foregone salary for increased leisure time. Already, however, my
senior colleague anticipated a problem at the very edge of wealth-
maximization theory. Elite law school graduates were demanding
prestige as well as money, and they were using the amount of money
firms offered as a proxy for the prestige that working for them con-
ferred. These graduates would, accordingly, have to buy their leisure
from our firm doubly dear, and the firm’s reputational currency
would depreciate even as they accepted it. On those terms, my con-
sultant suspected, probably too few of them would accept our offer to
meet our recruiting needs.
I thought at the time that my consultant was right, and right for
an additional reason that has worried me ever since, the inklings of a
peculiar market failure. I realized, in not too distant retrospect, that I
as a law student had had no clear sense of what it would be like to
work literally all the time, all the time. Not all the time for four years
of college as a prelude to three years of law school, then a year or two
in the highly recommended clerkship, but the traditional seven-year
(and lengthening) associate’s apprenticeship on top of that, with the
rigors of junior partnership yet to come, on into the indefinite but
definitely finite future. My more-life-for-less-money proposal would
fail, if only because people in the position I had recently been in my-
self would not realize the value of their lives until after they had sold
them. At the risk of making too explicit the obvious, if we had read
The Remains of the Day or The Death of Ivan Ilich—even John Jay
Osborn’s The Associates—we might have sold or held ourselves more
dear.
Now of course it is not fashionable to lament the lost youths of
yuppies. From the Left, we can expect to be told to look to the less
well-off; from the Right, we have already been told that the market
takes its toll. In any case, the days when partners and associates could
presume to set their hours, if not their salaries, without looking to
679. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Coming of Age in the Corporate Law Firm:
The Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567, 568 (1989) (“The first
[question] is why the up-or-out system was dominant for so long when, on initial analysis, it ap-
pears to work to the advantage of neither the firm nor the employee la wyer.”).
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their clients and their competition are long gone. In his own response
to Judge Edwards, Judge Richard Posner seems to welcome the
much-bemoaned loss of lawyers’ leisure time. He sees it as salutary,
as economically healthy, and he dismisses as self-indulgent whiners
those nostalgic for the lost days of lawyerly inefficiency and over-
charging: “Competitive markets are not much fun for sellers; the ef-
fect of competition is to transform producer surplus into consumer
surplus.”680
But there is, as Judge Posner should have seen, a public goods
element that his analysis omits from the time-for-money equation. To
see this, we must first note that Posner himself has found merit in the
law and literature movement. At the very least, he hopes that it will
“reawaken[] a delight in literature in some lawyers”;681 beyond that
increase in personal pleasure, he holds out very ambitious prospects
of professional benefits. He believes great literature can teach law-
yers and judges three important “craft values”: impartiality, scrupu-
lousness, and concreteness.682
Posner suggests that judges and lawyers who learn these craft
values will be able to write more persuasively.683 Assuming this to be
true, however, only raises the ancient issue that divided the sophists
and Socrates: is it enough to teach persuasion alone, winning others
over to what is good for you and your cause, or is it also necessary to
teach to persuade what is just, what is good for the whole commu-
nity? Socrates famously embraced the latter view, and Posner seems
to stand firmly in his camp.684
This classic moral problem can be usefully analyzed in economic
terms. Learning how to persuade the sophistical way—getting one’s
client’s will done, with indifference to social justice—is essentially a
private good. Most of the benefits of such goods—in this case,
skills—accrue to the individual who invests labor and other resources
680. Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91
MICH. L. REV. 1921, 1922 (1993). Perhaps as a model of scholarly economy, Posner makes the
same point, in almost the same words, in a 1995 book. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING
LAW 92 (1995). It may be telling, however, that what was “not much fun” in 1993 had become
“no fun at all” by 1995.
681. POSNER, supra note 526, at 364 (1988).
682. See POSNER, supra note 526, at 282 (2d ed. 1998).
683. See id. at 283.
684.  As to lawyers, Posner’s alliance with Socrates is less clear. But see id. (suggesting that
lawyers in preparing their cases ask, “How can I limit my submission so that its acceptance
would not require an unsettling change in doctrine or have untoward practical conse-
quences?”).
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in their acquisition.685 The lawyer thus skilled predictably will com-
mand premium fees from eager clients. By contrast, the skills of per-
suading the Socratic way—producing justice and benefitting society
as a whole—have important elements of what economists call public
goods.686 The benefits of these skills accrue not just to the lawyer or
judge who troubles to acquire them, but also to the legal system in
which such professionals practice law as a publicly consumed com-
modity.
This is particularly true of what Posner calls the skill of imparti-
ality. He argues at considerable length that we can acquire impartial-
ity by empathizing, in the reading of great literature, with a wide
range of characters different from ourselves and our usual heroes.687
That, of course, is very much what I suggest about the affiliation we
come to feel with Lucas through Chick in Intruder. It is close to the
position that Atticus recommends to Scout, as well as that which
Harper Lee never quite achieves for us with respect to Robert E. Lee
Ewell: “[C]limb into his skin and walk around in it.”688 Posner quite
rightly insists that a critical distinction between great and lesser lit-
erature is that the former presents even its villains as fully rounded
characters, never as mere caricatures.689 For Posner as for me, empa-
thizing with the perspectives of others through classic literature helps
free lawyers and judges from the prejudices that distort their profes-
sional lives and, inseparably, the quality of justice they dispense and
law they practice. For Posner, however, this poses a garden-variety
economic problem: lawyers whose only incentive—or only economi-
cally viable choice—is to maximize billable hours will predictably un-
dersupply such goods, to the detriment of wealth maximization in the
aggregate.690
Stated somewhat differently, if we are serious about the valuable
lessons that literature holds for law, then we need to ensure that law-
yers can meet the critical precondition. They cannot learn from lit-
685. See MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 66
(1996) (contrasting public and private goods).
686. See id. (defining and illustrating the concept of public good).
687. See POSNER, supra note 526, at 327 (2d ed. 1998) (“Imaginative literature can . . . en-
gender in its readers emotional responses to experiences they have not had.”).
688. See LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 36.
689. See POSNER, supra note 526, at 282-83 (2d ed. 1998) (“Forgoing the facile triumph, the
author makes the reader see the situation from the villain’s point of view too.”).
690. See SEIDENFELD, supra note 685, at 66 (describing the likely undersupply of public
goods due to the incentive to “free ride”).
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erature the lessons Posner himself hopes they will find there if, under
the market conditions Posner applauds, they have no time to read.
And they cannot use literature more ambitiously, as West, Weisberg,
and others would have it, as a basis for questioning contemporary
values, including Posner’s commodification of life itself, if their lit-
erature is purely popular.
De Tocqueville early in the last century,691 and Brandeis in the
present century,692 suggested that lawyers, given their immersion in
worldly affairs and their intermediate status between the best- and
the worst-off, are ideally suited to be statesmen. Lately, of course, the
lawyer-statesman ideal has been in decline, if not already forgotten.693
Miss Habersham should be credited with implicitly criticizing the
original idea and predicting its demise. The pragmatism that practice
requires of lawyers may benight rather than enlighten, narrow rather
broaden their social and political horizons.
But there is this much to be said in defense of the older model
(which is also an implicit indictment of the present state of affairs): in
those days, particularly the earlier days of the republic to which even
Brandeis already looked wistfully back, we had reason to believe that
lawyers were not just public citizens, but public citizens who took
time to read the classics. Washington would have modeled himself on
Cincinnatus in vain, if the other public citizens of his day, including
lawyers like Jefferson and Madison, had not known who Cincinnatus
was.694 Judges like Posner and Edwards—jurists above the mill run,
actively concerned with the commonwealth—require lawyers like
Gavin, “who could discuss Einstein with college professors.”695 Stu-
dents like Chick, whom Gavin guided to Harvard Law School,696 de-
serve him as well—chastened, of course, by his brush with Lucas and
Miss Habersham.
691. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Francis Bowen rev., Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1946) (1835) (“[M]ost public men
are or have been legal practitioners . . . .”).
692. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION
313, 314 (1914) (“[I]n America the lawyer was in the earlier period almost omnipresent in the
State. . . . [N]early every statesman, great or small, was a lawyer.”).
693. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993) (chronicling the institutional and intellectual forces causing the decline of
the lawyer-statesman ideal and attempting to resuscitate the ideal for contemporary lawyers).
694. Cf. FAULKNER, REQUIEM, supra note 120, at 43 (describing Gavin as “a sort of bucolic
Cincinnatus”).
695. WILLIAM FAULKNER, Smoke, in KNIGHT’S GAMBIT, supra note 295, at 3, 16.
696. See FAULKNER, The Mansion, supra note 19, at 864.
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And Lucas, for all his independence, also needs such lawyers, if
only as Aesop’s lion needed his mouse. The lives of privileged insid-
ers are linked to those of excluded others through other nexuses than
trickle-down economics. The sooner we lawyers learn the lesson of
Lucas, the better we can serve him—which is not, of course, the same
as saving him. The lives we save—if I may be forgiven a final allusion
to a southern author—may ultimately be our own.697 If this is, by con-
temporary standards, an insufficiently altruistic note on which to con-
clude, let me in lieu of apology point to an older, more humane—if
more conservative—attitude that laments the waste of any life, even
so pampered and privileged a life as Ivan Ilych’s, or ours.
CONCLUSION
Before he became a law professor, Charles Black, the constitu-
tional law scholar, had been actively involved in the civil rights
movement. According to the lore of the Yale Law School, he was
once asked how he, a southern boy, had become engaged in that
movement. I have always assumed that Black’s questioner expected a
tale of downtrodden but diligent sharecroppers and domestic ser-
vants who kept their dignity despite their humiliating labor. But Pro-
fessor Black told a different story. He recounted how, as a freshman
at the University of Texas, he had gone to a concert, where he heard
Louis Armstrong play the trumpet. There, he said, he encountered,
for the first time in the flesh, genuine genius. That encounter—that
epiphany—changed his life, and, through his life, many another.698
We have listened long enough to the mockingbird, with its reas-
suring harmony and its nostalgic notes.699 In the final analysis, Miss
Maudie, Atticus’s ever-faithful interpreter, was right from the begin-
ning: “Mockingbirds don’t do one thing but make music for us to en-
joy.”700 It is time we were more attentive to intruders—in life, in law,
even in legal education. As Gavin conceded, belatedly but unbe-
697. FLANNERY O’CONNOR, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in FLANNERY
O’CONNOR: THE COMPLETE STORIES 145 (Robert Giroux ed., 1971).
698. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 66-73 (1986) (recounting
the story of how hearing Louis Armstrong prompted his involvement in the civil rights move-
ment).
699. See JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 37 (“The two most obvious mockingbirds, Tom Robin-
son and Boo Radley, are not literally singers, but they convey song stories through the lives
that they live: Tom the black man and Boo the recluse singing through their lives of mystery
and gentleness.”).
700. LEE, MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 1, at 98.
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grudgingly, their riffs and interruptions, though importunate and in-
opportune, may show us the truth about ourselves and about others.
And here even Christ and anti-Christ converge: only the truth, harsh
and humbling though it is, can make us free. What can freedom be in
our time, but the will to improvise our common future from the val-
ues we choose together out of our diverse pasts?
